I call upon You, Lord, God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob and Israel, You who are the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the God who, through the abundance of your mercy, was well-pleased towards us so that we may know You, who made heaven and earth, who rules over all, You who are the one and the true God, above whom there is no other God; You who, by our Lord Jesus Christ gave us the gift of the Holy Spirit, give to every one who reads this writing to know You, that You alone are God, to be strengthened in You, and to avoid every heretical and godless and impious teaching.

St Irenaeus of Lyons, Against the Heresies 3:6:4


Sunday, January 31, 2010

Right Reasoning, pt. IV, The Hypothetical Syllogism

Yet another valid form of Right Reasoning...

IV. The Hypothetical Syllogism

A. Formally stated:

1. If P, then Q;
2. If Q, then R;
3. If R, then S,
4. Therefore, if P, then S

B. 1. Illustrated from epistemology:

i. If (P) knowledge is possible, then (Q) truth exists.

ii. If (Q) truth exists [and truth is absolute], then (R) truth requires an absolute mind [since truth is absolute and is mental activity].

iii. If (R) truth requires an absolute mind, then (S) knowledge is dependant on an absolute-personal being [since mind is a property of persons].

iv. Therefore, if (P) knowledge is possible, then (S) knowledge is dependant on an absolute-personal being, and that being can only be the God of Christian theism.

B. 2. Illustrated from (anti-) ethics:

i. If (P) Naturalism is true, then (Q) then nothing exists beyond natural phenomena.

ii. If (Q) nothing exists beyond natural phenomenon, then (R) morality must have its basis in natural phenomena.

iii. If (R) morality must have its basis in natural phenomena, then (S) scientific investigation is the only method of detecting morals.

iv. If (S) scientific investigation is the proper method for detecting morals, then (T) we’re left with only descriptions [i.e., “what is the case”], never prescriptions of behavior [i.e., “what ought to be the case”].

v. If (T) we’re left with only descriptions of behavior, never prescriptions [and we can’t move from “is” to “ought” – Hume], then (U) morality is impossible.

vi. If (U) morality is impossible, then (V) there is no morally significant reason one ought to believe anything at all.

vii. Therefore, if (P) Naturalism is true, then (V) no one ought to believe it.

C. Fallacy factor:

With the hypothetical syllogism, we risk postulating relations between antecedent (the “if” clause) and consequent (the “then” clause) that either are not obvious or not there at all. In fact, the hypothetical syllogism is most helpful for demonstrating the truth of more general propositions, such as, “There is no reason to believe Naturalism,” through a chain of causal or logical relations.

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Right Reasoning, pt. III, The Dilemma

More in our study of valid forms of arguments...

I. The Dilemma:

A. Formally stated:

1. Either P or Q.
2. If P, then R;
3. If Q, then S;
4. Therefore, either R or S

The dilemma has a powerful rhetorical punch. It’s purpose is to present a clear dichotomist choice, a choice where either answer will imply or lead to negative or undesirable consequences.

B. 1. Illustrated from Scripture:

(This passage is taken from Matthew 21:23—27. The Sanhedrin comes to examine Jesus after his Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem and the temple. The Sanhedrin presume to have the wherewithal to sit in judgment over Jesus’ words and deeds. The issue is a battle over warring ultimate authorities. Once we get through this series, I plan to revisit this passage and attend to some of the entailments for apologetics.)

The Sanhedrin came to Jesus in the temple asking, “’By what authority are you doing these things, and who gave you this authority?’ Jesus answered them, ‘I also will ask you one question, and if you tell me the answer, then I also will tell you by what authority I do these things. The baptism of John, from where did it come? From heaven or from man?’ And they discussed it among themselves, saying, ‘If we say, “From heaven,” he will say to us, “Why then did you not believe him?” But if we say, “From man,” we are afraid of the crowd, for they all hold that John was a prophet.’ So they answered Jesus, ‘We do not know.’ And he said to them, ‘Neither will I tell you by what authority I do these things.’”

The argument follows thus.

i. Either John’s ministry was from (P) God or (Q) man.

ii. If we say (P) from God, then (R) we are reprobate for not believing him.

iii. If we say (Q) from man, then (S) the crowds may turn on us.

iv. Our choices are really between (R) confessing our reprobation or (S) facing an angry mob.

v. Neither choice is acceptable; therefore, we will suspend judgment.

B. 2. Illustrated from anthropology and jurisprudence:

i. Either (P) people are inherently good or (Q) people are inherently evil.

ii. If (P) people are inherently good, then (R) prohibitory laws are superfluous.

iii. If (Q) people are inherently evil, then (S) prohibitory laws are superfluous.

iv. Therefore, whether (P) people are inherently good or (Q) inherently evil, (R/S) prohibitory laws are superfluous.

C. The fallacy factor:

Even intuitively, whether or not one is conscious of it, a clear hazard in the use of this form is to create a false dilemma or false dichotomy in the original premise (i.e., Either P or Q). This is commonly called the Either-or fallacy. See my Master List of Informal Logical Fallacies, II:9, under “Making Assumptions.”

Obviously, the flaw comes by presenting an “either-or” choice between two propositions when in fact there are one or several other options. This is easy to do. One must be sure that he has exhausted the options so as to avoid this fatal flaw. Again, while the form my be valid, following the Dilemma perfectly, beginning with a flawed premise makes the whole argument unsound.

However, it is often the case that there are only two reasonable picks; either one or its alternative. This is transparently the case with Jesus’ argument—God or man.

Friday, January 29, 2010

Right Reasoning, pt. II, Modus Tollens

To continue our series in valid forms of argument...

II. Modus Tollens (Latin, lit. “The mode of taking”):

A. Formally stated:

1. If P is the case, the Q is also the case;
2. Not-Q,
3. Therefore, not-P

B. 1. Illustrated from ethics:

(Here I cite Gregory Koukl and Francis Beckwith’s Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air, 1999, 65.)

“In like fashion [to B. F. Skinner’s conclusions in Beyond Freedom and Dignity], relativists must remove the words praise and blame from their vocabularies. But if the notions of praise and blame are valid, then relativism must be false.”

The line of reasoning is modus tollens.

i. If (P) moral relativism is the case, then (Q) the words praise and blame are unintelligible.

ii. But, (not-Q) the words praise and blame are valid moral categories (even presupposed by relativists!).

iii. Therefore, (not-P) relativism is not the case.

B. 2. Illustrated from Scripture (1 John 2:19, speaking of the antichrist heretics):

“They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us. But they went out, that it might become plain that they all are not of us.”

Again, modus tollens.

i. If (P) they had been of us, then (Q) they would have continued with us.

ii. But (not-Q) they did not continue with us.

iii. Therefore, (not-P) they were not of us.

B. 3. Illustrated from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, “The Adventure of Silver Blaze” (since Sherlock Holmes is Beaner new favorite movie!):

“A dog was kept in the stalls, and yet, though someone had been in and fetched out a horse, the dog had not barked. Obviously the visitor was someone whom the dog knew well...”

i. If (P) the horse thief was a stranger, then (Q) the dog would have barked, since the dog always barks at strangers.

ii. But (not-Q) the dog never barked.

iii. Therefore, (not-P) the horse thief was not a stranger.

C. The fallacy factor:

As with the modus ponens, discussed in pt. I of the Right Reasoning series, the modus tollens is susceptible to a formal logical fallacy, namely the fallacy of 'denying the antecedent.' (Remember, in the case of an “If...then” conditional statement, the “If” clause is the antecedent, and the “then” clause is the consequent.)

Obviously, the fallacious attempt at a modus tollens would formally follow like this:

1. If P, then Q;
2. Not-P,
3. Therefore, not-Q.

However, the conclusion, though perhaps true, doesn’t follow from the premises. This too is an invalid line of inference.

Consider this.

1. If (P) the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints (i.e., that the elect will persevere in their faith to the end) is true, then (Q) no Christian would denounce the faith.

2. However, (not-Q) some once-professed Christians do denounce the faith.

3. Therefore, (not-P) the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is not true.

It is amazing how many Arminians believe this to be a reasonable argument!

D. This last argument is valid, yet unsound: (see section D of Right Reasoning, pt I).

Right Reasoning, pt. I, Modus Ponens: Excursus

One of the points, # 6, in my Ten-plus-One Deadly Sins of Empiricism, I describe how a purely empirical method inescapably commits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. It reads,

The argument for empirical verificationism breaks a formal law of logic, and is therefore always fallacious. It goes like this: If hypothesis P, then effect Q will result; Q was the result, therefore P is verified and may be considered ‘theory’ or ‘law.’ As you well know, this is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. And because every line of verification must proceed thus, no method of verification is logically demonstrable.

In stating this inherent flaw in empiricism, I’ve been misunderstood (or accused by antitheists in debates) as being anti-science. I’m not anti-science; science is a very useful, God ordained means for carrying out the dominion mandate (Gen 1:26—28; 2:7—15), thus for reinterpreting and recreating our environment to the glory of God. For God’s glory and mankind’s good, science is a necessary and righteous endeavor.

However, when man seeks to take up science as a weapon against his Creator, and exalt autonomous human reason and logic to a deified position, so assuming that such may be employed to determine the scope of the possible and impossible and judge God and his Word, then a humbling will follow.

For if the material world is “all that was, is, or ever will be,” as the antitheists contend, then empiricism is the only reasonable epistemological method. And if empiricism is the only epistemological method, then that is the only method for a critical examination of the Christian worldview. But, since empiricism is always formally fallacious, all antitheist objections to the Christian worldview rest upon a fallacious line of reasoning. Therefore, antitheist’s objections to Christianity are irrational.

Funny. That’s exactly what the Bible says.

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Right Reasoning, pt. I: Modus Ponens

I’m now taking the time to offer that list of valid forms of arguments promised weeks ago. I’ll offer them one post at a time, due to the space it takes to illustrate and explain them.

