One of the points, # 6, in my Ten-plus-One Deadly Sins of Empiricism, I describe how a purely empirical method inescapably commits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. It reads,
The argument for empirical verificationism breaks a formal law of logic, and is therefore always fallacious. It goes like this: If hypothesis P, then effect Q will result; Q was the result, therefore P is verified and may be considered ‘theory’ or ‘law.’ As you well know, this is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. And because every line of verification must proceed thus, no method of verification is logically demonstrable.
In stating this inherent flaw in empiricism, I’ve been misunderstood (or accused by antitheists in debates) as being anti-science. I’m not anti-science; science is a very useful, God ordained means for carrying out the dominion mandate (Gen 1:26—28; 2:7—15), thus for reinterpreting and recreating our environment to the glory of God. For God’s glory and mankind’s good, science is a necessary and righteous endeavor.
However, when man seeks to take up science as a weapon against his Creator, and exalt autonomous human reason and logic to a deified position, so assuming that such may be employed to determine the scope of the possible and impossible and judge God and his Word, then a humbling will follow.
For if the material world is “all that was, is, or ever will be,” as the antitheists contend, then empiricism is the only reasonable epistemological method. And if empiricism is the only epistemological method, then that is the only method for a critical examination of the Christian worldview. But, since empiricism is always formally fallacious, all antitheist objections to the Christian worldview rest upon a fallacious line of reasoning. Therefore, antitheist’s objections to Christianity are irrational.
Funny. That’s exactly what the Bible says.
Friday, January 29, 2010
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Right Reasoning, pt. I: Modus Ponens
I’m now taking the time to offer that list of valid forms of arguments promised weeks ago. I’ll offer them one post at a time, due to the space it takes to illustrate and explain them.
As Christians, we are morally obligated to reason correctly. Reliable patterns of reason are reflections of the way God thinks, thus we are to reflect that reality in all our reasoning. The Christian theory of ethics is inextricably tethered to the Christian theory of knowledge (epistemology), which, likewise, is bound-up in the Christian theory of being (metaphysics). If Christ is Lord, he has authority over not only our actions, but our thinking as well, by virtue of Who and What he is. This especially since, our thinking is the loamy soil from which our actions spring, hence revealing what we truly believe.
Valid argument, moreover, is necessary for persuasive, winsome apologetics and evangelism. If a soft-minded unbeliever is persuaded by means of the many invalid arguments Christians often use, while the end may be worth celebration, the means are perfectly unacceptable.
The following will not be an exhaustive list, to be sure; but it is a foundation. Most arguments we (should) use or encounter will roughly follow one form or another.
Not only does knowing and utilizing valid patterns of reasoning help us to frame the message and defense of the gospel in a cogent, truthful way. It also helps us to recognize the fallacious reasoning that inevitably follows in the arguments of the non-Christians working on their own unbelieving presuppositions.
I. Modus Ponens (Latin, lit. “The mode of putting”):
A. Formally stated:
1. If P is the case, then Q is also the case;
2. P is the case;
3. Therefore, Q is also the case.
B. 1 Illustrated from Naturalistic presuppositions:
i. If (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry, then (Q) true beliefs are illusory, since beliefs are only the consequences of these bits of matter reacting with other bits of matter in ways predetermined by antecedent material causes.
ii. It is, according to Naturalism, the case that (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry.
iii. Therefore, (Q) true beliefs are illusory, not least a belief in Naturalism.
B. 2. Illustrated from Scripture:
(I.e., Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s messengers, logically confirming that Jesus was the Coming One, the Messiah. See Matt 11:1—5 // Lk 7:18—22)
i. If I [Jesus] am (P) giving sight to the blind, granting the lame to walk, cleansing lepers, making the deaf to hear, raising the dead, and preaching the good news of the gospel of the Kingdom to the poor, then (Q) I am the One who was to come, the Messiah, since the Old Covenant promised that these works would accompany the Messiah’s ministry.
ii. Tell John what you see and hear, namely that (P) the blind receive their sight, et cetera...
iii. Therefore, John has his assurance; (Q) I am the Messiah, promised in the Old Covenant, whom also his ministry proclaimed.
B. 3 Illustrated from the crux pro-life argument:
i. If (P) the pre-born are innocent human beings, then (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.
ii. (P) The pre-born are innocent human beings (biblically, biologically and embryologically speaking).
iii. Therefore, (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.
C. The fallacy factor:
With respect to modus ponens and modus tollens (see below in next post) there is always the risk of committing a formal fallacy. In the case of modus ponens, we risk the common error of ‘affirming the consequent.’ This needs some explanation.
In logic, the “If...then” construction is known as a conditional statement. Conditionals are then broken into two parts: The antecedent is the “If...” clause, whereas the consequent is the “then...” clause.
In a valid expression of modus ponens, the antecedent is affirmed or asserted in the second premise. However, if the consequent is affirmed, the argument is made invalid and the conclusion doesn’t follow. To use a classic example:
1. If (P) the roads are icy, then (Q) the mail will be late.
2. (Q) The mail is late.
3. Therefore, (P) the roads are icy.
Of course, it is possible that the conclusion is true; the roads may be icy, thus causing the mail to be late. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not the result of a valid, reliable line of reasoning; it’s mere coincidence.
Only months ago, I had a former co-worker argue for the truth of astrology this way.
“Yesterday, my horoscope said (P) that I’d meet an old lover and rekindle the spark. Then, lo and behold, (Q) I ran into ol’ Billy Bob at the bar, and we had a real good time, if you get my drift! How can you doubt the truth of this, then, Kevin? If (P), then (Q); it was the case that (Q), therefore (P) is true!”
I attempted to explain to Debbie that her reasoning didn’t follow; her argument was a non sequitur. She responded. “I don’t know about all your P’s and Q’s, I just know that Billy Bob and I had a real good time!”
D. Valid, yet unsound:
It is quite possible to also use a modus ponens to create a valid argument that is still false. An argument’s validity, as we have labored to show, has to do with following rules and patterns of reliable inference, logical laws. Still, one may produce a false conclusion by means of a valid form of argument. Consider how a nosey neighbor could reason validly, yet end with a false conclusion.
1. If (P) John is late coming home from work, then (Q) John is committing adultery against his wife, Sara.
2. (P) John is late coming home from work!
3. Oh my! (Q) John is having an affair! Quick, call Joan!
The argument follows the valid form of a modus ponens, yet the conclusion is false. The nosey neighbor’s first premise is faulty, the counterfactual being, John had a blow-out on his way home from work. And because a premise on which the conclusion rests is flawed, the conclusion is also flawed; the argument is unsound.
Therefore, we must watch for both a valid form of modus ponens, avoiding the fallacy of affirming the consequent and drawing conclusions from faulty premises, thus avoiding unsoundness. These things we must watch first in our own reasoning and then in the reasoning of others (Matt 7:1—5). For: If we can’t recognize proper patterns of argument in our own reasoning, then neither will we be able to critique that of others...well you should know how the rest goes by now.
As Christians, we are morally obligated to reason correctly. Reliable patterns of reason are reflections of the way God thinks, thus we are to reflect that reality in all our reasoning. The Christian theory of ethics is inextricably tethered to the Christian theory of knowledge (epistemology), which, likewise, is bound-up in the Christian theory of being (metaphysics). If Christ is Lord, he has authority over not only our actions, but our thinking as well, by virtue of Who and What he is. This especially since, our thinking is the loamy soil from which our actions spring, hence revealing what we truly believe.
Valid argument, moreover, is necessary for persuasive, winsome apologetics and evangelism. If a soft-minded unbeliever is persuaded by means of the many invalid arguments Christians often use, while the end may be worth celebration, the means are perfectly unacceptable.
The following will not be an exhaustive list, to be sure; but it is a foundation. Most arguments we (should) use or encounter will roughly follow one form or another.
Not only does knowing and utilizing valid patterns of reasoning help us to frame the message and defense of the gospel in a cogent, truthful way. It also helps us to recognize the fallacious reasoning that inevitably follows in the arguments of the non-Christians working on their own unbelieving presuppositions.
