WHO WERE THE SONS OF GOD?

INTRODUCTION AND INTERPRETATIONS FROM ANTIQUITY

The phrase “sons of God,” in Gen 6:2 and 4, has been subject to a variety of interpretations.  Once fringe views are excluded, we are left with three possibilities.  The phrase “sons of God” refer to either (1) fallen angels, or (2) Sethites, or (3) rulers/nobles.  The earliest interpretations were almost unanimously view (1), fallen angels. 

            The Second Jewish Commonwealth apocryphal work 1 Enoch, dating around the second century B.C., provides one of the earliest commentaries on Gen 6:1—4, presenting the sons of God as angels (see 1 Enoch 6 – 11).  The primitive popularity of the angel view is also reflected in some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint (e.g., Alexandrinus), which translates the Hebrew term בני  האלהים (bene elohim) with ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ (aggeloi tou theou), “angels of God.”  The angel view is further testified to by a number of other Jewish apocryphal and apocalyptic works, such as, Jubilees 4:15, the Testament of Reuben 5:6,  2 Baruch 56:12—16, 2 Enoch 18:4, and the Genesis Apocryphon 2:1.  Both Philo (Gig. 2:6) and Josephus (Antiq. 1.3.1) appeared to follow this view (1) as well.  In addition to these early Jewish interpretations are a number of early Church fathers who likewise viewed the sons of God as angels.  Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Lactanitus, Irenaeus, Cyprian and Ambrose are names that the angel view may boast as authorities.[1] Finally, the two central NT texts that appear to support angel view must not be ignored (i.e., 2 Pet 2:4; Jude 6).  However, these passages will be adequately interacted with in the sections below in parts comparing modern perspectives.

            The following table is illustrative of the historical and statistical dominance of angel view over that of the Sethite in early Jewish and Christian interpretation.[2]

Date	Writer	Angels	Sethites	Reference
c.250 BC	Various	X		Septuagint, Gen. 6:3
165-64 BC	Unknown	X		1 Enoch 6-19; 86-88; 106: 13-15, 17
150 BC	Unknown	X		Jubilees 4:15, 22; 5:1
100 BC	Unknown	X		Damascus Document (Qumran) 2:16-19
20 BC-50 AD	Philo of Alexandria	X		Giants 6-7
37-100 AD	Josephus	X		Antiquities, Book 1.3.1 (73)
c.70	Pseudo-Philo		X	Biblical Antiquities 3:1-2
Late 1st Cent.	Unknown	X		Genesis Apocryphon 2:1
Late 1st Cent.	Unknown	X		2 Baruch 56:10-14
c.100-c.165	Justin Martyr	X		1 Apology 5; 2 Apology
c.115-202	Irenaeus of Lyons	X		Demonstration 18; Heresies 16.2
c.130	Rabbi Akiba		X	[Greek translation of OT]
130-160	Rabbi Simean b. Yohai		X	Genesis Rabbah 26:5-7
130-160	Rabbi Jose		X	Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 108a
2nd Cent.	Athenagoras	X		A Plea for the Christians, 24.
Late 2nd Cent.	Symmachus		X	[Greek translation of OT]
c. 150-215	Clement of Alexandria	X		Miscellanies 5.1.10
c.160-c.225	Tertullian	X		Idolatry 9; Veiling 7; Women, 1.2
c. 160-240	Julius Africanus		X	Chronology, Fragment 2
240-320	Lactantius	X		Divine Institutes 2.15
263-339	Eusebius of Caesarea	X		Eusebius, Preparation, 5.5
306-373	Ephrem the Syrian		X	Commentary on Genesis 6.3.1
340-397	Ambrose of Milan	X		Noah and the Ark 4.8
c.345-420	Jerome	X		Hebrew, 6.4
374-407	John Chrysostom		X	Homily on Genesis, 22.6-8
363-420	Sulpicius Severus	X		History, 1.2
354-430	Augustine of Hippo*	X	X?	City of God 15:22-23