As Christians, we are morally obligated to reason correctly. Reliable patterns of reason are reflections of the way God thinks, thus we are to reflect that reality in all our reasoning. The Christian theory of ethics is inextricably tethered to the Christian theory of knowledge (epistemology), which, likewise, is bound-up in the Christian theory of being (metaphysics). If Christ is Lord, he has authority over not only our actions, but our thinking as well, by virtue of Who and What he is. This especially since, our thinking is the loamy soil from which our actions spring, hence revealing what we truly believe.

Valid argument, moreover, is necessary for persuasive, winsome apologetics and evangelism. If a soft-minded unbeliever is persuaded by means of the many invalid arguments Christians often use, while the end may be worth celebration, the means are perfectly unacceptable.

The following will not be an exhaustive list, to be sure; but it is a foundation. Most arguments we (should) use or encounter will roughly follow one form or another.

Not only does knowing and utilizing valid patterns of reasoning help us to frame the message and defense of the gospel in a cogent, truthful way. It also helps us to recognize the fallacious reasoning that inevitably follows in the arguments of the non-Christians working on their own unbelieving presuppositions.


I. Modus Ponens (Latin, lit. “The mode of putting”):

A. Formally stated:

1. If P is the case, then Q is also the case;
2. P is the case;
3. Therefore, Q is also the case.

B. 1 Illustrated from Naturalistic presuppositions:

i. If (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry, then (Q) true beliefs are illusory, since beliefs are only the consequences of these bits of matter reacting with other bits of matter in ways predetermined by antecedent material causes.

ii. It is, according to Naturalism, the case that (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry.

iii. Therefore, (Q) true beliefs are illusory, not least a belief in Naturalism.

B. 2. Illustrated from Scripture:

(I.e., Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s messengers, logically confirming that Jesus was the Coming One, the Messiah. See Matt 11:1—5 // Lk 7:18—22)

i. If I [Jesus] am (P) giving sight to the blind, granting the lame to walk, cleansing lepers, making the deaf to hear, raising the dead, and preaching the good news of the gospel of the Kingdom to the poor, then (Q) I am the One who was to come, the Messiah, since the Old Covenant promised that these works would accompany the Messiah’s ministry.

ii. Tell John what you see and hear, namely that (P) the blind receive their sight, et cetera...

iii. Therefore, John has his assurance; (Q) I am the Messiah, promised in the Old Covenant, whom also his ministry proclaimed.

B. 3 Illustrated from the crux pro-life argument:

i. If (P) the pre-born are innocent human beings, then (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.

ii. (P) The pre-born are innocent human beings (biblically, biologically and embryologically speaking).

iii. Therefore, (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.

C. The fallacy factor:

With respect to modus ponens and modus tollens (see below in next post) there is always the risk of committing a formal fallacy. In the case of modus ponens, we risk the common error of ‘affirming the consequent.’ This needs some explanation.

In logic, the “If...then” construction is known as a conditional statement. Conditionals are then broken into two parts: The antecedent is the “If...” clause, whereas the consequent is the “then...” clause.

In a valid expression of modus ponens, the antecedent is affirmed or asserted in the second premise. However, if the consequent is affirmed, the argument is made invalid and the conclusion doesn’t follow. To use a classic example:

1. If (P) the roads are icy, then (Q) the mail will be late.
2. (Q) The mail is late.
3. Therefore, (P) the roads are icy.

Of course, it is possible that the conclusion is true; the roads may be icy, thus causing the mail to be late. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not the result of a valid, reliable line of reasoning; it’s mere coincidence.

Only months ago, I had a former co-worker argue for the truth of astrology this way.

“Yesterday, my horoscope said (P) that I’d meet an old lover and rekindle the spark. Then, lo and behold, (Q) I ran into ol’ Billy Bob at the bar, and we had a real good time, if you get my drift! How can you doubt the truth of this, then, Kevin? If (P), then (Q); it was the case that (Q), therefore (P) is true!”

I attempted to explain to Debbie that her reasoning didn’t follow; her argument was a non sequitur. She responded. “I don’t know about all your P’s and Q’s, I just know that Billy Bob and I had a real good time!”

D. Valid, yet unsound:

It is quite possible to also use a modus ponens to create a valid argument that is still false. An argument’s validity, as we have labored to show, has to do with following rules and patterns of reliable inference, logical laws. Still, one may produce a false conclusion by means of a valid form of argument. Consider how a nosey neighbor could reason validly, yet end with a false conclusion.

1. If (P) John is late coming home from work, then (Q) John is committing adultery against his wife, Sara.

2. (P) John is late coming home from work!

3. Oh my! (Q) John is having an affair! Quick, call Joan!

The argument follows the valid form of a modus ponens, yet the conclusion is false. The nosey neighbor’s first premise is faulty, the counterfactual being, John had a blow-out on his way home from work. And because a premise on which the conclusion rests is flawed, the conclusion is also flawed; the argument is unsound.

Therefore, we must watch for both a valid form of modus ponens, avoiding the fallacy of affirming the consequent and drawing conclusions from faulty premises, thus avoiding unsoundness. These things we must watch first in our own reasoning and then in the reasoning of others (Matt 7:1—5). For: If we can’t recognize proper patterns of argument in our own reasoning, then neither will we be able to critique that of others...well you should know how the rest goes by now.

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Apologetic Application of Two Classics

Over the last couple of days I’ve posted two of my favorite’s from classic literature: The Emperor’s New Clothes by the Dane, Hans Christian Anderson (A.D. 1805—1875) and “The Eagle and the Arrow”, attributed to the Samian slave “Aesop” (c. mid-6th century B.C.). I do this because they are relevant to our recent discussion of apologetics.

Both the fable and the allegory are pregnant with applications for our apologetic practice; here I’ll mention only the obvious.

I. Concerning The Emperor’s New Clothes:

1. Over the last two centuries, our culture has been visited by two rogue Weavers: Metaphysical Naturalism in the fields of science and philosophy, and her ugly twin sister, Secular Humanism in the areas of education and polity.

2. Western society (sadly much of the visible Church also) has been duped by these two swindlers. Both have claimed that those who won’t see the truth of their systems are either “unfit for the office they hold," or are "incorrigibly stupid.”

3. The Intelligentsia of the Academy (e.g., secular universities) have spun a weave around every discipline of the field of education. If one wants to retain their tenure, they must pretend to see the truth and value of evolutionary antitheism in every domain. Any idea that Darwinism may not be absolute, apodicticly certain fact will render one’s aptitude to teach as “unfit,” thus loosing their position. Moreover, any student that will not bow to the dogamtics of Darwinism is academically flayed as being “incorrigibly stupid.”

4. Secular Humanism is, say the Weavers, the only “neutral ground” between religious factions, each of whom would have their own brand of morality running the socio-political show. But, the delusion follows. Secular Humanism is a world and life view in its own right. It is an overarching theory of everything that enjoys governmental protection and immediate legislative power, which is then imposed upon the whole of society. It is not “morally/religiously neutral” but a moral and religious dogma. (For a succinct examination and critique of Secular Humanism, see Steve Galt’s series of posts, beginning here.)

5. It is the solemn duty of every Christian (2 Cor 10:3—5) to destroy these two strongholds that bulwark our depraved society against the gospel of Christ. When everyone you meet is saying, “How incomparable are the Emperor’s new clothes! What a train he has to his mantle! How it fits him!” As J.C. Ryle has said, “We [Christians] have the truth and we needn’t be ashamed to say it!” We should, then, be like the innocent little lad in Anderson’s story, being the one’s who have the honesty to say, “But these worldviews have nothing on!” (Rom 3:4).

II. Concerning The Eagle and the Arrow:

1. Since only the Christian worldview can provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility (e.g., the laws of logic, human dignity and freedom, causality, normative ethics, et cetera), it’s perfectly unacceptable to allow the non-Christian opponent to assume these while waging an attack on the faith. We should be faithful Christian skeptics.

2. Most approaches to apologetics will grant that, e.g., logical laws and reliable patterns of reason (which make sense in terms of the Christian worldview alone) can provide an agreed, authoritative, neutral point of contact, by which the two contrary positions may be evaluated.

3. But to grant the non-Christian opponent say, logic, is the fletch the very arrow with which he intends to shoot down our holy faith. Moreover, this subjects Christ's Self-attesting authority to another authority, which is nonsensical.

4. Non-Christian systems simply cannot provide the necessary grounding to make sense of the laws of logic, and therefore, must assume the truth of the Christian worldview in order to argue for its falsehood.

5. If we wish to see the Lordship of Christ fly over all, to the ends of the earth, it must begin with us and our approach to contrary systems and philosophies. We cannot give to Christ’s opponents the very weapons (e.g., logic, science, morality) with which to wages their attack.

Any further thoughts?

Reading to the Glory of God

I was talking with my dearest friend, brother and co-laborer in Christ, Steve (see his blog, “All Things New,” in my blogroll), yesterday, and he shared a new endeavor that is worth repeating and emulating.

Steve joined a book club at his local public library. Perhaps you’re thinking that “Being Nerdy to the Glory of God” would have been a more appropriate title for this entry. No. The book club membership is not an end, but a means that Steve has chosen to shine the light and glory of Christ in his neighborhood.

Typically, the club selects a particular title; they spend an allotment of time reading, and then converge again to discuss the work in a reasonably sized group. I assure you, Steve’s intended reading list is too long and his life too busy to chisel out the time and energy necessary to read and dialogue about recent titles in pop-culture. However, he is willing to spend and be spent for the sake of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is precisely why he’s joined the group.

Steve’s desire is to hear the culture through the literature and conversation, understand the writers’ perspectives, and then interpret each book through the Christian worldview. All this, to the end of sharing with the group the Christian perspective of not only the book as a book, but also the often personal (and/or cosmic) issues that it may raise. Strategically, Steve’s wisely decided to use the tried and true Creation/Fall/Redemption paradigm to classify each books content, evaluating the material: “affirming the good, correcting the bad, and presenting the gospel.”

I found Steve’s idea fresh and imaginative. Certainly worth sharing and imitating.