I. Modus Ponens (Latin, lit. “The mode of putting”):
A. Formally stated:
1. If P is the case, then Q is also the case;
2. P is the case;
3. Therefore, Q is also the case.
B. 1 Illustrated from Naturalistic presuppositions:
i. If (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry, then (Q) true beliefs are illusory, since beliefs are only the consequences of these bits of matter reacting with other bits of matter in ways predetermined by antecedent material causes.
ii. It is, according to Naturalism, the case that (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry.
iii. Therefore, (Q) true beliefs are illusory, not least a belief in Naturalism.
B. 2. Illustrated from Scripture:
(I.e., Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s messengers, logically confirming that Jesus was the Coming One, the Messiah. See Matt 11:1—5 // Lk 7:18—22)
i. If I [Jesus] am (P) giving sight to the blind, granting the lame to walk, cleansing lepers, making the deaf to hear, raising the dead, and preaching the good news of the gospel of the Kingdom to the poor, then (Q) I am the One who was to come, the Messiah, since the Old Covenant promised that these works would accompany the Messiah’s ministry.
ii. Tell John what you see and hear, namely that (P) the blind receive their sight, et cetera...
iii. Therefore, John has his assurance; (Q) I am the Messiah, promised in the Old Covenant, whom also his ministry proclaimed.
B. 3 Illustrated from the crux pro-life argument:
i. If (P) the pre-born are innocent human beings, then (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.
ii. (P) The pre-born are innocent human beings (biblically, biologically and embryologically speaking).
iii. Therefore, (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.
C. The fallacy factor:
With respect to modus ponens and modus tollens (see below in next post) there is always the risk of committing a formal fallacy. In the case of modus ponens, we risk the common error of ‘affirming the consequent.’ This needs some explanation.
In logic, the “If...then” construction is known as a conditional statement. Conditionals are then broken into two parts: The antecedent is the “If...” clause, whereas the consequent is the “then...” clause.
In a valid expression of modus ponens, the antecedent is affirmed or asserted in the second premise. However, if the consequent is affirmed, the argument is made invalid and the conclusion doesn’t follow. To use a classic example:
1. If (P) the roads are icy, then (Q) the mail will be late.
2. (Q) The mail is late.
3. Therefore, (P) the roads are icy.
Of course, it is possible that the conclusion is true; the roads may be icy, thus causing the mail to be late. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not the result of a valid, reliable line of reasoning; it’s mere coincidence.
Only months ago, I had a former co-worker argue for the truth of astrology this way.
“Yesterday, my horoscope said (P) that I’d meet an old lover and rekindle the spark. Then, lo and behold, (Q) I ran into ol’ Billy Bob at the bar, and we had a real good time, if you get my drift! How can you doubt the truth of this, then, Kevin? If (P), then (Q); it was the case that (Q), therefore (P) is true!”
I attempted to explain to Debbie that her reasoning didn’t follow; her argument was a non sequitur. She responded. “I don’t know about all your P’s and Q’s, I just know that Billy Bob and I had a real good time!”
D. Valid, yet unsound:
It is quite possible to also use a modus ponens to create a valid argument that is still false. An argument’s validity, as we have labored to show, has to do with following rules and patterns of reliable inference, logical laws. Still, one may produce a false conclusion by means of a valid form of argument. Consider how a nosey neighbor could reason validly, yet end with a false conclusion.
1. If (P) John is late coming home from work, then (Q) John is committing adultery against his wife, Sara.
2. (P) John is late coming home from work!
3. Oh my! (Q) John is having an affair! Quick, call Joan!
The argument follows the valid form of a modus ponens, yet the conclusion is false. The nosey neighbor’s first premise is faulty, the counterfactual being, John had a blow-out on his way home from work. And because a premise on which the conclusion rests is flawed, the conclusion is also flawed; the argument is unsound.
Therefore, we must watch for both a valid form of modus ponens, avoiding the fallacy of affirming the consequent and drawing conclusions from faulty premises, thus avoiding unsoundness. These things we must watch first in our own reasoning and then in the reasoning of others (Matt 7:1—5). For: If we can’t recognize proper patterns of argument in our own reasoning, then neither will we be able to critique that of others...well you should know how the rest goes by now.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Apologetic Application of Two Classics
Over the last couple of days I’ve posted two of my favorite’s from classic literature: The Emperor’s New Clothes by the Dane, Hans Christian Anderson (A.D. 1805—1875) and “The Eagle and the Arrow”, attributed to the Samian slave “Aesop” (c. mid-6th century B.C.). I do this because they are relevant to our recent discussion of apologetics.
Both the fable and the allegory are pregnant with applications for our apologetic practice; here I’ll mention only the obvious.
I. Concerning The Emperor’s New Clothes:
1. Over the last two centuries, our culture has been visited by two rogue Weavers: Metaphysical Naturalism in the fields of science and philosophy, and her ugly twin sister, Secular Humanism in the areas of education and polity.
2. Western society (sadly much of the visible Church also) has been duped by these two swindlers. Both have claimed that those who won’t see the truth of their systems are either “unfit for the office they hold," or are "incorrigibly stupid.”
3. The Intelligentsia of the Academy (e.g., secular universities) have spun a weave around every discipline of the field of education. If one wants to retain their tenure, they must pretend to see the truth and value of evolutionary antitheism in every domain. Any idea that Darwinism may not be absolute, apodicticly certain fact will render one’s aptitude to teach as “unfit,” thus loosing their position. Moreover, any student that will not bow to the dogamtics of Darwinism is academically flayed as being “incorrigibly stupid.”
4. Secular Humanism is, say the Weavers, the only “neutral ground” between religious factions, each of whom would have their own brand of morality running the socio-political show. But, the delusion follows. Secular Humanism is a world and life view in its own right. It is an overarching theory of everything that enjoys governmental protection and immediate legislative power, which is then imposed upon the whole of society. It is not “morally/religiously neutral” but a moral and religious dogma. (For a succinct examination and critique of Secular Humanism, see Steve Galt’s series of posts, beginning here.)
5. It is the solemn duty of every Christian (2 Cor 10:3—5) to destroy these two strongholds that bulwark our depraved society against the gospel of Christ. When everyone you meet is saying, “How incomparable are the Emperor’s new clothes! What a train he has to his mantle! How it fits him!” As J.C. Ryle has said, “We [Christians] have the truth and we needn’t be ashamed to say it!” We should, then, be like the innocent little lad in Anderson’s story, being the one’s who have the honesty to say, “But these worldviews have nothing on!” (Rom 3:4).
II. Concerning The Eagle and the Arrow:
1. Since only the Christian worldview can provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility (e.g., the laws of logic, human dignity and freedom, causality, normative ethics, et cetera), it’s perfectly unacceptable to allow the non-Christian opponent to assume these while waging an attack on the faith. We should be faithful Christian skeptics.
2. Most approaches to apologetics will grant that, e.g., logical laws and reliable patterns of reason (which make sense in terms of the Christian worldview alone) can provide an agreed, authoritative, neutral point of contact, by which the two contrary positions may be evaluated.
3. But to grant the non-Christian opponent say, logic, is the fletch the very arrow with which he intends to shoot down our holy faith. Moreover, this subjects Christ's Self-attesting authority to another authority, which is nonsensical.
4. Non-Christian systems simply cannot provide the necessary grounding to make sense of the laws of logic, and therefore, must assume the truth of the Christian worldview in order to argue for its falsehood.
5. If we wish to see the Lordship of Christ fly over all, to the ends of the earth, it must begin with us and our approach to contrary systems and philosophies. We cannot give to Christ’s opponents the very weapons (e.g., logic, science, morality) with which to wages their attack.
Any further thoughts?
Both the fable and the allegory are pregnant with applications for our apologetic practice; here I’ll mention only the obvious.
I. Concerning The Emperor’s New Clothes:
1. Over the last two centuries, our culture has been visited by two rogue Weavers: Metaphysical Naturalism in the fields of science and philosophy, and her ugly twin sister, Secular Humanism in the areas of education and polity.
2. Western society (sadly much of the visible Church also) has been duped by these two swindlers. Both have claimed that those who won’t see the truth of their systems are either “unfit for the office they hold," or are "incorrigibly stupid.”