KEY: X indicates agreement with this view

            Although views (1) and (2) dominated in antiquity, view (3) was not without a voice.  “Genesis Rabbah 26:8 (fifth-sixth century A.D.) cites R. Simeon b. Yohai (A.D. 130—160) as insisting on the interpretation ‘sons of nobles’ and placing a curse on anyone who promulgated the ‘angels’ theory.  By the time of the medieval rabbis, this interpretation had become entrenched.  Rashi, Ramban and Ibn Exra all favored identifying the sons of God as rulers or judges.”[3]  

            Among critical scholarship today, all three views identified above have their heavy-hitting protagonists.  View (3), the Sethite view, however, has consensus among conservative scholars. “The most common view of orthodox interpreters has been that the ‘sons of God’ were the men of the godly Sethite lineage.”[4] We will now turn to three modern scholars, each supporting one or the other of the respective views on the sons of God.

SONS OF GOD AS SETHITES: GEERHARDUS VOS

The old Princeton student and then professor of biblical theology, Geerhardus Vos, was a proponent of (2), the Sethite view.[5]  Vos is particularly sensitive to two motifs that appear in the fore of the antediluvian epoch of revelation.  First, he notes that the antediluvian context of Genesis is not primarily concerned with the sphere of redemptive progress, but with the development of the race in general, which he recognizes is ultimately significant for the development of the plan of redemption.  Second, Vos points out that the revelation on the whole bears negative rather than positive connotations.[6]  These observations, with others below, play a role in him settling on the Sethite view.

            Vos further notes that the narrative develops in three stages. 

It first describes the rapid development of sin in the line of Cain.  In connection with this it describes the working of common grace in the gift of invention for the advance of civilization in the sphere of nature.  It shows further that these gifts of grace were abused by the Cainites and made subservient to the progress of evil in the world.  We have here a story of rapid degeneration, so guided by God as to bring out the inherent tendency of sin to lead to ruin, and its power to corrupt and debase whatever of good might still develop…The details of the description are evidently chosen with a view to emphasize the result.[7]

With this backcloth in mind, the narrative goes on to contrast the wickedness of the Cainite to the progress of the godly line of Seth (Gen 4:25—5:32).  With respect to the Sethites, nothing is said of secular or civil progress; rather, it is the continuity of redemption that is stressed.  “The two kinds of progress appear distributed over the two lines of the Cainites and the Sethites.”[8]

            Vos couches the situation in the context as he interpreted it, saying, “The character of the period in this respect finds clearest expression in what is said…about the commingling of the Cainites and Sethites through intermarriage.  The latter allowed themselves to become assimilated to the wickedness of the former.”[9]

            Because he so carefully recreated the context of the unit, Vos does not believe that the Sethite view needs much technical defense; “[it] alone would seem to fit into the construction of the period to serve the purpose of showing the necessary outcome of sin, when left to work itself out freely.  If the angel theory be accepted, this will tend to obscure the idea aimed at.”[10]  To inject a source ab extra, i.e., fallen angels, would interrupt the development of human sin that Moses so carefully created.  Vos recognizes that the evidence for the angel view from Jude 6, admitting that it does give the angel view some force, yet it is far from conclusive.

            Furthermore, in connection with the terms ‘sons of God’ and ‘daughters of men,’ Vos makes the point that in Hebrew idiom sometimes a genus is set over against a part of that genus as though they were mutually exclusive.  He cites Ps 73:5 and Jer 32:20 as explicit cases of this idiom.  Both classes mentioned are naturally speaking, mere men; so, the sons of God are men, but sons of God besides, thus marking their distinguished status.  These are the Sethites, for Vos.  Finally, he mentions that in 6:3, 5—7 we find the divine evaluation of things and pronouncement of pending judgment on the antediluvian race of man and his sphere of sovereignty; angels are not mentioned at all.

SONS OF GOD AS ANGELS: HENRY MORRIS

Henry Morris represents a resurgence among orthodox interpreters, which is increasingly adopting the angel view, and not without good exegetical reason.[11]  For Morris, taking the term bene elohim to refer to angels is the “obvious meaning.”[12]  That the term is used explicitly for angels elsewhere in the OT is crucial for Morris.  He cites, of course, Job 1:6; 2:1; 38:7.  The similar language of Dan 3:25 (bar elohim) refers to either angels or a theophany.  Finally, in Ps 29:1 and 89:6 the variation of the term (bene elim) clearly means angels.  Morris also references presidents in both Jewish and Christian historical theology, dominated by the angel view, in support of his thesis. 