The Lord bless you, Steve, joining him in the missio Dei, right where you are! Keep us updated!

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

The Eagle and the Arrow, a Fable of Aesop

An Eagle was soaring through the air when suddenly it heard
the whizz of an Arrow, and felt itself wounded to death. Slowly
it fluttered down to the earth, with its life-blood pouring out of
it. Looking down upon the Arrow with which it had been pierced,
it found that the shaft of the Arrow had been feathered with one
of its own plumes. "Alas!" it cried, as it died,

"We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction."

Monday, January 25, 2010

The Emperor's New Clothes

By Hans Christian Anderson

Many years ago there lived an Emperor who was so exceedingly fond of fine new clothes that he spent vast sums of money on dress. To him clothes meant more than anything else in the world. He took no interest in his army, nor did he care to go to the theatre, or to drive about in his state coach, unless it was to display his new clothes. He had different robes for every single hour of the day.

In the great city where he lived life was gay and strangers were always coming and going. Everyone knew about the Emperor's passion for clothes.

Now one fine day two swindlers, calling themselves weavers, arrived. They declared that they could make the most magnificent cloth that one could imagine; cloth of most beautiful colours and elaborate patterns. Not only was the material so beautiful, but the clothes made from it had the special power of being invisible to everyone who was stupid or not fit. for his post.

"What a splendid idea," thought the Emperor. "What useful clothes to have. If I had such a suit of clothes I could know at once which of my people is stupid or unfit for his post."

So the Emperor gave the swindlers large sums of money and the two weavers set up their looms in the palace. They demanded the finest thread of the best silk and the finest gold and they pretended to work at their looms. But they put nothing on the looms. The frames stood empty. The silk and gold thread they stuffed into their bags. So they sat pretending to weave, and continued to work at the empty loom till late into the night. Night after night they went home with their money and their bags full of the finest silk and gold thread. Day after day they pretended to work.

Now the Emperor was eager to know how much of the cloth was finished, and would have loved to see for himself. He was, however, somewhat uneasy. "Suppose," he thought secretly, "suppose I am unable to see the cloth. That would mean I am either stupid or unfit for my post. That cannot be," he thought, but all the same he decided to send for his faithful old minister to go and see. "He will best be able to see how the cloth looks. He is far from stupid and splendid at his work."

So the faithful old minister went into the hall where the two weavers sat beside the empty looms pretending to work with all their might.

The Emperor's minister opened his eyes wide. "Upon my life!" he thought. "I see nothing at all, nothing." But he did not say so.

The two swindlers begged him to come nearer and asked him how he liked it. "Are not the colors exquisite, and see how intricate are the patterns," they said. The poor old minister stared and stared. Still he could see nothing, for there was nothing. But he did not dare to say he saw nothing. "Nobody must find out,"' thought he. "I must never confess that I could not see the stuff."

"Well," said one of the rascals. "You do not say whether it pleases you."

"Oh, it is beautiful-most excellent, to be sure. Such a beautiful design, such exquisite colors. I shall tell the Emperor how enchanted) I am with the cloth."

"We are very glad to hear that," said the weavers, and they started to describe the colors and patterns in great detail. The old minister listened very carefully so that he could repeat the description to the Emperor. They also demanded more money and more gold thread, saying that they needed it to finish the cloth. But, of course, they put all they were given into their bags and pockets and kept on working at their empty looms.

Soon after this the Emperor sent another official to see how the men were ,getting on and to ask whether the cloth would soon be ready. Exactly the same happened with him as with the minister. He stood and stared, but as there was nothing to be seen, he could see nothing.

"Is not the material beautiful?" said the swindlers, and again they talked of 'the patterns and the exquisite colors. "Stupid I certainly am not," thought the official. "Then I must be unfit for my post. But nobody shall know that I could not see the material." Then he praised the material he did not see and declared that he was delighted with the colors and the marvelous patterns.

To the Emperor he said when he returned, "The cloth the weavers are preparing is truly magnificent."

Everybody in the city had heard of the secret cloth and were talking about the splendid material.

And now the Emperor was curious to see the costly stuff for himself while it was still upon the looms. Accompanied by a number of selected ministers, among whom were the two poor ministers who had already been before, the Emperor went to the weavers. There they sat in front of the empty looms, weaving more diligently than ever, yet without a single thread upon the looms.

"Is not the cloth magnificent?" said the two ministers. "See here, the splendid pattern, the glorious colors." Each pointed to the empty loom. Each thought that the other could see the material.

"What can this mean?" said the Emperor to himself. "This is terrible. Am I so stupid? Am I not fit to be Emperor? This is disastrous," he thought. But aloud he said, "Oh, the cloth is perfectly wonderful. It has a splendid pattern and such charming colors." And he nodded his approval and smiled appreciatively and stared at the empty looms. He would not, he could not, admit he saw nothing, when his two ministers had praised the material so highly. And all his men looked and looked at the empty looms. Not one of them saw anything there at all. Nevertheless, they all said, "Oh, the cloth is magnificent."

They advised the Emperor to have some new clothes made from this splendid material to wear in the great procession the following day.

"Magnificent." "Excellent." "Exquisite," went from mouth to mouth and everyone was pleased. Each of the swindlers was given a decoration to wear in his button-hole and the title of "Knight of the Loom".

The rascals sat up all that night and worked, burning more than sixteen candles, so that everyone could see how busy they were making the suit of clothes ready for the procession. Each of them had a great big pair of scissors and they cut in the air, pretending to cut the cloth with them, and sewed with needles without any thread.

There was great excitement in the palace and the Emperor's clothes were the talk of the town. At last the weavers declared that the clothes were ready. Then the Emperor, with the most distinguished gentlemen of the court, came to the weavers. Each of the swindlers lifted up an arm as if he were holding something. "Here are Your Majesty's trousers," said one. "This is Your Majesty's mantle," said the other. "The whole suit is as light as a spider's web. Why, you might almost feel as if you had nothing on, but that is just the beauty of it."

"Magnificent," cried the ministers, but they could see nothing at all. Indeed there was nothing to be seen.

"Now if Your Imperial Majesty would graciously consent to take off your clothes," said the weavers, "we could fit on the new ones." So the Emperor laid aside his clothes and the swindlers pretended to help him piece by piece into the new ones they were supposed to have made.

The Emperor turned from side to side in front of the long glass as if admiring himself.

"How well they fit. How splendid Your Majesty's robes look: What gorgeous colors!" they all said.

"The canopy which is to be held over Your Majesty in the procession is waiting," announced the Lord High Chamberlain.

"I am quite ready," announced the Emperor, and he looked at himself again in the mirror, turning from side to side as if carefully examining his handsome attire.

The courtiers who were to carry the train felt about on the ground pretending to lift it: they walked on solemnly pretending to be carrying it. Nothing would have persuaded them to admit they could not see the clothes, for fear they would be thought stupid or unfit for their posts.

And so the Emperor set off under the high canopy, at the head of the great procession. It was a great success. All the people standing by and at the windows cheered and cried, "Oh, how splendid are the Emperor's new clothes. What a magnificent train! How well the clothes fit!" No one dared to admit that he couldn't see anything, for who would want it to be known that he was either stupid or unfit for his post?

None of the Emperor's clothes had ever met with such success.

But among the crowds a little child suddenly gasped out, "But he hasn't got anything on." And the people began to whisper to one another what the child had said. "He hasn't got anything on." "There's a little child saying he hasn't got anything on." Till everyone was saying, "But he hasn't got anything on." The Emperor himself had the uncomfortable feeling that what they were whispering was only too true. "But I will have to go through with the procession," he said to himself.

So he drew himself up and walked boldly on holding his head higher than before, and the courtiers held on to the train that wasn't there at all.

Saturday, January 23, 2010

AVOIDING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

“Therefore I still contend with you, declares Yahweh, and with you children’s children I will contend. For cross to the coasts of Cyprus and see, or send to Kedar and examine with care; see if there has been such a thing. Has a nation changed its gods, even though they are no gods? But my people have changed their glory for that which does not profit. Be appalled, O heavens, at this; be shocked, be utterly desolate, declares Yahweh” (Jer 2:9—12).

With these words, Yahweh is wondering at the fact that the nations, who worship non-Gods, are incorrigibly faithful to their non-God idols, while Israel, a spectacle in ‘comparative religions,’ is seemingly predisposed to abandoning the Rock of their refuge and hope, Yahweh. Geerhardus Vos makes the following observation in Biblical Theology:

“Jeremiah complains that Israel is more inclined to change its God than the heathen nations. It is not difficult to explain this. The pagan nations had no desire to change, because their religion was the natural expression of their disposition. Israel persistently struggled to throw off the yoke of Jehovah’s service, because the old pagan nature of Israel felt it as a yoke” (1983, 62).

Are we today decidedly immune from Jeremiah’s marveling? Does our “old pagan nature” cause us to throw of the Lordship of Christ’s rule, while the actual pagans are thoroughly consistent and staunch in their ultimate commitments? Sadly, at times, especially when discussing apologetics, we must answer yes.

The archetypical sin of our first parents in the garden was based on the assumption that humans can reason rightly and interpret reality properly independent of God’s verbal revelation. They believed under the influence of the serpent, that God’s Word was unclear and his knowledge of things was indeterminate, for the whole question was whether or not the judgment of death would actually follow their snatching the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Disregarding the Creator-creature relationship, they decided to conduct an empirical analysis of the claims of the Creator; they held God’s knowledge and creaturely knowledge to be co-equal. Thus, it was believed that, man could reason according to logical laws and empirical observations and come to a true knowledge of God, themselves and their world, all-independent of the Word of God.

This, as we well know, both propositionally and experientially, had disastrous, cosmic, and eternal results. If this were the case when man was in a state of righteousness—in need of God’s revelation for proper reinterpretation of things and that reasoning independent of God’s Word brings ruinous consequences—how much more now, east of Eden, being radically depraved?