3. The Intelligentsia of the Academy (e.g., secular universities) have spun a weave around every discipline of the field of education. If one wants to retain their tenure, they must pretend to see the truth and value of evolutionary antitheism in every domain. Any idea that Darwinism may not be absolute, apodicticly certain fact will render one’s aptitude to teach as “unfit,” thus loosing their position. Moreover, any student that will not bow to the dogamtics of Darwinism is academically flayed as being “incorrigibly stupid.”
4. Secular Humanism is, say the Weavers, the only “neutral ground” between religious factions, each of whom would have their own brand of morality running the socio-political show. But, the delusion follows. Secular Humanism is a world and life view in its own right. It is an overarching theory of everything that enjoys governmental protection and immediate legislative power, which is then imposed upon the whole of society. It is not “morally/religiously neutral” but a moral and religious dogma. (For a succinct examination and critique of Secular Humanism, see Steve Galt’s series of posts, beginning here.)
5. It is the solemn duty of every Christian (2 Cor 10:3—5) to destroy these two strongholds that bulwark our depraved society against the gospel of Christ. When everyone you meet is saying, “How incomparable are the Emperor’s new clothes! What a train he has to his mantle! How it fits him!” As J.C. Ryle has said, “We [Christians] have the truth and we needn’t be ashamed to say it!” We should, then, be like the innocent little lad in Anderson’s story, being the one’s who have the honesty to say, “But these worldviews have nothing on!” (Rom 3:4).
II. Concerning The Eagle and the Arrow:
1. Since only the Christian worldview can provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility (e.g., the laws of logic, human dignity and freedom, causality, normative ethics, et cetera), it’s perfectly unacceptable to allow the non-Christian opponent to assume these while waging an attack on the faith. We should be faithful Christian skeptics.
2. Most approaches to apologetics will grant that, e.g., logical laws and reliable patterns of reason (which make sense in terms of the Christian worldview alone) can provide an agreed, authoritative, neutral point of contact, by which the two contrary positions may be evaluated.
3. But to grant the non-Christian opponent say, logic, is the fletch the very arrow with which he intends to shoot down our holy faith. Moreover, this subjects Christ's Self-attesting authority to another authority, which is nonsensical.
4. Non-Christian systems simply cannot provide the necessary grounding to make sense of the laws of logic, and therefore, must assume the truth of the Christian worldview in order to argue for its falsehood.
5. If we wish to see the Lordship of Christ fly over all, to the ends of the earth, it must begin with us and our approach to contrary systems and philosophies. We cannot give to Christ’s opponents the very weapons (e.g., logic, science, morality) with which to wages their attack.
Any further thoughts?
Reading to the Glory of God
I was talking with my dearest friend, brother and co-laborer in Christ, Steve (see his blog, “All Things New,” in my blogroll), yesterday, and he shared a new endeavor that is worth repeating and emulating.
Steve joined a book club at his local public library. Perhaps you’re thinking that “Being Nerdy to the Glory of God” would have been a more appropriate title for this entry. No. The book club membership is not an end, but a means that Steve has chosen to shine the light and glory of Christ in his neighborhood.
Typically, the club selects a particular title; they spend an allotment of time reading, and then converge again to discuss the work in a reasonably sized group. I assure you, Steve’s intended reading list is too long and his life too busy to chisel out the time and energy necessary to read and dialogue about recent titles in pop-culture. However, he is willing to spend and be spent for the sake of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is precisely why he’s joined the group.
Steve’s desire is to hear the culture through the literature and conversation, understand the writers’ perspectives, and then interpret each book through the Christian worldview. All this, to the end of sharing with the group the Christian perspective of not only the book as a book, but also the often personal (and/or cosmic) issues that it may raise. Strategically, Steve’s wisely decided to use the tried and true Creation/Fall/Redemption paradigm to classify each books content, evaluating the material: “affirming the good, correcting the bad, and presenting the gospel.”
I found Steve’s idea fresh and imaginative. Certainly worth sharing and imitating.
The Lord bless you, Steve, joining him in the missio Dei, right where you are! Keep us updated!
Steve joined a book club at his local public library. Perhaps you’re thinking that “Being Nerdy to the Glory of God” would have been a more appropriate title for this entry. No. The book club membership is not an end, but a means that Steve has chosen to shine the light and glory of Christ in his neighborhood.
Typically, the club selects a particular title; they spend an allotment of time reading, and then converge again to discuss the work in a reasonably sized group. I assure you, Steve’s intended reading list is too long and his life too busy to chisel out the time and energy necessary to read and dialogue about recent titles in pop-culture. However, he is willing to spend and be spent for the sake of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is precisely why he’s joined the group.
Steve’s desire is to hear the culture through the literature and conversation, understand the writers’ perspectives, and then interpret each book through the Christian worldview. All this, to the end of sharing with the group the Christian perspective of not only the book as a book, but also the often personal (and/or cosmic) issues that it may raise. Strategically, Steve’s wisely decided to use the tried and true Creation/Fall/Redemption paradigm to classify each books content, evaluating the material: “affirming the good, correcting the bad, and presenting the gospel.”
I found Steve’s idea fresh and imaginative. Certainly worth sharing and imitating.
The Lord bless you, Steve, joining him in the missio Dei, right where you are! Keep us updated!
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
The Eagle and the Arrow, a Fable of Aesop
An Eagle was soaring through the air when suddenly it heard
the whizz of an Arrow, and felt itself wounded to death. Slowly
it fluttered down to the earth, with its life-blood pouring out of
it. Looking down upon the Arrow with which it had been pierced,
it found that the shaft of the Arrow had been feathered with one
of its own plumes. "Alas!" it cried, as it died,
"We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction."
the whizz of an Arrow, and felt itself wounded to death. Slowly
it fluttered down to the earth, with its life-blood pouring out of
it. Looking down upon the Arrow with which it had been pierced,
it found that the shaft of the Arrow had been feathered with one
of its own plumes. "Alas!" it cried, as it died,
"We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction."
Monday, January 25, 2010
The Emperor's New Clothes
By Hans Christian Anderson
Many years ago there lived an Emperor who was so exceedingly fond of fine new clothes that he spent vast sums of money on dress. To him clothes meant more than anything else in the world. He took no interest in his army, nor did he care to go to the theatre, or to drive about in his state coach, unless it was to display his new clothes. He had different robes for every single hour of the day.
In the great city where he lived life was gay and strangers were always coming and going. Everyone knew about the Emperor's passion for clothes.
Now one fine day two swindlers, calling themselves weavers, arrived. They declared that they could make the most magnificent cloth that one could imagine; cloth of most beautiful colours and elaborate patterns. Not only was the material so beautiful, but the clothes made from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone who was stupid or not fit. for his post.
"What a splendid idea," thought the Emperor. "What useful clothes to have. If I had such a suit of clothes I could know at once which of my people is stupid or unfit for his post."
So the Emperor gave the swindlers large sums of money and the two weavers set up their looms in the palace. They demanded the finest thread of the best silk and the finest gold and they pretended to work at their looms. But they put nothing on the looms. The frames stood empty. The silk and gold thread they stuffed into their bags. So they sat pretending to weave, and continued to work at the empty loom till late into the night. Night after night they went home with their money and their bags full of the finest silk and gold thread. Day after day they pretended to work.
Now the Emperor was eager to know how much of the cloth was finished, and would have loved to see for himself. He was, however, somewhat uneasy. "Suppose," he thought secretly, "suppose I am unable to see the cloth. That would mean I am either stupid or unfit for my post. That cannot be," he thought, but all the same he decided to send for his faithful old minister to go and see. "He will best be able to see how the cloth looks. He is far from stupid and splendid at his work."
So the faithful old minister went into the hall where the two weavers sat beside the empty looms pretending to work with all their might.
The Emperor's minister opened his eyes wide. "Upon my life!" he thought. "I see nothing at all, nothing." But he did not say so.
The two swindlers begged him to come nearer and asked him how he liked it. "Are not the colors exquisite, and see how intricate are the patterns," they said. The poor old minister stared and stared. Still he could see nothing, for there was nothing. But he did not dare to say he saw nothing. "Nobody must find out,"' thought he. "I must never confess that I could not see the stuff."
"Well," said one of the rascals. "You do not say whether it pleases you."
"Oh, it is beautiful-most excellent, to be sure. Such a beautiful design, such exquisite colors. I shall tell the Emperor how enchanted) I am with the cloth."