            Liberalistic interpreters are quick to dismiss the angel view on the ground that it smacks of supernaturalism, something that is presuppositionally incredible for them.  Some, however, will accept a mythologized variation of the angel view.[13]  Morris does not concern himself with treating these objections; rather, he treats the primary rejection of conservatives who discard the angel view on the basis of Jesus’ teachings in Matthew. 

            The primary objection raised against the angel view is Jesus’ teaching concerning the resurrection in his debate with the Sadducees in Matt 22:23—33.  Therein, Jesus makes the remark that “At the resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven” (NIV).  This, it is said, would appear to preclude the angel view of the sons of God, which presents them as having “took wives for themselves, whomever they chose.”  Therefore, if in the resurrection people will not marry, and this makes them similar to the angels in heaven, then angels must not marry, or so the reasoning goes.  Morris, however, does not find this reasoning persuasive at all; he deals at length with its implications. 

            Morris raises the point that Jesus’ remark is not equivalent to saying that angels are sexless.  Instead, in Scripture, angels are given masculine pronouns and are described as having the appearance of men.  Moreover, in Jesus’ teaching the angels are qualified as the angels “in heaven” (Matt 22:30).  What is true for angels “in heaven” may very well not be true of fallen angels, Morris contends.[14]  A count against the Sethite view, according to Morris, is the fact that not all the Sethites were godly, which is made obvious by their demise in the deluge.[15] 

              For Morris, the toughest issue that the angel view must wrestle with is the nature of the union of women and angels and the prospect of their offspring.  “Admittedly, however, there is a grave difficulty in the idea of angel-human sexual unions, not only the question of whether such a thing is possible, but even more in the theologically paradoxical and grotesque nature of the progeny of such unions.”[16]  Morris answers the difficulty by postulating that angels were using the bodies of possessed men.  “Thus, the ‘sons of God’ controlled not only the men whose bodies they had acquired for their own exploitation, but also the women they took to themselves in this way, and then all the children they bore.”[17]

SONS OF GOD AS NOBLES/RULERS: JOHN WALTON

Walton begins his investigation respecting the identity of the sons of God with the cautious reminder that “This issue is one of the thorniest in Old Testament interpretation.”[18]  Walton admits that the case for the angel view has tremendous lexical strength, especially based on a synchronic analysis of the phrase.  He warns, however, that confident conclusions drawn from such an analysis depends in good measure on the phrase or term having a broad lexical base throughout Scripture.  It is this dependence on a broad lexical base that Walton calls “the weak link in the armor of the ‘angels’ view.” [19]  Despite the term sons of God having a limited lexical base, Walton offers three lines of reasoning for why it cannot be maintained.

            (1) Cohabitation between angels and humans has no immediately obvious connection with the purposes of Genesis; (2) an angelic intrusion is considered out of place in the sequence of episodes recounting the advance of human sin;[20] and (3) the mythological tone is at odds with life in the real world as we know it, though in the end our interest in the world as the Israelites knew it.[21]  Nevertheless, Walton has the honesty to admit that the burden of proof still lies with either the Sethite or rules view to build a convincing lexical case for the respective view, one that makes sense in the literary, cultural, and theological context.  Walton says, “I believe such a case can be built for a variation of the ‘rulers’ view.”[22]

            Walton assumes that the ‘sons of God’ were oppressive despotic kings, rulers, or nobles, whose sin—an primary source of oppression—was the practice of the ancient, ever-despised practice of the divine right of the first night.  “In this practice, the local authority (whether king, governor, or lord of the manor) imposes his will in his people by demanding and exercising the right to spend the first night with any woman who is being married…The wording of Genesis 6:2, that ‘the sons of God…married any of them they chose,’ would be an apt description of this practice.”[23]