Presuppositionalists aptly describe this independence from God, particularly in the area of epistemology, as striving for autonomy. Bahnsen defines the term autonomy thus: “’Autonomy’ refers to being a law unto oneself, so that one’s thinking is independent of any outside authority, including God’s. Autonomous reasoning takes itself philosophically as the final reference and interpretation, the ultimate court of intellectual appeal; it presumes to be self-governing, self-determinative, and self-directing” (Van Til’s Apologetic, 1 fn. 2).

We see, then, that traditional apologists must delineate their apologetic method from their theological conclusions. As far as their theology is biblically faithful and historically orthodox, their apologetical assumptions are inconsistent with their theology. On the one hand, they would affirm that all that’s bound up in Bahnsen’s definition of autonomy could be appropriately ascribed to God alone. In apologetic practice, however, traditional methods afford and even foster the non-Christians in their fallen desire and struggle for autonomy. Traditionalists seek to satisfy the non-Christian’s struggle for autonomy by feeding their insatiable insistence for scientific evidences, philosophical and logical proofs, and demonstrations of the Bible’s ethics that fit their own sinful emotivism. Submitting one’s thinking, in faith, to the Lordship of Christ as the Light that gives us light to see anything aright (Ps 36:9), is, for them, something that comes at the end of the apologetic encounter; this act of repentance is seen strictly as evangelistic and posterior to apologetics.

Herein lays the analogy to Jeremiah’s charge: The adherents of non-Christian systems of thought are more faithful to their epistemological authorities, since these are merely an expressed manifestation of their commitment to their own autonomy. But Christ’s people are quick to exchange their glory—i.e., Christ’s epistemological Lordship—for that which does not profit, the futile, darkened epistemological autonomy of man.

Presuppositionalism doesn’t make any clear distinctions between apologetics and evangelism, for this apologetic is hardly more than a relentless challenge to the non-Christian’s sinful, white-knuckled claim to intellectual autonomy, and seeking to see this taken captive to obey Christ. Furthermore, presuppositionalists are willing confessors of Christ: that their believing obedience to him rests not in some linear, valid line of reason; their submission to Christ is the result of the Holy Spirit graciously regenerating them so that they proudly stand under the gentle-light yoke of Christ’s rule over them, especially their minds. They contend that, since surrender to God and his wisdom is the beginning, not the end, of knowledge (Prov 1:7), and that the unbeliever’s mind is at enmity with God, there must therefore be a frontal assault on the unbeliever’s epistemological autonomy, and at once an appeal to repentance from their idols of a depraved mind. Autonomous reason can never lead one to Christ; it must be recognized for what it really is—the very sin that is in constant rebellion to God and refuses to surrender to the Savior.

With Jeremiah, the presuppositionalist wonders at the traditional apologetic, how it exchanges the glory of Christ’s epistemic Lordship for the unprofitable would-be authority of autonomous human reason. With Tertullian, we agree, “It must...be added, that no solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and substance of the whole thing” (On the Soul, II). And finally, with the Master himself, who declares that, no one can serve two masters (Matt 6:24).

Presuppositionalism strips human reason of its would-be autonomy; our old nature still struggles (or oftimes surrenders to) for its autonomy. Perhaps this, then, is one of the main reasons for avoiding presuppositional apologetics.

For an example of APPLYING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM click here.

Monday, January 18, 2010

GRASPING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Here is a helpful article from Gregory Koukl at "Stand to Reason." The focus of the article is on what’s called the problem of “moral grounding.”

Koukl begins with the classic objection to the faith, the problem of evil. He then uses the problem of moral grounding to indirectly defuse the challenge by pointing out that for the problem of evil to be real, evil must be real and so a violation of a real good. He then states the obvious, that relativists can’t raise the objection from evil honestly, since real and objective evil can’t exist in a relativistic framework.

At this point, Koukl presents a question.

“The grounding question is: Given that there is real evil and good, as well, why is the world the way it is? What properly accounts for this moral feature of the world?”

Granted, Koukl is a rationalist, epistemologically speaking. However, even a green-winged presuppositionalist will recognize the transcendental nature of the question Koukl sets forth. He goes on to argue that morality is deontological; that is, morals have an obligatory nature. Morals are not descriptive but prescriptive; they don’t tell us how things are but how they ought to be. Morals have an ought-ness about them.

Finally, Koukl demonstrates that obligation assumes personality. Obligation is something that exists between persons. Although I need to prune my Azaleas for spring, I don’t feel any obligation to them to do it for them. They are impersonal entities and impersonals don’t prescribe what persons ought to do. Morals therefore could only have their “grounding” in a personal moral-maker to whom we are obligated.

Koukl is quite apt with illustrations, and doesn’t let us down in this article. The illustration serves to show the a priority of morality, thus concluding that morals have their “grounding” in the personal, moral-maker God of Christian theism.

While this is a good article, I’m not commending it for what it’s worth in and of itself. I’d have you read the article and then consider the auxiliary application I’m going to suggest.

Yesterday I posted Robert Reymond’s attempt at defining the presuppositional apologetic method. Today I thought I’d use Koukl’s article as a springboard to helping those unacquainted with presuppositionalism grasp it better.

Christians who are the slightest bit self-conscious in their apologetic practice are generally accustom to denying unbelievers any grounding for morality, since only Yahweh, the holy Law-Giver, alone has the authority to tell us what is right and wrong. This is nothing especially new; Koukl is sort of playing Capt. Obvious in this way.

A helpful step in grasping what distinguishes presuppositionalism from traditional methods is that the presuppositional apologete extends this denial of “grounding” from the unbeliever to every sphere of human experience, especially the area of epistemology.

Epistemology is the study of how we know what we know, the methods and extent of our knowing, et cetera. My favorite definition is (roughly stated) “When asked how you know what you know, then take away the option of answering, ‘I just do,’ and what is left is epistemology.”

The presuppositional challenge to unbelief is that unless the God of Christian theism is presupposed at the beginning, knowledge of anything is impossible. Christ, the Word of God, endowing light and speaking with absolute and Self-attesting authority alone provides the necessary “grounding” for the integration and unity of knowledge necessary for human knowledge to happen at all. It is an epistemological axiom that unless everything is known by Someone, nothing can be known by anyone. Exhaustive knowledge must reside Somewhere in order for any knowledge to reside elsewhere. (I capitalize “Someone” and “Somewhere” in the preceding sentences because in Whomever or Wherever all knowledge resides, that one or place deserves this respect!)

The traditional apologetic method Evangelicals are so used to ironically operates on a Roman Catholic understanding of anthropology and the fall of man. The traditional apologetic operates on the assumption that the fall had little or no effect on man’s reasoning ability; sin is a moral rather than epistemological issue, or so it’s presumed. This, however, cannot stand against either the biblical data, human experience, or historic Protestant theology. That the fall was primarily an epistemological laps is sufficient to prove the Romish doctrine wrong.

Tomorrow I’ll post what I believe is a positive vindication of these claims. In the mean time, ponder this analogy. Presuppositionalism is (in part) just an extension of Koukl’s argument in his “moral grounding” article. Presuppositionalism argues that God speaking in the Word of God is the transcendentally necessary ontological “grounding” for knowledge. We argue that human reason, the laws of logic, induction, et cetera depend upon humans being created in God’s image; the biblical God, who is the comprehensively rational One. Moreover, since the all the world reflects his glory, majesty and “eternal power and Godhead,” the world has a rational structure which corresponds with not only God’s Mind, but man’s as well. Therefore, God is the necessary ontological “grounding” of epistemology, from the impossibility of all contrary epistemological options.

This illustration, from the moral argument to the epistemological argument, may help some grasp the distinctives of a presuppositional apologetic.

Sunday, January 17, 2010

DEFINING PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

The charge is often made that presuppositionalists have a proclivity for ambiguity in their writings. There is certainly some warrant for this. I was talking to Ken Ham (who is no slouch to be sure) of Answers in Genesis one evening about their ministry’s overt move towards a presuppositional methodology. He almost immediately complained that Van Til’s work left him mystified. Ham added that Van Tilian purist, Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s most articulate interpreter, wasn’t much help either.

We who’ve studied (and studied and studied!) these two patriarchs of the biblical apologetic method can surely empathize with Ham. Despite Van Til’s penchant for creating new vocabulary (often by using arcane philosophical terms, packing them with utterly unique content) and assuming with his readers/students a PhD. in the history of philosophy, sometimes, I think, our problem is that we over complicate things.

For instance, one of Van Til’s more often expressed statements of the transcendental challenge to unbelief hung on the term “predication.” Without first presupposing the triune God of Scripture, said he, predication is impossible. Our tendency is to assume that Van Til means something other than what is normally meant by the term; but he doesn’t. The point is that sometimes we fail to grasp the subtlety of the presuppositional procedure.

We live in a world of people (sadly, ourselves often included) that is so blinded by their most basic presupposition of their would-be epistemological autonomy that any challenge to that autonomy is prima facie incredible and absurd. (How much more, then, the claim that humans cannot, in principle, predicate any subject with any property?!?)

Misunderstanding presuppositionalism therefore can be for reason of its proponent's philosophical complexity and/or the method’s inherent simplicity and fidelity to the God of Scripture. However, another cause of misunderstanding can be a lack of clear definition, especially one contrasting the method with the traditional “Case for this...Case for that” method that has been popular for so long (i.e., evidentialism, classical apologetics).

Dr. Robert Reymond in his New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith does a pretty good job of giving a definition (and/or description) of presuppositionalism and contrasting it with the popular evidentialism. Here are a couple of very helpful paragraphs from Pt. 2, “Introduction to the Doctrine of God” (pp. 145—46).