"We are very glad to hear that," said the weavers, and they started to describe the colors and patterns in great detail. The old minister listened very carefully so that he could repeat the description to the Emperor. They also demanded more money and more gold thread, saying that they needed it to finish the cloth. But, of course, they put all they were given into their bags and pockets and kept on working at their empty looms.
Soon after this the Emperor sent another official to see how the men were ,getting on and to ask whether the cloth would soon be ready. Exactly the same happened with him as with the minister. He stood and stared, but as there was nothing to be seen, he could see nothing.
"Is not the material beautiful?" said the swindlers, and again they talked of 'the patterns and the exquisite colors. "Stupid I certainly am not," thought the official. "Then I must be unfit for my post. But nobody shall know that I could not see the material." Then he praised the material he did not see and declared that he was delighted with the colors and the marvelous patterns.
To the Emperor he said when he returned, "The cloth the weavers are preparing is truly magnificent."
Everybody in the city had heard of the secret cloth and were talking about the splendid material.
And now the Emperor was curious to see the costly stuff for himself while it was still upon the looms. Accompanied by a number of selected ministers, among whom were the two poor ministers who had already been before, the Emperor went to the weavers. There they sat in front of the empty looms, weaving more diligently than ever, yet without a single thread upon the looms.
"Is not the cloth magnificent?" said the two ministers. "See here, the splendid pattern, the glorious colors." Each pointed to the empty loom. Each thought that the other could see the material.
"What can this mean?" said the Emperor to himself. "This is terrible. Am I so stupid? Am I not fit to be Emperor? This is disastrous," he thought. But aloud he said, "Oh, the cloth is perfectly wonderful. It has a splendid pattern and such charming colors." And he nodded his approval and smiled appreciatively and stared at the empty looms. He would not, he could not, admit he saw nothing, when his two ministers had praised the material so highly. And all his men looked and looked at the empty looms. Not one of them saw anything there at all. Nevertheless, they all said, "Oh, the cloth is magnificent."
They advised the Emperor to have some new clothes made from this splendid material to wear in the great procession the following day.
"Magnificent." "Excellent." "Exquisite," went from mouth to mouth and everyone was pleased. Each of the swindlers was given a decoration to wear in his button-hole and the title of "Knight of the Loom".
The rascals sat up all that night and worked, burning more than sixteen candles, so that everyone could see how busy they were making the suit of clothes ready for the procession. Each of them had a great big pair of scissors and they cut in the air, pretending to cut the cloth with them, and sewed with needles without any thread.
There was great excitement in the palace and the Emperor's clothes were the talk of the town. At last the weavers declared that the clothes were ready. Then the Emperor, with the most distinguished gentlemen of the court, came to the weavers. Each of the swindlers lifted up an arm as if he were holding something. "Here are Your Majesty's trousers," said one. "This is Your Majesty's mantle," said the other. "The whole suit is as light as a spider's web. Why, you might almost feel as if you had nothing on, but that is just the beauty of it."
"Magnificent," cried the ministers, but they could see nothing at all. Indeed there was nothing to be seen.
"Now if Your Imperial Majesty would graciously consent to take off your clothes," said the weavers, "we could fit on the new ones." So the Emperor laid aside his clothes and the swindlers pretended to help him piece by piece into the new ones they were supposed to have made.
The Emperor turned from side to side in front of the long glass as if admiring himself.
"How well they fit. How splendid Your Majesty's robes look: What gorgeous colors!" they all said.
"The canopy which is to be held over Your Majesty in the procession is waiting," announced the Lord High Chamberlain.
"I am quite ready," announced the Emperor, and he looked at himself again in the mirror, turning from side to side as if carefully examining his handsome attire.
The courtiers who were to carry the train felt about on the ground pretending to lift it: they walked on solemnly pretending to be carrying it. Nothing would have persuaded them to admit they could not see the clothes, for fear they would be thought stupid or unfit for their posts.
And so the Emperor set off under the high canopy, at the head of the great procession. It was a great success. All the people standing by and at the windows cheered and cried, "Oh, how splendid are the Emperor's new clothes. What a magnificent train! How well the clothes fit!" No one dared to admit that he couldn't see anything, for who would want it to be known that he was either stupid or unfit for his post?
None of the Emperor's clothes had ever met with such success.
But among the crowds a little child suddenly gasped out, "But he hasn't got anything on." And the people began to whisper to one another what the child had said. "He hasn't got anything on." "There's a little child saying he hasn't got anything on." Till everyone was saying, "But he hasn't got anything on." The Emperor himself had the uncomfortable feeling that what they were whispering was only too true. "But I will have to go through with the procession," he said to himself.
So he drew himself up and walked boldly on holding his head higher than before, and the courtiers held on to the train that wasn't there at all.
Many years ago there lived an Emperor who was so exceedingly fond of fine new clothes that he spent vast sums of money on dress. To him clothes meant more than anything else in the world. He took no interest in his army, nor did he care to go to the theatre, or to drive about in his state coach, unless it was to display his new clothes. He had different robes for every single hour of the day.
In the great city where he lived life was gay and strangers were always coming and going. Everyone knew about the Emperor's passion for clothes.
Now one fine day two swindlers, calling themselves weavers, arrived. They declared that they could make the most magnificent cloth that one could imagine; cloth of most beautiful colours and elaborate patterns. Not only was the material so beautiful, but the clothes made from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone who was stupid or not fit. for his post.
"What a splendid idea," thought the Emperor. "What useful clothes to have. If I had such a suit of clothes I could know at once which of my people is stupid or unfit for his post."
So the Emperor gave the swindlers large sums of money and the two weavers set up their looms in the palace. They demanded the finest thread of the best silk and the finest gold and they pretended to work at their looms. But they put nothing on the looms. The frames stood empty. The silk and gold thread they stuffed into their bags. So they sat pretending to weave, and continued to work at the empty loom till late into the night. Night after night they went home with their money and their bags full of the finest silk and gold thread. Day after day they pretended to work.
Now the Emperor was eager to know how much of the cloth was finished, and would have loved to see for himself. He was, however, somewhat uneasy. "Suppose," he thought secretly, "suppose I am unable to see the cloth. That would mean I am either stupid or unfit for my post. That cannot be," he thought, but all the same he decided to send for his faithful old minister to go and see. "He will best be able to see how the cloth looks. He is far from stupid and splendid at his work."
So the faithful old minister went into the hall where the two weavers sat beside the empty looms pretending to work with all their might.
The Emperor's minister opened his eyes wide. "Upon my life!" he thought. "I see nothing at all, nothing." But he did not say so.
The two swindlers begged him to come nearer and asked him how he liked it. "Are not the colors exquisite, and see how intricate are the patterns," they said. The poor old minister stared and stared. Still he could see nothing, for there was nothing. But he did not dare to say he saw nothing. "Nobody must find out,"' thought he. "I must never confess that I could not see the stuff."
"Well," said one of the rascals. "You do not say whether it pleases you."
"Oh, it is beautiful-most excellent, to be sure. Such a beautiful design, such exquisite colors. I shall tell the Emperor how enchanted) I am with the cloth."
"We are very glad to hear that," said the weavers, and they started to describe the colors and patterns in great detail. The old minister listened very carefully so that he could repeat the description to the Emperor. They also demanded more money and more gold thread, saying that they needed it to finish the cloth. But, of course, they put all they were given into their bags and pockets and kept on working at their empty looms.
Soon after this the Emperor sent another official to see how the men were ,getting on and to ask whether the cloth would soon be ready. Exactly the same happened with him as with the minister. He stood and stared, but as there was nothing to be seen, he could see nothing.
"Is not the material beautiful?" said the swindlers, and again they talked of 'the patterns and the exquisite colors. "Stupid I certainly am not," thought the official. "Then I must be unfit for my post. But nobody shall know that I could not see the material." Then he praised the material he did not see and declared that he was delighted with the colors and the marvelous patterns.
To the Emperor he said when he returned, "The cloth the weavers are preparing is truly magnificent."
Everybody in the city had heard of the secret cloth and were talking about the splendid material.
And now the Emperor was curious to see the costly stuff for himself while it was still upon the looms. Accompanied by a number of selected ministers, among whom were the two poor ministers who had already been before, the Emperor went to the weavers. There they sat in front of the empty looms, weaving more diligently than ever, yet without a single thread upon the looms.