“Believing that ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge' (Prov 1:7), that 'all treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ' (Col 2:3), and therefore that the triune God (and/or the self-attesting Christ) is the transcendental, necessary ground of all meaning, intelligibility and predication, the presuppositional apologist maintains that the truth of God’s self-authenticating Word should be presupposed from start to finish throughout one’s apologetic witness. Accordingly, while the presuppositionalist values logic he understands that apart from God there is no reason to believe that the laws of logic correspond universally to objective reality. While he values science he understands that apart from God there is no reliable basis for doing science. While he values ethics he understands that apart from God moral principles are simply changing conventions and today’s vices can become tomorrow’s virtues. While he affirms the dignity and significance of human personhood he understands that apart from God man is simply a biological machine, an accident of nature, a cipher. And while he values the concepts of purpose, cause, probability and meaning he understands that apart from God these concepts have no real basis or meaning. Therefore, he thinks the Christian evidentialist is being untrue to his own faith when he grants to the unbeliever the hypothetical possibility of this being a non-theistic world that can successfully function and be rightly understood in terms of the laws of logic and the human sciences. And to suggest that the law of noncontradiction, the ‘law of causality,’ and ‘the basic reliability of sense perception’ are more non-negotiably certain in this world that God himself is to deny the existence of the sovereign God of the universe ‘for whom and through whom and to whom are all things’ (Rom 11:36). To do so is also abandon the Christ who ‘is before all things, in whom all thing consist’ (Col 1:7), ‘in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Col 2:3), and without whom man can do nothing (John 15:5). He reminds the evidentialist that it is not God who is the felon on trial; men are the felons. It is not God’s character and word which are questionable; men’s are (Job 40:1, 8; Rom 3:4; 9:20). And it is not the Christian who is the unauthorized intruder in this world...

It is not then the Christian primarily who must justify his Christian prescence in the world but the non-Christian who must be made to feel the burden of justifying his non-Christian views.”

Robertson...Help, Don't Help!

Seldom does he fail; if any catastrophic event happens, Pat Robertson is there to inform the world exactly God’s reason(s) for the calamity. Haiti’s bereavements have been quickly met with Robertson’s self-pronouncements of the divine motives behind the disaster: God’s judgment (of course!) for the people allegedly having made a “pact with the devil.”

The guys at The White Horse Inn have done a good job at answering Robertson’s ridiculous remarks and moving readers toward a biblical assessment of the horrible situation that has befallen this impoverished people.

As Christians, we are commanded by the our Lord to intercede on behalf of those in Haiti, and extend relief, according to our means, to those suffering, especially our brothers and sisters in Christ who are there. We should also be prompted to meditate and study the problem of the suffering and evil that is present in our Father’s world, being ready always with a biblical answer to anyone that might inquire of us how we understand and have hope in the face of this such darkness. In this connection, let’s us also not be shy in asking others to do the same; this is a great opportunity to engage nonbelievers with the reality of suffering and evil, asking them for an answer to the problem from their own perspective and presuppositions.


O Lord, Sovereign King, eternal, infinite and unchangeable in power and goodness and wisdom, be ever-present in that power, working out your purposes of glory and good in Haiti; Lord Jesus, you, who knows grief and suffering better than we, comfort and shepherd the hearts of those who are walking through the valley of death; and Holy Spirit, applying the power of the death and resurrection Christ, renew and recreate this void and uninhabitable land and its people, demonstrating that in Christ the old has passed away, death is destroyed in his death, and all things have become new through your infallible, victorious, irresistible and always efficacious regeneration. To the praise and glory of the triune God. Amen.

Saturday, January 16, 2010

"Theodramatic" Theology?

Here is a very insightful summary by Guy Davies of Kevin Vanhoozer’s The Drama of Doctrine. He focuses especially on the implications a “theodramatic” view of Scripture, redemption and theology has on preaching (among other crucial aspects). Interesting and fresh!

Friday, January 15, 2010

Tertullian on Idolatry and Its Taunt-worthiness

What are the consequences of people's rejection to building their lives on a reverent respect and fear of the Lord? One of the consequences is foolishness, the hatred of all knowledge and wisdom and sound instruction (Prov 1:7, 29). This, because a person can’t despise the One in whom are hidden all the riches of wisdom and knowledge and still retain a solid foundation for life (Col 2:3). Every aspect of the unbeliever’s thoughts, words and deeds is resting squarely on a sand-like foundation (Matt 7:24ff).

Additionally, since as humans created to reflect what we reverence, in our unbelief we wind up taking on the dead, impersonal, and irrational characteristics of whatever object we have given God’s place of ultimacy over to (Ps 115:3—8). This idolatry leads us to futile reasoning and hearts of darkness. Finally, our exchanging the natural relationship we are to have with our God for that which is unnatural, worshipping something in creation (ultimately ourselves), leads us to pervert ALL that is natural. Making the natural unnatural and then proclaiming it “natural,” putting our selves as gods, we throw everything upside down and backwards (Rom 1:18ff). What’s saddest is that, we believe the upside down and backwards world is “just the way things are”—in a word, normal.

What the unbelieving world calls “normal,” Paul describes as a world of people who operate within every domain in the “futility of their minds,” and are “darkened in their understanding...hard-hearted” and “ignorant” (Eph 4:17—18). However, Paul also teaches us that God, in the omnipotent power and divine wisdom of the gospel, has made the world’s wisdom to be seen for the foolishness that it is; and the world’s perceived strength as it is in reality, weakness.

Now, as confessing Christians, we at least mentally assent to and affirm the truth of these biblical assessments of the unbelieving rationale (or should!). Far from Freud’s “psycho-scientific” conclusion that, our primary problems are the result of repressed anxieties of our sexual or patricidal tendencies; or Skinner’s excusing inferences from a person’s antecedent sociological depravations of one kind or another, the biblical diagnosis of our problem is simply idolatry. And idolatry makes one stupid—sin is irrationality in its highest manifestation. Despite the perceptions and delusions of the world, this is the reality and nature of the case.

Nevertheless, how often are we honest (or convicted) enough to tell the truth in this regard? Why aren’t Christians more willing to “answer the fool according to his folly” (Prov 1:5), not merely announcing the biblical diagnosis, but demonstrating it as well? As D. A. Carson often says, we’ll never agree on the solution (i.e., the gospel) until we can first agree on the problem (i.e., idolatry). The gospel is the only alternative to idolatry.

There has been one in our past who was not afraid to do these very things: reduce humanity’s dilemma down to the living true God or idols, and then make a mockery of the latter option. This one’s name was Tertullian.

In chapter I of De Idololatria, Tertullian gives a persuasive exhibition of how every sin, vice and avarice is in principle only a flagrant display of the deeper problem of idolatry. “The principle crime of the human race, the highest guilt charged upon the world, the whole procuring cause of judgment, is idolatry.” This is the opening line of this work, and the thesis that the rest compellingly proves.

Fraud, even, is rooted in idolatry. Tertullian explains, “The essence of fraud, I take it, is, that any should seize what is another’s, or refuse to another his due; and of course, fraud done toward man is a name of great crime. Well, but idolatry does fraud to God, by refusing to Him, and conferring on others, His honors.” Many similar correspondences are draw in this way. He concludes this chapter. “[S]ince all faults savor opposition to God...doubtless, whoever commits a fault is chargeable with idolatry.”

From a biblical perspective, idolatry is the root of all evil; for Tertullian, it was the same.

We insist that idolatry has not only moral but also intellectual fallout—idolatry = irrationality. Tertullian was quite comfortable to repeatedly point this out to his opponents. It must further be borne in mind that, in the late second and early third centuries, the N. African and Asia Minor Christian communities were experiencing a baptism of blood. Tertullian’s penchant for sardonic tones and heckling taunts were on the pains of death. Today, in the West, we fear challenging our Intelligentsians in the academy, for example, lest our grades suffer; we instead regurgitate their buffoonery back to them on tests and in papers, and in the end, place a measure of offering on the alter of rebellious human Reason. Not Tertullian. There was no compromise at any point; there will always be antithesis between the Church and the Academy, between Jerusalem and Athens.

Last night, Beaner and I read a striking example of his canny for making a mockery out of the judgments of idolaters who despised Christians for nothing more than their name. His point was to illustrate how the Emperor and the Senates’ hatred for Christ and his people had driven them to utter madness. This he does in both Apology II, III and Ad Nationes II. The latter makes the point lucid.

“In this case [of those charged only with being Christians] you actually conduct trials contrary to the usual form of judicial process against criminals; for when culprits are brought up for trial, should they deny the charge, you press them for a confession by tortures. When Christians, however, confess without compulsion, you apply torture to induce them to deny. What great perversity is this, when you stand out against confession, and change the use of torture, compelling the man who frankly acknowledges the charge to evade it, and him who is unwilling, to deny it? You, who preside for the purpose of extorting truth, demand falsehood from us alone, that we declare ourselves not to be what we are...To be sure, you put others on the rack and gibbet, to get them to deny what they have the reputation of being. Now, when they deny (the charge against them), you do not believe them; but on our denial [of Christ and the faith], you instantly believe us!”

“Let this perversity of yours lead you to suspect that there is some hidden power in the case under whose influence you act against the forms [of jurisprudence], against the nature of public justice, even against the laws themselves” (Apol. II).

“Upside down and backwards” are the terms we ascribed to the folly of idolatry earlier, and Tertullian has given us a brilliant illustration of it in the antichrist idolaters of his own day. “O miserable deliverance,--under the necessity of the case, a self-contradiction!...Goodness is of less value that hatred of Christians!” (Apol. II, III).

Although Tertullian had some heterodox slippage, not least with his Montanistic leanings, his taunts and censors against the idolatry and heresy of his day were reminiscent of Paul and in parts Jesus also.

That’s Tertullian. But, what about us today?

Viewing the World Aright

“For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse” (Romans 1:20).

For Bible class, I (Israel) have been working through James Jordan’s book Through New Eyes, and something caught my eye. Jordan briefly touches on the subject of how the world reveals God and his attributes. It is absolutely amazing how many comparisons there are between creatures on our little blue marble and God and his personality. He has revealed himself through our world in so many ways.

To make this point, Jordan draws from the mastery of the Dutch neo-Calvinist Herman Bavinck’s work in Reformed Dogmatics, vol. II, where Bavink gives this list of analogous comparisons between nature and God and what these teach us about God and his personality:

“He is compared to the lion (Isa 31:4), an eagle (Deut 32:11), a lamb (Isa 53:7), a hen (Matt 23:37), the sun (Ps 84:11), the morning star (Rev 22:16), the light (Ps 27:1), the lamp (Rev 21:23), a fire (Heb 12:29), a spring or fountain (Ps 36:9; Jer 2:13), food, bread, drink, water, anointment (Isa 55:1; Jn 4:10; 6:35, 55), a rock (Deut 32:4), a refuge (Ps 119:114), a tower (Prov 18:10), a stronghold (Ps 9:9), a shadow (Ps 91:1; 121:5), a shield (Ps 84:11), a road (Jn 14:6), a temple (Rev 21:22), and so on” (p. 101).

Jordan captures this by saying, “...God chose to reveal the infinity of his personality in the diversity of this world...” The Lord created this universe in such a way that man could see his creator in the creation around him. Everything in the universe reflects God’s character, but we are special symbols, made in God’s very own image (Gen. 1:26). How well are you reflecting God’s character?

“The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge” (Ps. 19:1-2).


Israel

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

The Bible: America's favorite unopened text!

David R. Nienhuis has written an intriguing piece for Modern Reformation on the state of biblical illiteracy our country, particularly with youth. Well worth the read. Check it out here.

Saturday, January 9, 2010

IRENAEUS: ADAM, CHRIST, AND REDEMPTIVE HISTORY

I love patrology (i.e., the study of the early Church Fathers); I love apologetics; I love good theology, and I love a redemptive-historical view of the Bible, one that holds Jesus high and centered. These are just a few reasons why I love Irenaeus and his works.

Reading the patristics often requires a critical eye. Few early Church fathers were thoroughly orthodox in their theology, oftimes, being influenced by their heritage and saturation in Platonism and the spirit of the age. With Irenaeus, however, one may relax and enjoy. His mind and subsequently his theology were radically transformed by the Rule of Faith (i.e., the essential gospel) and a Christological reading of all the Scriptures.

James Dennison, Jr. has written an insightful piece titled “Irenaeus and Redemptive History”, which covers Irenaeus and his redemptive-historical hermeneutic, particularly the “recapitulation” theme. Something very central to Irenaeus’ eschatology, Christology, anthropology, and soteriology—in a word all his theology.

Friday, January 8, 2010

THE PRIMARY RULES OF ARGUMENT ANALYSIS

Two years ago, when Beaner was studying critical thinking, I made this simple list for her curriculum. Whether one is studying Scripture, engaging in apologetic conversation, reading the newspaper, or listening to a commercial on the radio, knowing the basic rules for identifying an argument (or lack thereof) is crucial.

Proverbs teaches us that, “The first one who states his case first seems right, until another comes and examines him” (18:13). And how often do the Scriptures warn us against being deceived, the root of the primeval, archetypical sin? Moreover, “A fool takes no pleasure in understanding, but only expressing his opinion” (Prov 18:2).

How, then, are we to discern between mere opinion, conjecture or arbitrariness and reliable patterns of reasoning? It’s only a start, but being able to discover and identify premises and conclusions is essential. So, here are some general guidelines and helps for that end...

1. Premises and conclusions are not identified by their content or their location in the paragraph.

2. The appearance of the following words at the beginning of a sentence or clause signifies that what follows will be a:

PREMISE
a. since
b. for
c. because
d. as
e. whereas
f. inasmuch as
g. seeing that

CONCLUSION
a. therefore
b. thus
c. hence
d. so
e. consequently
f. accordingly
g. it follows that
h. as a result
i. I conclude

These terms may or may not be present; in other words, the rule is not absolute. But the presence of one of these words before a premise or a conclusion is the rule, not the exception. Argument identification can be greatly enhanced by learning the various forms of valid arguments. (We’ll look at that in a future post.)

3. An enthymeme is a kind of argument that is so clear from the context that it assumes the reader/hearer will supply some premises or the conclusion.

One example of the enthymeme that is lucid is Jesus’ argument that “My kingdom is not of this world” in John 18:36. Yes; this verse contains a complete argument. It goes like this:

P1. “If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would have been fighting, that I might not be delivered over to the Jews.”

P2. [The supplied premise: And it’s not so that my servants are fighting]

Therefore,

C1. My kingdom is not of this world.

P2 is supplied by the reader/hearer thus completing the the pattern of thought. That this is enthymemic is reinforced by the fact that Jesus is employing a particular from of argument, known as the modus tollens (one we’ll look at in the future), which is made complete with the assumed/supplied premise.

4. A sorites is a set of interlocking arguments in which there are propositions that may be both a conclusion in one and a premise in another following argument. This method doesn’t have a great showing in our culture; this due to the fact that media saturation, the ridiculous institution known as public “education,” and the misological attitude that has prevailed Western society of late, has degenerated our abilities to follow a lengthy, escalating discourse (esp. a written one). Nevertheless, if you read the Bible or any theological or philosophical works anterior to the 20th century, then you’ve been exposed to the sorites. Paul’s letters, especially Romans, provide great examples, as does Hebrews.

I hope you'll find these points helpful.

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Salvation History Overview Article From The ESV Study Bible

Clicking here will take you to a wonderful article, which is also found in the recently released ESV Study Bible from Crossway Bibles. Appropriately, Crossway placed the article just before the Old Testament. It’s concise but robust. The sections are as follows:

God’s Plan for History
Christ in the Old Testament
The Promises of God
Warnings and Curses
Covenants
Offspring
Christ as the Last Adam
Shadows, Prefigures, and “Types”
Christ the Mediator

Those initiated in biblical theology will rightly recognize the subject matter as topics of the same. You’ll also notice the stress on Christ in all the Scriptures, as well as the continuity of the Old and New Covenants.

Sadly, few Christians have even a cursory understanding of the systematic theology they profess; and worse, fewer still can give a cogent expression of any of the topics listed above.

This article is a great contribution to the greatest study Bible available anywhere. The English Standard Version is, I believe, the finest expression of Holy Writ in the English language. And the commentary notes are as good as it gets. I can’t recommend this Bible enough. But even if I didn’t get the ESV Study Bible, I’d print this article and read it at least once a year. The themes discussed therein are to the Bible what an engine is to your car—the driving power behind every movement!

Sunday, January 3, 2010

John Walton on the use of the plural pronouns in Gen 1:26

I recently received John Walton’s NIV Application Commentary on Genesis from a good friend. Apart from a general dislike for the structural format of the series, the content has been both extremely insightful and bewildering at the same time.

Every one has their “thing,” their particular emphasis and specialty. Of course, Walton’s thing is ancient Near Eastern (ANE) background comparative studies. Walton’s emphasis provides us with fruitful reference material, which helps us to transcend our cultural situatedness and read the text of the OT through the lenses of reconstructed elements of an ANE paradigm. Walton’s contributions in this respect shine through in his part in the IVP Bible Background Commentary: Old Testament.

I’ve found times, however, in his Genesis commentary that this emphasis becomes so axiomatic for Walton that, the comparative analysis is held at the expense of the straight forward teaching in other biblical passages, not least the ones that are authoritatively interpreting the various Genesis texts he’s considering. Genesis 1:26 is a case in point.

Walton affords two-plus pages to the use of plural pronouns in reference to God in Gen 1:26 (i.e., “Let us...in our image”; see pp. 128—30). Walton sets forward three lines of reasoning used to deal with this anything but uncontroversial topic: 1) theological, 2) grammatical, and 3) cultural. The cultural perspective is later qualified as offering two differing veins, one of which is Walton’s preferred resolution for the plurals. Walton defines these three categories as follows:

1. Theological: The plurals are explained as an expression of the plurality within the Godhead, either specifically of the Trinity or at least as a recognition of the two persons represented by the creator God (elohim) and the Holy Spirit of verse 2.

2. Grammatical: The plurals are explained as an expression of grammatical or rhetorical conventions, including self-deliberation, plural of majesty, and grammatical agreement with the plural elohim.

3. Cultural: The plurals are explained against the background of ancient Near Eastern culture.

One of the cultural interpretive options is that the plurals represent a vestige of polytheism. Walton rightly dismisses this option out of hand, as it is the result of heterodox presuppositions that he (and most other students of the Bible) simply can’t adopt. The grammatical option even less attention before dismissal.

Granting the ANE background and other OT text such as 1 Kings 22:19—22; Is 14:13, and Job 1, Walton concludes that the cultural view that assumes the plurals are to be understood as representing a “heavenly court” comprised of angels is the best case hypothesis for reading Gen 1:26.

Walton’s positive conclusion notwithstanding, my concern with his handling of this verse is in connection with his dismissal of the theological reading of the plurals.

He begins by admitting that, “the theological is probably the most popular in traditional circles...” I’m sorry, but given the contemporary attitude towards anything “traditional,” this reads as poisoning the well—he has bent the reader toward his conclusion prior to hearing his argument, if, that is, the reader doesn’t understand themselves to be part of the “traditional circle.” Today, it is almost unanimous consensus that if something is coming from a traditional perspective, it is necessarily wrong or at very least needs serious questioning.

In addition, the statement reads as if the theological reading is held only by those in “traditional circles,” or in other words, modern “traditionalists,” a.k.a, anti-intellectual fundamentalists. How it ought to read, though, is that the theological view of Gen 1:26 comes not from a traditional “circle” but rather a long “line” of tradition. The theological reading has a sustained pedigree throughout the orthodox hermeneutical tradition.

For instance, if the Epistle of Barnabas sheds any light on the apostolic interpretation of this verse, then the following is significant. “For the Scripture says concerning us, while he speaks to the Son, ‘Let Us make man...’” (Barn., VI). Likewise, Irenaeus has this: “[T]he Son and Holy Spirit, to whom He says, ‘Let Us make man’” (AH, IV, Preface: 4). And again, “[T]he Son and Spirit, by whom and in whom...He made all things, to whom He also speaks, saying, ‘Let Us make man...’” (AH, IV:XX:1). Furthermore, Tertullian, in his treatise Against Marcion, says the same. “Since then he is the image of the Creator (for He, when looking on Christ His Word, who was to become man, said, ‘Let Us make man...’)” (Ch. VIII).