"Is not the cloth magnificent?" said the two ministers. "See here, the splendid pattern, the glorious colors." Each pointed to the empty loom. Each thought that the other could see the material.
"What can this mean?" said the Emperor to himself. "This is terrible. Am I so stupid? Am I not fit to be Emperor? This is disastrous," he thought. But aloud he said, "Oh, the cloth is perfectly wonderful. It has a splendid pattern and such charming colors." And he nodded his approval and smiled appreciatively and stared at the empty looms. He would not, he could not, admit he saw nothing, when his two ministers had praised the material so highly. And all his men looked and looked at the empty looms. Not one of them saw anything there at all. Nevertheless, they all said, "Oh, the cloth is magnificent."
They advised the Emperor to have some new clothes made from this splendid material to wear in the great procession the following day.
"Magnificent." "Excellent." "Exquisite," went from mouth to mouth and everyone was pleased. Each of the swindlers was given a decoration to wear in his button-hole and the title of "Knight of the Loom".
The rascals sat up all that night and worked, burning more than sixteen candles, so that everyone could see how busy they were making the suit of clothes ready for the procession. Each of them had a great big pair of scissors and they cut in the air, pretending to cut the cloth with them, and sewed with needles without any thread.
There was great excitement in the palace and the Emperor's clothes were the talk of the town. At last the weavers declared that the clothes were ready. Then the Emperor, with the most distinguished gentlemen of the court, came to the weavers. Each of the swindlers lifted up an arm as if he were holding something. "Here are Your Majesty's trousers," said one. "This is Your Majesty's mantle," said the other. "The whole suit is as light as a spider's web. Why, you might almost feel as if you had nothing on, but that is just the beauty of it."
"Magnificent," cried the ministers, but they could see nothing at all. Indeed there was nothing to be seen.
"Now if Your Imperial Majesty would graciously consent to take off your clothes," said the weavers, "we could fit on the new ones." So the Emperor laid aside his clothes and the swindlers pretended to help him piece by piece into the new ones they were supposed to have made.
The Emperor turned from side to side in front of the long glass as if admiring himself.
"How well they fit. How splendid Your Majesty's robes look: What gorgeous colors!" they all said.
"The canopy which is to be held over Your Majesty in the procession is waiting," announced the Lord High Chamberlain.
"I am quite ready," announced the Emperor, and he looked at himself again in the mirror, turning from side to side as if carefully examining his handsome attire.
The courtiers who were to carry the train felt about on the ground pretending to lift it: they walked on solemnly pretending to be carrying it. Nothing would have persuaded them to admit they could not see the clothes, for fear they would be thought stupid or unfit for their posts.
And so the Emperor set off under the high canopy, at the head of the great procession. It was a great success. All the people standing by and at the windows cheered and cried, "Oh, how splendid are the Emperor's new clothes. What a magnificent train! How well the clothes fit!" No one dared to admit that he couldn't see anything, for who would want it to be known that he was either stupid or unfit for his post?
None of the Emperor's clothes had ever met with such success.
But among the crowds a little child suddenly gasped out, "But he hasn't got anything on." And the people began to whisper to one another what the child had said. "He hasn't got anything on." "There's a little child saying he hasn't got anything on." Till everyone was saying, "But he hasn't got anything on." The Emperor himself had the uncomfortable feeling that what they were whispering was only too true. "But I will have to go through with the procession," he said to himself.
So he drew himself up and walked boldly on holding his head higher than before, and the courtiers held on to the train that wasn't there at all.
Saturday, January 23, 2010
AVOIDING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM
“Therefore I still contend with you, declares Yahweh, and with you children’s children I will contend. For cross to the coasts of Cyprus and see, or send to Kedar and examine with care; see if there has been such a thing. Has a nation changed its gods, even though they are no gods? But my people have changed their glory for that which does not profit. Be appalled, O heavens, at this; be shocked, be utterly desolate, declares Yahweh” (Jer 2:9—12).
With these words, Yahweh is wondering at the fact that the nations, who worship non-Gods, are incorrigibly faithful to their non-God idols, while Israel, a spectacle in ‘comparative religions,’ is seemingly predisposed to abandoning the Rock of their refuge and hope, Yahweh. Geerhardus Vos makes the following observation in Biblical Theology:
“Jeremiah complains that Israel is more inclined to change its God than the heathen nations. It is not difficult to explain this. The pagan nations had no desire to change, because their religion was the natural expression of their disposition. Israel persistently struggled to throw off the yoke of Jehovah’s service, because the old pagan nature of Israel felt it as a yoke” (1983, 62).
Are we today decidedly immune from Jeremiah’s marveling? Does our “old pagan nature” cause us to throw of the Lordship of Christ’s rule, while the actual pagans are thoroughly consistent and staunch in their ultimate commitments? Sadly, at times, especially when discussing apologetics, we must answer yes.
The archetypical sin of our first parents in the garden was based on the assumption that humans can reason rightly and interpret reality properly independent of God’s verbal revelation. They believed under the influence of the serpent, that God’s Word was unclear and his knowledge of things was indeterminate, for the whole question was whether or not the judgment of death would actually follow their snatching the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Disregarding the Creator-creature relationship, they decided to conduct an empirical analysis of the claims of the Creator; they held God’s knowledge and creaturely knowledge to be co-equal. Thus, it was believed that, man could reason according to logical laws and empirical observations and come to a true knowledge of God, themselves and their world, all-independent of the Word of God.
This, as we well know, both propositionally and experientially, had disastrous, cosmic, and eternal results. If this were the case when man was in a state of righteousness—in need of God’s revelation for proper reinterpretation of things and that reasoning independent of God’s Word brings ruinous consequences—how much more now, east of Eden, being radically depraved?
Presuppositionalists aptly describe this independence from God, particularly in the area of epistemology, as striving for autonomy. Bahnsen defines the term autonomy thus: “’Autonomy’ refers to being a law unto oneself, so that one’s thinking is independent of any outside authority, including God’s. Autonomous reasoning takes itself philosophically as the final reference and interpretation, the ultimate court of intellectual appeal; it presumes to be self-governing, self-determinative, and self-directing” (Van Til’s Apologetic, 1 fn. 2).
We see, then, that traditional apologists must delineate their apologetic method from their theological conclusions. As far as their theology is biblically faithful and historically orthodox, their apologetical assumptions are inconsistent with their theology. On the one hand, they would affirm that all that’s bound up in Bahnsen’s definition of autonomy could be appropriately ascribed to God alone. In apologetic practice, however, traditional methods afford and even foster the non-Christians in their fallen desire and struggle for autonomy. Traditionalists seek to satisfy the non-Christian’s struggle for autonomy by feeding their insatiable insistence for scientific evidences, philosophical and logical proofs, and demonstrations of the Bible’s ethics that fit their own sinful emotivism. Submitting one’s thinking, in faith, to the Lordship of Christ as the Light that gives us light to see anything aright (Ps 36:9), is, for them, something that comes at the end of the apologetic encounter; this act of repentance is seen strictly as evangelistic and posterior to apologetics.
Herein lays the analogy to Jeremiah’s charge: The adherents of non-Christian systems of thought are more faithful to their epistemological authorities, since these are merely an expressed manifestation of their commitment to their own autonomy. But Christ’s people are quick to exchange their glory—i.e., Christ’s epistemological Lordship—for that which does not profit, the futile, darkened epistemological autonomy of man.
Presuppositionalism doesn’t make any clear distinctions between apologetics and evangelism, for this apologetic is hardly more than a relentless challenge to the non-Christian’s sinful, white-knuckled claim to intellectual autonomy, and seeking to see this taken captive to obey Christ. Furthermore, presuppositionalists are willing confessors of Christ: that their believing obedience to him rests not in some linear, valid line of reason; their submission to Christ is the result of the Holy Spirit graciously regenerating them so that they proudly stand under the gentle-light yoke of Christ’s rule over them, especially their minds. They contend that, since surrender to God and his wisdom is the beginning, not the end, of knowledge (Prov 1:7), and that the unbeliever’s mind is at enmity with God, there must therefore be a frontal assault on the unbeliever’s epistemological autonomy, and at once an appeal to repentance from their idols of a depraved mind. Autonomous reason can never lead one to Christ; it must be recognized for what it really is—the very sin that is in constant rebellion to God and refuses to surrender to the Savior.