These men are not reading Gen 1:26 through highly developed, post-Nicene Christological/Trinitarian lenses; a charge that might be laid at the doorstep of Calvin, who concludes thus in his commentary of Genesis, “Christians, therefore, properly contend, from this testimony, that there exists a plurality of Persons in the Godhead. God summons no foreign counsellor; hence we infer that he finds within himself something distinct; as, in truth, his eternal wisdom and power reside within him.”

From these examples, the “traditional circle” boasts a 2000 year circumference; from the best minds in the faith, the theological view was the Patrological view and the Reformational view of the plurals in Gen 1:26. Shall we then throw this to the wind?

This, of course, provokes a question: How much authority ought ecclesiastical tradition and historical theology exercise over our hermeneutical practice today? Historically, Protestants, in response to the absolutism of the Romish doctrine of papal authority, have tended to overreact and do their interpretation in a vacuum. This attitude has been heightened and exaggerated by the individualistic and autonomous spirit resident in the various independent-fundamentalists movements of the 20th century, which scathes any tradition as being the “traditions of men” (as though they are not constructing a tradition of their own!).

Such an attitude is unwise at best (literally). And it seems that Walton shares some measure of this attitude toward the authority of our historical interpretive heritage.

Walton continues.

“[I]f we ask what the Hebrew author and audience understood, any explanation assuming plurality in the Godhead is easily eliminated. If the interpreter wishes to bypass the human author with the claim that God’s intention is what is important, there are large obstacles to hurdle. If divine intention is not conveyed by the human author, where is it conveyed?”

This last sentence begs some attention. The question seems loaded and rhetorical to me. If we answer this question with any dual agency theory, Walton has framed it so it would seem that we’re disparaging authorial intent (and adopting a quasi-dictation idea of inspiration). This works, however, only is we accept his equivocation.

Here Walton seems to be equivocating the terms “understood” and “conveyed.” This appears to me to be the only way for his argument to work. For if we take the terms to denote their usual lexical sense, then limiting our conclusions to what the human author and his contemporaries understood would eliminate not only plurality in the Godhead, but divine intention altogether, reducing the Bible to a monument of human literary genius. On the other hand, of course, we’re obligated to subscribe to the idea that the divine intention is conveyed (or carried through, communicated by, et cetera). However, it does not follow from the fact that the author’s own words are the vehicle of divine intent to the notion that the divine intention of the author’s words are strictly bound by the cultural categories and plausibility structure of the author and his contemporaries. This, though, is exactly what I believe Walton’s remarks “convey.”

Moreover, if the divine intention is constricted to the paradigmatic understanding of the author/audience, then what we commonly understand as “progressive revelation,” the organic escalation of God’s Self-disclosure in Scripture, is dependant on and subordinate to the cultural and sociological developments of ANE civilization. I believe this conclusion is as unavoidable as it is heterodox.

Finally, Walton says:

“Certainly, if the New Testament told us that the Trinity was referred to in this verse, we would have no trouble accepting that as God’s intention. But it is not enough for the New Testament to affirm that there is such a thing as the Trinity. That affirmation does not prove that the Trinity is referred to in Genesis 1:26. Without specific New Testament treatment, we have no authoritative basis for bypassing the human author.”

I’m inclined to respond to these remarks with tongue in cheek...

“Certainly, Mr. Walton, if the NT explicitly told us that ANE comparative analysis was the most proper means of extracting the divine intention from the OT texts, then we’d have no trouble accepting the primacy you afford the method. That modernistic methods like this exist, and can be brought to bear on the text of Scripture (working on the presupposition that the Bible is ordinary literature!), is not enough to convince us. Without specific NT use of this method, we have no authoritative basis for bypassing the Christological-Canonical reading used by the NT authors.”

The truth in this jest is this: Walton rightly appeals to later revelation, particularly that later than the Advent of Christ, Who is the Sum and Finale of God’s revelation to mankind, in order to establish an “authoritative basis” for the theological view. He believes there is none, so... But this seems like special pleading, since Walton has no NT basis for allowing ANE background analysis to be the final determiner in discovering the divine intention in the reading of Gen 1:26.

In Lk 24:25ff, the two on the road to Emmaus are upbraided by Jesus for their reading of the OT. “O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory? And beginning with Moses (i.e., Genesis) and all the Prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself...Then he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures.” Further, Paul teaches that an Old Covenant reading that does not presuppose Christ is a “veiled” reading.

Does not, then, the NT train us to always take a Christ-first, theological reading, lest we too are “slow of heart to believe”?

And what of the logic of the NT? The NT presents Christ as the uncreated Creator, through whom all things, including man, were made. Moreover, the image-restoration texts (esp. Eph 4:24 and Col 3:10) teach us not only the essential attributes lost in the Fall, but also their recovery; our salvation is a progressive recreating into that originally good image of God in us, through the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Thus, without any self-consciousness of inconsistency, Paul presents us with the clear teaching in the renown ordo salutis, Rom 8:28--30, that our salvific reshaping is into the image of the Son. And John, when we shall inherit our full redemption, the resurrection and perfection of our bodies, 1 Jn 3:2. Good and necessary deduction from the NT data offers the very thing Walton claims is not there.

Nevertheless, beyond the logic of the NT, what about the explicit texts, such as Jn 1:1—3, Col 1:15f, and Heb 1:1—3? Where else did the early Church fathers get the notion that the plurals of Gen 1:26 were an intra-Trinitarian discourse? For Walton to claim that because these texts don’t explicitly read “Gen 1:26 is Uni-Plural Divine dialogue,” we must suspend judgment is unfair; for using the same rationale, he’d also have to suspend judgment that even there exists such a thing as the Trinity, since the NT doesn’t say so according to the rigors of his expectations.

So, while I’m finding some of Walton’s gleanings from his expert research in ANE background very helpful in many respects, there are several points in the commentary, such as this one, where he seems so stuck on his “thing,” his specialty, that he’ll slay both good exegesis and common sense on its altar (to use ANE language, that is;).

Saturday, January 2, 2010

WORLDVIEW 104: The Principle of Antithesis, pt. 1

Because I’ve been so sloth in following up posts on this topic, I thought a bit of review would be in order. I’ve also linked the former posts in the series for convenience.

In the first entry on the subject of worldview, we saw that the fact of worldview is ubiquitous in human experience. Everyone has a worldview. This stems from the truth that all people are made in the image of God, and since God has a worldview, so to speak, so too does every creature bearing his image. In the second entry, WORLDVIEW 102, we attempted to define worldview, using the contributions of various scholars, and concluding with Abraham Kuyper’s definition.

In the third post, finally, we concluded that every worldview has its “touchstone proposition,” its “root” principle, that one ultimate presupposition from which all others come and are brought into constant relationship with; and that most ultimate heart commitment, that root principle, is an attitude toward one’s relation to God, the controlling premise of all other inferences and beliefs. Hear Kuyper again on this point. “Thus I maintain that it is the interpretation of our relation to God which dominates every general life system [i.e., worldview]” (Christianity: A Total World and Life System, 10). It is this fundamental principle which every other truth claim is determined to be in some measure believable or else flatly false within the context of the given worldview.

Jesus said, “Whoever is not with me is against me” (Matt 12:30), and that a person cannot serve two masters (7:24). These, and scriptural statements like them, immediately throw everybody on the horns of a dilemma. So, as C. S. Lewis rightly concluded in The Problem of Pain, "From the moment a creature becomes aware of God as God and of itself as self, the terrible alternative of choosing God or self for the centre is opened to it." In other words, there are really only two worldviews available, and these are—in their respective fundamental principles—in diametrical opposition to one another. See this article for a fuller demonstration of the theme of a biblical view of the antithesis.

This diametrical opposition or antithesis is essentially absolute. Now, this needs qualification, I know. What we mean by absolute antithesis is that, at the root of the respective worldviews—their original, fundamental principle—there is comprehensive contrariety. The Christian outlook accepts Lewis’ dilemma above and adopts the theocentric, i.e., God-centered principle as its foundational starting-point, submitting to the God of Scripture as the final authority; the rejection of the Christian perspective is necessarily, then, the positive adoption of the latter principle—a self-centered perspective, or more generally, an anthropocentric presupposition, wherein man is taken to be the starting-point for up building the entirety of the worldview, and consequently, the ultimate authority.

Therefore, at the very root of the respective outlooks, there is, as Kuyper said, a struggle for primacy, a wrestling match engaged in mortal combat, warring over the question of absolute primacy and authority. One begins and ends with man as its ultimate reference point; one begins and ends with the triune God of the Bible as its ultimate reference point. And because there cannot exist two beings with absolute and universal authority, there is absolute and universal antithesis between those who claim the prerogative and power of the position of primacy and ultimate authority.

In addition to this, there is the fact that the fundamental presupposition of a worldview is profoundly personal, beginning as it does in an attitude or disposition rather than a mere premise of one’s intellectual assent. The antithesis is comprehensive and holistic, reaching to the furthest bud on the longest branch that grows out of the root principle. Thus, the antithesis between the Christian worldview and all others is one which is absolute, leaving no room for compromise; and it is comprehensive, leaving no area of human experience or endeavor, no intellectual domain or discipline, no question of what is real, right, reasonable, or remedial is untouched by the absoluteness of this essential antithesis.

In principle, then, there is no “partnership...fellowship...accord...portion” or “agreement” between the Christian worldview and any other competitor (2 Cor 6:14—16). One begins by submitting to and worshiping the Creator-Controller-Redeemer God in Christ, the other worships and serves the creature; and each has its relative corollaries and consequences, which spring up from its fundamental root (Rom 1:18ff; Gal 5:16ff). There is no area of neutrality between these two warring world and life systems.