With Jeremiah, the presuppositionalist wonders at the traditional apologetic, how it exchanges the glory of Christ’s epistemic Lordship for the unprofitable would-be authority of autonomous human reason. With Tertullian, we agree, “It must...be added, that no solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and substance of the whole thing” (On the Soul, II). And finally, with the Master himself, who declares that, no one can serve two masters (Matt 6:24).
Presuppositionalism strips human reason of its would-be autonomy; our old nature still struggles (or oftimes surrenders to) for its autonomy. Perhaps this, then, is one of the main reasons for avoiding presuppositional apologetics.
For an example of APPLYING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM click here.
With these words, Yahweh is wondering at the fact that the nations, who worship non-Gods, are incorrigibly faithful to their non-God idols, while Israel, a spectacle in ‘comparative religions,’ is seemingly predisposed to abandoning the Rock of their refuge and hope, Yahweh. Geerhardus Vos makes the following observation in Biblical Theology:
“Jeremiah complains that Israel is more inclined to change its God than the heathen nations. It is not difficult to explain this. The pagan nations had no desire to change, because their religion was the natural expression of their disposition. Israel persistently struggled to throw off the yoke of Jehovah’s service, because the old pagan nature of Israel felt it as a yoke” (1983, 62).
Are we today decidedly immune from Jeremiah’s marveling? Does our “old pagan nature” cause us to throw of the Lordship of Christ’s rule, while the actual pagans are thoroughly consistent and staunch in their ultimate commitments? Sadly, at times, especially when discussing apologetics, we must answer yes.
The archetypical sin of our first parents in the garden was based on the assumption that humans can reason rightly and interpret reality properly independent of God’s verbal revelation. They believed under the influence of the serpent, that God’s Word was unclear and his knowledge of things was indeterminate, for the whole question was whether or not the judgment of death would actually follow their snatching the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Disregarding the Creator-creature relationship, they decided to conduct an empirical analysis of the claims of the Creator; they held God’s knowledge and creaturely knowledge to be co-equal. Thus, it was believed that, man could reason according to logical laws and empirical observations and come to a true knowledge of God, themselves and their world, all-independent of the Word of God.
This, as we well know, both propositionally and experientially, had disastrous, cosmic, and eternal results. If this were the case when man was in a state of righteousness—in need of God’s revelation for proper reinterpretation of things and that reasoning independent of God’s Word brings ruinous consequences—how much more now, east of Eden, being radically depraved?
Presuppositionalists aptly describe this independence from God, particularly in the area of epistemology, as striving for autonomy. Bahnsen defines the term autonomy thus: “’Autonomy’ refers to being a law unto oneself, so that one’s thinking is independent of any outside authority, including God’s. Autonomous reasoning takes itself philosophically as the final reference and interpretation, the ultimate court of intellectual appeal; it presumes to be self-governing, self-determinative, and self-directing” (Van Til’s Apologetic, 1 fn. 2).
We see, then, that traditional apologists must delineate their apologetic method from their theological conclusions. As far as their theology is biblically faithful and historically orthodox, their apologetical assumptions are inconsistent with their theology. On the one hand, they would affirm that all that’s bound up in Bahnsen’s definition of autonomy could be appropriately ascribed to God alone. In apologetic practice, however, traditional methods afford and even foster the non-Christians in their fallen desire and struggle for autonomy. Traditionalists seek to satisfy the non-Christian’s struggle for autonomy by feeding their insatiable insistence for scientific evidences, philosophical and logical proofs, and demonstrations of the Bible’s ethics that fit their own sinful emotivism. Submitting one’s thinking, in faith, to the Lordship of Christ as the Light that gives us light to see anything aright (Ps 36:9), is, for them, something that comes at the end of the apologetic encounter; this act of repentance is seen strictly as evangelistic and posterior to apologetics.
Herein lays the analogy to Jeremiah’s charge: The adherents of non-Christian systems of thought are more faithful to their epistemological authorities, since these are merely an expressed manifestation of their commitment to their own autonomy. But Christ’s people are quick to exchange their glory—i.e., Christ’s epistemological Lordship—for that which does not profit, the futile, darkened epistemological autonomy of man.
Presuppositionalism doesn’t make any clear distinctions between apologetics and evangelism, for this apologetic is hardly more than a relentless challenge to the non-Christian’s sinful, white-knuckled claim to intellectual autonomy, and seeking to see this taken captive to obey Christ. Furthermore, presuppositionalists are willing confessors of Christ: that their believing obedience to him rests not in some linear, valid line of reason; their submission to Christ is the result of the Holy Spirit graciously regenerating them so that they proudly stand under the gentle-light yoke of Christ’s rule over them, especially their minds. They contend that, since surrender to God and his wisdom is the beginning, not the end, of knowledge (Prov 1:7), and that the unbeliever’s mind is at enmity with God, there must therefore be a frontal assault on the unbeliever’s epistemological autonomy, and at once an appeal to repentance from their idols of a depraved mind. Autonomous reason can never lead one to Christ; it must be recognized for what it really is—the very sin that is in constant rebellion to God and refuses to surrender to the Savior.
With Jeremiah, the presuppositionalist wonders at the traditional apologetic, how it exchanges the glory of Christ’s epistemic Lordship for the unprofitable would-be authority of autonomous human reason. With Tertullian, we agree, “It must...be added, that no solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and substance of the whole thing” (On the Soul, II). And finally, with the Master himself, who declares that, no one can serve two masters (Matt 6:24).
Presuppositionalism strips human reason of its would-be autonomy; our old nature still struggles (or oftimes surrenders to) for its autonomy. Perhaps this, then, is one of the main reasons for avoiding presuppositional apologetics.
For an example of APPLYING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM click here.
Monday, January 18, 2010
GRASPING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM
Here is a helpful article from Gregory Koukl at "Stand to Reason." The focus of the article is on what’s called the problem of “moral grounding.”
Koukl begins with the classic objection to the faith, the problem of evil. He then uses the problem of moral grounding to indirectly defuse the challenge by pointing out that for the problem of evil to be real, evil must be real and so a violation of a real good. He then states the obvious, that relativists can’t raise the objection from evil honestly, since real and objective evil can’t exist in a relativistic framework.
At this point, Koukl presents a question.
“The grounding question is: Given that there is real evil and good, as well, why is the world the way it is? What properly accounts for this moral feature of the world?”
Granted, Koukl is a rationalist, epistemologically speaking. However, even a green-winged presuppositionalist will recognize the transcendental nature of the question Koukl sets forth. He goes on to argue that morality is deontological; that is, morals have an obligatory nature. Morals are not descriptive but prescriptive; they don’t tell us how things are but how they ought to be. Morals have an ought-ness about them.
Finally, Koukl demonstrates that obligation assumes personality. Obligation is something that exists between persons. Although I need to prune my Azaleas for spring, I don’t feel any obligation to them to do it for them. They are impersonal entities and impersonals don’t prescribe what persons ought to do. Morals therefore could only have their “grounding” in a personal moral-maker to whom we are obligated.
Koukl is quite apt with illustrations, and doesn’t let us down in this article. The illustration serves to show the a priority of morality, thus concluding that morals have their “grounding” in the personal, moral-maker God of Christian theism.
While this is a good article, I’m not commending it for what it’s worth in and of itself. I’d have you read the article and then consider the auxiliary application I’m going to suggest.
Yesterday I posted Robert Reymond’s attempt at defining the presuppositional apologetic method. Today I thought I’d use Koukl’s article as a springboard to helping those unacquainted with presuppositionalism grasp it better.
Christians who are the slightest bit self-conscious in their apologetic practice are generally accustom to denying unbelievers any grounding for morality, since only Yahweh, the holy Law-Giver, alone has the authority to tell us what is right and wrong. This is nothing especially new; Koukl is sort of playing Capt. Obvious in this way.
A helpful step in grasping what distinguishes presuppositionalism from traditional methods is that the presuppositional apologete extends this denial of “grounding” from the unbeliever to every sphere of human experience, especially the area of epistemology.
Epistemology is the study of how we know what we know, the methods and extent of our knowing, et cetera. My favorite definition is (roughly stated) “When asked how you know what you know, then take away the option of answering, ‘I just do,’ and what is left is epistemology.”
The presuppositional challenge to unbelief is that unless the God of Christian theism is presupposed at the beginning, knowledge of anything is impossible. Christ, the Word of God, endowing light and speaking with absolute and Self-attesting authority alone provides the necessary “grounding” for the integration and unity of knowledge necessary for human knowledge to happen at all. It is an epistemological axiom that unless everything is known by Someone, nothing can be known by anyone. Exhaustive knowledge must reside Somewhere in order for any knowledge to reside elsewhere. (I capitalize “Someone” and “Somewhere” in the preceding sentences because in Whomever or Wherever all knowledge resides, that one or place deserves this respect!)
The traditional apologetic method Evangelicals are so used to ironically operates on a Roman Catholic understanding of anthropology and the fall of man. The traditional apologetic operates on the assumption that the fall had little or no effect on man’s reasoning ability; sin is a moral rather than epistemological issue, or so it’s presumed. This, however, cannot stand against either the biblical data, human experience, or historic Protestant theology. That the fall was primarily an epistemological laps is sufficient to prove the Romish doctrine wrong.
Tomorrow I’ll post what I believe is a positive vindication of these claims. In the mean time, ponder this analogy. Presuppositionalism is (in part) just an extension of Koukl’s argument in his “moral grounding” article. Presuppositionalism argues that God speaking in the Word of God is the transcendentally necessary ontological “grounding” for knowledge. We argue that human reason, the laws of logic, induction, et cetera depend upon humans being created in God’s image; the biblical God, who is the comprehensively rational One. Moreover, since the all the world reflects his glory, majesty and “eternal power and Godhead,” the world has a rational structure which corresponds with not only God’s Mind, but man’s as well. Therefore, God is the necessary ontological “grounding” of epistemology, from the impossibility of all contrary epistemological options.
This illustration, from the moral argument to the epistemological argument, may help some grasp the distinctives of a presuppositional apologetic.
Koukl begins with the classic objection to the faith, the problem of evil. He then uses the problem of moral grounding to indirectly defuse the challenge by pointing out that for the problem of evil to be real, evil must be real and so a violation of a real good. He then states the obvious, that relativists can’t raise the objection from evil honestly, since real and objective evil can’t exist in a relativistic framework.
At this point, Koukl presents a question.
“The grounding question is: Given that there is real evil and good, as well, why is the world the way it is? What properly accounts for this moral feature of the world?”
Granted, Koukl is a rationalist, epistemologically speaking. However, even a green-winged presuppositionalist will recognize the transcendental nature of the question Koukl sets forth. He goes on to argue that morality is deontological; that is, morals have an obligatory nature. Morals are not descriptive but prescriptive; they don’t tell us how things are but how they ought to be. Morals have an ought-ness about them.
Finally, Koukl demonstrates that obligation assumes personality. Obligation is something that exists between persons. Although I need to prune my Azaleas for spring, I don’t feel any obligation to them to do it for them. They are impersonal entities and impersonals don’t prescribe what persons ought to do. Morals therefore could only have their “grounding” in a personal moral-maker to whom we are obligated.
Koukl is quite apt with illustrations, and doesn’t let us down in this article. The illustration serves to show the a priority of morality, thus concluding that morals have their “grounding” in the personal, moral-maker God of Christian theism.
While this is a good article, I’m not commending it for what it’s worth in and of itself. I’d have you read the article and then consider the auxiliary application I’m going to suggest.
Yesterday I posted Robert Reymond’s attempt at defining the presuppositional apologetic method. Today I thought I’d use Koukl’s article as a springboard to helping those unacquainted with presuppositionalism grasp it better.
Christians who are the slightest bit self-conscious in their apologetic practice are generally accustom to denying unbelievers any grounding for morality, since only Yahweh, the holy Law-Giver, alone has the authority to tell us what is right and wrong. This is nothing especially new; Koukl is sort of playing Capt. Obvious in this way.
A helpful step in grasping what distinguishes presuppositionalism from traditional methods is that the presuppositional apologete extends this denial of “grounding” from the unbeliever to every sphere of human experience, especially the area of epistemology.
Epistemology is the study of how we know what we know, the methods and extent of our knowing, et cetera. My favorite definition is (roughly stated) “When asked how you know what you know, then take away the option of answering, ‘I just do,’ and what is left is epistemology.”
The presuppositional challenge to unbelief is that unless the God of Christian theism is presupposed at the beginning, knowledge of anything is impossible. Christ, the Word of God, endowing light and speaking with absolute and Self-attesting authority alone provides the necessary “grounding” for the integration and unity of knowledge necessary for human knowledge to happen at all. It is an epistemological axiom that unless everything is known by Someone, nothing can be known by anyone. Exhaustive knowledge must reside Somewhere in order for any knowledge to reside elsewhere. (I capitalize “Someone” and “Somewhere” in the preceding sentences because in Whomever or Wherever all knowledge resides, that one or place deserves this respect!)
The traditional apologetic method Evangelicals are so used to ironically operates on a Roman Catholic understanding of anthropology and the fall of man. The traditional apologetic operates on the assumption that the fall had little or no effect on man’s reasoning ability; sin is a moral rather than epistemological issue, or so it’s presumed. This, however, cannot stand against either the biblical data, human experience, or historic Protestant theology. That the fall was primarily an epistemological laps is sufficient to prove the Romish doctrine wrong.
Tomorrow I’ll post what I believe is a positive vindication of these claims. In the mean time, ponder this analogy. Presuppositionalism is (in part) just an extension of Koukl’s argument in his “moral grounding” article. Presuppositionalism argues that God speaking in the Word of God is the transcendentally necessary ontological “grounding” for knowledge. We argue that human reason, the laws of logic, induction, et cetera depend upon humans being created in God’s image; the biblical God, who is the comprehensively rational One. Moreover, since the all the world reflects his glory, majesty and “eternal power and Godhead,” the world has a rational structure which corresponds with not only God’s Mind, but man’s as well. Therefore, God is the necessary ontological “grounding” of epistemology, from the impossibility of all contrary epistemological options.
This illustration, from the moral argument to the epistemological argument, may help some grasp the distinctives of a presuppositional apologetic.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
DEFINING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM
The charge is often made that presuppositionalists have a proclivity for ambiguity in their writings. There is certainly some warrant for this. I was talking to Ken Ham (who is no slouch to be sure) of Answers in Genesis one evening about their ministry’s overt move towards a presuppositional methodology. He almost immediately complained that Van Til’s work left him mystified. Ham added that Van Tilian purist, Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s most articulate interpreter, wasn’t much help either.
We who’ve studied (and studied and studied!) these two patriarchs of the biblical apologetic method can surely empathize with Ham. Despite Van Til’s penchant for creating new vocabulary (often by using arcane philosophical terms, packing them with utterly unique content) and assuming with his readers/students a PhD. in the history of philosophy, sometimes, I think, our problem is that we over complicate things.
For instance, one of Van Til’s more often expressed statements of the transcendental challenge to unbelief hung on the term “predication.” Without first presupposing the triune God of Scripture, said he, predication is impossible. Our tendency is to assume that Van Til means something other than what is normally meant by the term; but he doesn’t. The point is that sometimes we fail to grasp the subtlety of the presuppositional procedure.
We live in a world of people (sadly, ourselves often included) that is so blinded by their most basic presupposition of their would-be epistemological autonomy that any challenge to that autonomy is prima facie incredible and absurd. (How much more, then, the claim that humans cannot, in principle, predicate any subject with any property?!?)
Misunderstanding presuppositionalism therefore can be for reason of its proponent's philosophical complexity and/or the method’s inherent simplicity and fidelity to the God of Scripture. However, another cause of misunderstanding can be a lack of clear definition, especially one contrasting the method with the traditional “Case for this...Case for that” method that has been popular for so long (i.e., evidentialism, classical apologetics).
Dr. Robert Reymond in his New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith does a pretty good job of giving a definition (and/or description) of presuppositionalism and contrasting it with the popular evidentialism. Here are a couple of very helpful paragraphs from Pt. 2, “Introduction to the Doctrine of God” (pp. 145—46).