However, if all this were true, someone might object, then it would follow that Christians are utterly insolated and isolated from the unbelieving world around them, thus leading them to an unqualified pietism. Further, it seems that consistency with this principal antithesis would preclude any and all dialogue with non-Christians, since, supposing such were true, there would be no commonality, no neutral ground, no point of contact between the adherents of those who espouse the contrary systems.

Admittedly, there is some sense in which we would respond to these apparent problems with an emphatic “Yes, that’s right." But, on the other hand, nothing is further from the truth. As paradoxical as it might sound, consistency with the principle of antithesis is alone that which provides the point of contact necessary for trans-worldview communication. That is why this particular point of our look at worldview will come in parts, this one being only the first of several. This point needs careful attention and illustration.

In the next part, therefore, we’ll make the qualifications required for resolving these and other objections with the principle of antithesis, and hopefully give some clarity to the issue.

Until then, blessings in the thrice-holy God be yours!

Friday, January 1, 2010

TO THE ENDS OF THE EARTH, Beaner's Romans Paper

Here’s a paper the Beaner wrote for last year’s Bible class. Not too bad for a then thirteen year old ;). Earlier this year, she did a piece on Nero, which I’ll post sometime in the not too distant future. I’m awful proud of God’s grace that works in her heart and mind; and I wouldn't trade the pleasure of homeschooling her any thing, getting to see her grow everyday in the grace and knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ--in every discipline, with heart, soul, and mind.
INTRODUCTION

Martin Luther once said that Romans was “the chief part of the New Testament and the very purest of all the gospels.”[1] He believed we should soak our souls in this Epistle everyday, and for good reason. To know anything about Martin Luther is to know about the agonizing struggle he went through trying to become acceptable before a holy God. K. Scott Oliphint says that Romans 1:17 “began to soothe Luther’s guilty conscience and bring him to an understanding of the liberty of the gospel.” He further recounts that Luther said that this verse—“The righteous shall live by faith”—“struck my conscience like lighting” and was “like a thunderbolt in my heart.”[2]

If the question of our acceptability before God is the most important one that can be asked (and it is), and more directly than any other book in the Bible, the Epistle to the Romans answers that question, then our coming to better understand this Epistle should be the most important object of every heart. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to investigate and answer four of the basic but essential questions for a correct understanding of the Epistle to the Romans: The who, the when, the where, and primarily the why of Romans. I will venture to do so by presenting various hypotheses formed by a variety of conservative commentators, dating from the Reformation to today.

AUTHORSHIP

Most commentators automatically assume the apostle Paul to be the author of Romans, largely because of certain writings in earlier manuscripts written to the churches of various cities, namely Galatia. As Harrison argues, “If the claim of the apostle to have written the Galatian and Corinthian letters is accepted, there is no reasonable basis for denying that he wrote Romans, since it echoes much of what is in the earlier writings, yet not slavishly.”[3] Galatians provides many such examples. For instance, when Paul mentioned how “we know that our old self was crucified with him in order that the body of sin might be brought to nothing…” in Romans 6:6, this echoes “I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me…” in Galatians 2:20, written earlier. There are a number of other parallel phrases and concepts found between these two books thus further proving Paul as the author. [4]

DATING THE EPISTLE

Many commentators (e.g., Schaff, Harrison, Quarles, Bryan, Moo, and Hendrickson)[5] agree that the epistle to the Romans was undoubtedly written on Paul’s third missionary journey, sometime between the years of AD 53 and AD 58. Douglas Moo states, for example, “Paul writes Romans on his third missionary journey…probably in about AD 57.”[6] He was completing his third missionary journey and was heading back to Jerusalem with a collection (gift) from the Gentile churches, preparing for a missionary trip to Spain by way of Rome.

ORIGIN OF THE EPISTLE

In the book of Acts, Luke tells us that when Paul was in Corinth, testifying in front of the Jews, they opposed him and he said, “Your blood be on your own heads! I am innocent. From now on I will go to the gentiles.” The Roman church was predominantly a gentile congregation with some from the Jewish community. More than likely, Paul wrote this letter to Rome not long after he made this declaration. Many scholars support that it was most likely written in Corinth. Although, others, including Christopher Bryan and Douglas J. Moo, believe it was written in Cenchreae (a small seaport very near to Corinth).[7] Thus Paul was writing from Corinth or near Corinth about his plan to go to Rome.

PURPOSE OF THE EPISTLE

This is not an exhaustive list of supported reasons for Paul to have written the letter, but what follows are a few of the basics or more general themes and motives behind his writing the Epistle.

Paul’s Thesis Statement

Paul states the thesis of his Epistle in the first chapter. “I am not ashamed of the Gospel, for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith, as it is written, ‘The righteous shall live by faith.’” (Rom. 1:16-17). That Paul would write down a summery of his Gospel and the theology behind that in a letter and send it to Rome, so that the church there could digest his message, before his visit, is the main reason supported by scholars for Paul writing Romans. Barrett agrees, “Most commentators recognize in them [1:16, 17] the ‘text’ of the Epistle; it is not wrong to see in them a summary Paul’s theology as a whole.”[8]

Paul’s Call to Unity within the Church

Another clear reason behind the Epistle, which is held highly by commentators, is that Paul wanted to address and correct certain problems existing in the Roman church; in particular, calling them to unity. Thanks to Gods providence, through Roman conquest, the pax Romana (“Peace of Rome”) helped to tare down nationalistic boundaries that would have kept Christian evangelists from reaching the nations, keeping the Great Commission. Rome also sustained a ‘universal,’ common language, KoinÄ“ Greek, which made it possible to communicate the Gospel to every “tongue, tribe, nation, and people”—or “the whole world.” Moreover, a highway system that allowed for easy travel. Despite these external benefits of Rome’s peace, this peace did not go deep enough to touch human hearts. There still existed bitter hostility between ethnic, social, religious, and cultural groups throughout the empire. The clearest tension lies between the Jews and Greeks, and the enmity was mutual. This disunity spread through all areas of their lives, but the one it was most evident in was their religion. The church in Rome was born under this area of false ‘peace.’ This disunity was at the heart of the church, and it was obvious. The attitude of resentment toward each other was the one Paul was facing when he was writing the letter. Bryan articulates this by saying, “Paul sought to address both groups not with a ‘compendium of Christian doctrine,’ but with an account of how the Gospel accords with God’s promises to restore creation (Rom 8:18—25) and how that should affect the attitude of believers toward each other (Rom 12:1—15:13).”[9] Paul is trying to point out that Caesar’s counterfeit peace could not reach the core of peoples hearts and Jesus’ genuine peace can (Ephesians 2:11-22).

Paul’s Personal and Theological Introduction to the Church in Rome

Since Paul had been longing to go to Rome for so long (Rom 1:11), and the Roman church had never seen him or heard his message, he sought to formally introduce himself and give them a full exposition of his Gospel. In this way, they would not be totally ignorant of his message and perceive it wrongly. Many commentators hold to the belief that this was at least part of the purpose of the letter.[10] Not least, C. K. Barrett, who puts it this way, “An obscure provincial, Paul plans to visit the center of the world; a self-styled apostle, lacking the self evident authorization of the Twelve, he approaches a church where his authority and even his credentials may well be questioned.”[11] Never the less he marches on, because that is what God called him to do.

CONCLUSION

I set out to answer the questions, who, when, where, and why, and I have done so to the best of my ability. There is no reason to doubt that the Apostle Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans on his third missionary journey, between AD 53 and AD 58 in the city of Corinth. He did so, because that was God’s plan for him to fulfill the Great Commission in Rome.


[1] Luther, Martin, Commentary of Romans, (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications. 1976) xiii.

[2] Oliphant, K. Scott, The Battle Belongs to the Lord: The Power of Scripture for Defending Our Faith, (Phillipsburg – New Jersey: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing. 2003) pp. 107—8.

[3] Everett F. Harrison, “Romans,” pp. 519—605 in The Expositors Bible Commentary, Barker, L. Kenneth, John R. Kohlenberger general editors, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing. 1994) p. 519.

[4] E.g., Rom 6:3//Gal 2:20, 3:27; Rom 6:9//Gal 2:19-20; Rom 6:21, 22//Gal 6:8; Rom 7:4//Gal 2:19; 5:22; Rom 7:23//Gal 5:17; Rom 8:6//Gal 6:8; Rom 814—17//Gal 4:3—7, etc.

[5] Respectively: Phillip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 1, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers. 2006), holds AD 58. p. 369; Everett Harrison, “Romans,” EBC, dates the epistle to early AD 57. p. 519; Charles Quarles, “Romans, letter to the,” pp. 1409—15 in Holman Illustrated Bible Dictionary, Brand, Chad, Charles Draper, Archie England general editors, (Nashville, TN: Holman Reference. 2004), agrees on AD 56 – 57. p. 1410; Christopher Bryan, “Romans, book of,” pp. 697—703 in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, Kevin J. Vanhoozer general editor, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Publishing. 2005), concurs with AD 56 – 57. p. 697; William Hendrickson, Survey of the Bible, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books Publishing. 2005), also maintains Paul’s third missionary journey as the time of writing. p. 341.

[6] Douglas J. Moo, “Romans,” pp. 291—96 in New Dictionary of Biblical Theology: Exploring the Unity and Diversity of Scripture, Alexander, T. Desmond, Brian S. Rosner, D.A. Carson, Graeme Goldsworthy general editors, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. 2000) p. 292.

[7] Christopher Bryan, “Romans, Book of,” DTIB, is comfortable with either Cenchreae or Corinth, p.697. Douglas J. Moo, “Romans,” NDBT, says, “Cenchreae, near Corinth…” p.292.

[8] C. K Barrett., A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, (New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London; Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957.) p. 27.

[9] Christopher Bryan, “Romans, Book of,” DTIB, p. 699.

[10] Charles Quarles, “Romans, Letter to the,” HIBD, p. 521; Everett Harrison, “ Romans,” EBC, p. 1411.

[11] C. K Barrett, Ibid.