“Believing that ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge' (Prov 1:7), that 'all treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ' (Col 2:3), and therefore that the triune God (and/or the self-attesting Christ) is the transcendental, necessary ground of all meaning, intelligibility and predication, the presuppositional apologist maintains that the truth of God’s self-authenticating Word should be presupposed from start to finish throughout one’s apologetic witness. Accordingly, while the presuppositionalist values logic he understands that apart from God there is no reason to believe that the laws of logic correspond universally to objective reality. While he values science he understands that apart from God there is no reliable basis for doing science. While he values ethics he understands that apart from God moral principles are simply changing conventions and today’s vices can become tomorrow’s virtues. While he affirms the dignity and significance of human personhood he understands that apart from God man is simply a biological machine, an accident of nature, a cipher. And while he values the concepts of purpose, cause, probability and meaning he understands that apart from God these concepts have no real basis or meaning. Therefore, he thinks the Christian evidentialist is being untrue to his own faith when he grants to the unbeliever the hypothetical possibility of this being a non-theistic world that can successfully function and be rightly understood in terms of the laws of logic and the human sciences. And to suggest that the law of noncontradiction, the ‘law of causality,’ and ‘the basic reliability of sense perception’ are more non-negotiably certain in this world that God himself is to deny the existence of the sovereign God of the universe ‘for whom and through whom and to whom are all things’ (Rom 11:36). To do so is also abandon the Christ who ‘is before all things, in whom all thing consist’ (Col 1:7), ‘in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Col 2:3), and without whom man can do nothing (John 15:5). He reminds the evidentialist that it is not God who is the felon on trial; men are the felons. It is not God’s character and word which are questionable; men’s are (Job 40:1, 8; Rom 3:4; 9:20). And it is not the Christian who is the unauthorized intruder in this world...
It is not then the Christian primarily who must justify his Christian prescence in the world but the non-Christian who must be made to feel the burden of justifying his non-Christian views.”
We who’ve studied (and studied and studied!) these two patriarchs of the biblical apologetic method can surely empathize with Ham. Despite Van Til’s penchant for creating new vocabulary (often by using arcane philosophical terms, packing them with utterly unique content) and assuming with his readers/students a PhD. in the history of philosophy, sometimes, I think, our problem is that we over complicate things.
For instance, one of Van Til’s more often expressed statements of the transcendental challenge to unbelief hung on the term “predication.” Without first presupposing the triune God of Scripture, said he, predication is impossible. Our tendency is to assume that Van Til means something other than what is normally meant by the term; but he doesn’t. The point is that sometimes we fail to grasp the subtlety of the presuppositional procedure.
We live in a world of people (sadly, ourselves often included) that is so blinded by their most basic presupposition of their would-be epistemological autonomy that any challenge to that autonomy is prima facie incredible and absurd. (How much more, then, the claim that humans cannot, in principle, predicate any subject with any property?!?)
Misunderstanding presuppositionalism therefore can be for reason of its proponent's philosophical complexity and/or the method’s inherent simplicity and fidelity to the God of Scripture. However, another cause of misunderstanding can be a lack of clear definition, especially one contrasting the method with the traditional “Case for this...Case for that” method that has been popular for so long (i.e., evidentialism, classical apologetics).
Dr. Robert Reymond in his New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith does a pretty good job of giving a definition (and/or description) of presuppositionalism and contrasting it with the popular evidentialism. Here are a couple of very helpful paragraphs from Pt. 2, “Introduction to the Doctrine of God” (pp. 145—46).
“Believing that ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge' (Prov 1:7), that 'all treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ' (Col 2:3), and therefore that the triune God (and/or the self-attesting Christ) is the transcendental, necessary ground of all meaning, intelligibility and predication, the presuppositional apologist maintains that the truth of God’s self-authenticating Word should be presupposed from start to finish throughout one’s apologetic witness. Accordingly, while the presuppositionalist values logic he understands that apart from God there is no reason to believe that the laws of logic correspond universally to objective reality. While he values science he understands that apart from God there is no reliable basis for doing science. While he values ethics he understands that apart from God moral principles are simply changing conventions and today’s vices can become tomorrow’s virtues. While he affirms the dignity and significance of human personhood he understands that apart from God man is simply a biological machine, an accident of nature, a cipher. And while he values the concepts of purpose, cause, probability and meaning he understands that apart from God these concepts have no real basis or meaning. Therefore, he thinks the Christian evidentialist is being untrue to his own faith when he grants to the unbeliever the hypothetical possibility of this being a non-theistic world that can successfully function and be rightly understood in terms of the laws of logic and the human sciences. And to suggest that the law of noncontradiction, the ‘law of causality,’ and ‘the basic reliability of sense perception’ are more non-negotiably certain in this world that God himself is to deny the existence of the sovereign God of the universe ‘for whom and through whom and to whom are all things’ (Rom 11:36). To do so is also abandon the Christ who ‘is before all things, in whom all thing consist’ (Col 1:7), ‘in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Col 2:3), and without whom man can do nothing (John 15:5). He reminds the evidentialist that it is not God who is the felon on trial; men are the felons. It is not God’s character and word which are questionable; men’s are (Job 40:1, 8; Rom 3:4; 9:20). And it is not the Christian who is the unauthorized intruder in this world...
It is not then the Christian primarily who must justify his Christian prescence in the world but the non-Christian who must be made to feel the burden of justifying his non-Christian views.”
Robertson...Help, Don't Help!
Seldom does he fail; if any catastrophic event happens, Pat Robertson is there to inform the world exactly God’s reason(s) for the calamity. Haiti’s bereavements have been quickly met with Robertson’s self-pronouncements of the divine motives behind the disaster: God’s judgment (of course!) for the people allegedly having made a “pact with the devil.”
The guys at The White Horse Inn have done a good job at answering Robertson’s ridiculous remarks and moving readers toward a biblical assessment of the horrible situation that has befallen this impoverished people.
As Christians, we are commanded by the our Lord to intercede on behalf of those in Haiti, and extend relief, according to our means, to those suffering, especially our brothers and sisters in Christ who are there. We should also be prompted to meditate and study the problem of the suffering and evil that is present in our Father’s world, being ready always with a biblical answer to anyone that might inquire of us how we understand and have hope in the face of this such darkness. In this connection, let’s us also not be shy in asking others to do the same; this is a great opportunity to engage nonbelievers with the reality of suffering and evil, asking them for an answer to the problem from their own perspective and presuppositions.
O Lord, Sovereign King, eternal, infinite and unchangeable in power and goodness and wisdom, be ever-present in that power, working out your purposes of glory and good in Haiti; Lord Jesus, you, who knows grief and suffering better than we, comfort and shepherd the hearts of those who are walking through the valley of death; and Holy Spirit, applying the power of the death and resurrection Christ, renew and recreate this void and uninhabitable land and its people, demonstrating that in Christ the old has passed away, death is destroyed in his death, and all things have become new through your infallible, victorious, irresistible and always efficacious regeneration. To the praise and glory of the triune God. Amen.
The guys at The White Horse Inn have done a good job at answering Robertson’s ridiculous remarks and moving readers toward a biblical assessment of the horrible situation that has befallen this impoverished people.
As Christians, we are commanded by the our Lord to intercede on behalf of those in Haiti, and extend relief, according to our means, to those suffering, especially our brothers and sisters in Christ who are there. We should also be prompted to meditate and study the problem of the suffering and evil that is present in our Father’s world, being ready always with a biblical answer to anyone that might inquire of us how we understand and have hope in the face of this such darkness. In this connection, let’s us also not be shy in asking others to do the same; this is a great opportunity to engage nonbelievers with the reality of suffering and evil, asking them for an answer to the problem from their own perspective and presuppositions.
O Lord, Sovereign King, eternal, infinite and unchangeable in power and goodness and wisdom, be ever-present in that power, working out your purposes of glory and good in Haiti; Lord Jesus, you, who knows grief and suffering better than we, comfort and shepherd the hearts of those who are walking through the valley of death; and Holy Spirit, applying the power of the death and resurrection Christ, renew and recreate this void and uninhabitable land and its people, demonstrating that in Christ the old has passed away, death is destroyed in his death, and all things have become new through your infallible, victorious, irresistible and always efficacious regeneration. To the praise and glory of the triune God. Amen.
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