            Walton argues that accepting this view allows for a very natural progression of the account of sin in the narrative:  individuals (Adam and Eve) à family (Cain) à society leaders (sons of God) à everyone (Flood).[24] His argument for this view, however, is one largely dependent on ancient Near Eastern background material, which helps provide a window into the worldview and culture of the original audience.  The concept of the divine descent of kings and nobility in the ancient Near East was copious, a point which strengthens the ruler view.  Walton cites numerous examples of this.  “From Sumerian times (e.g., Eannatum, Gudea), through Old Babylonian (e.g., Hammurabi), into Middle Assyrian (e.g., Tukulti-Ninurta) and Neo-Assyrian (e.g., Ashubanipal), it was part of the royal prerogative to claim divine heritage.”[25]  Walton leans most heavily on parallels between parts of the Epic of Gilgamesh and Genesis 6.[26]

            Birney, who also deftly defends the ruler view, offers this summary of the passage.  “The ‘daughters of men’ were women in general, the ‘sons of God’ were famous mighty rulers…the sin was polygamy, and the judgment was that the breath of life would be taken away from man in 120 years.”[27]

PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

I personally find the ruler view interesting and challenging, although far from convincing, due to its crass dependency on reconstructive background parallels and inferences.  Furthermore, the scanty background parallels for the practice of right of first night, and utter lack the practice elsewhere treated in Scripture, the ruler view has a deep sense of anachronism for me.[28]

            In the unity and context of the rest of Torah (even into Joshua and Judges) the Sethite view holds pride of place in my estimation.  The original audience was saved out of the house of Egyptian bondage and “set-apart” as Yahweh’s special people.  As such, the whole of Torah commands and galvanizes a perpetual antithesis between Israel and the nations, especially those in the land to which they were headed, the Canaanites.  I believe, therefore, that the Sethite view provides the best framework for reading Gen 6 as the original audience would (or should) have. Genesis 6 was another illustration of the war between the “seeds,” set into motion in 3:15. 

            My settlement on the Sethite view is, however, an uncomfortable one.  When confronted with the pertinent latter-NT texts, and the accompanying background material concomitant with them, it seems most likely that the NT authors did themselves espouse the angel view, which was part and parcel of their literary, cultural, and theological context.  This presupposition would have therefore been back of their inspired writing, and thus is an authoritative interpretation for Gen 6.  I find myself hard-pressed between the angel and the Sethite views, praying that further study and illumination will help me to resolve the dilemma and create a cognitive rest on the issue.   

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[1] This paragraph is greatly indebted for its content to John Walton’s entry, “Sons of God, daughters of men.” Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch.  T. Desmond Alexander and David W. Baker, editors (Downers Grove, IL: IVP.  2003), 794.

[2]  Robert I. Bradshaw, “Creationism & the Early Church,” chapter 5. http://www.robibrad.demon.co.uk/Chapter5.htm (Accessed on November 18, 2010).  *Exception must be taken with Bradshaw’s reading of Augustine’s view, presenting him as subscribing to view (1), angels.  Henry Morris understands Augustine’s position as (2), Sethites (The Genesis Record [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books.  1976], 166), as does this present writer’s reading of Augustine, see City of God XV:23.  Also see John Walton, who calls Augustine’s view a variation of the Sethite view, “Sons of God, daughters of men,” DOT:P, 794.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Leroy Birney, “An Exegetical Study of Genesis 6:1—4.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 13, no. 1, pp. 43—52 (Winter 1970), 45.

[5] Biblical Theology: Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.  1948), 45—51.

[6] Ibid. 45.

[7] Ibid. 45—6. Italics added.

[8] Ibid. 46.

[9] Ibid. 48.

[10] Ibid.

[11] The Genesis Record, see 164—70.  Also, Walton cites Westermann, who said that we can basically consider the debate “closed.”  Westermann adds, “The number of voices supporting the view that they [sons of God] are human has diminished,” in “Sons of God, daughters of men,”  DOT:P, 795.

[12] The Genesis Record, 166.

[13] Ibid. 168.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid. 168—9.

[17] Ibid. 169.

[18] Genesis in The NIV Application Commentary.  Terry Muck, editor (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.  2001), 291. 

[19] Ibid. 292.

[20] Note the similarity of this line of criticism to that of Vos, see fn. 7.

[21] Genesis, 292.

[22] Ibid. Op. cit.

[23] Ibid. 293.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid. 294.

[26] These parallels are presented on pp. 294—95.

[27] Leroy Birney, “An Exegetical Study of Genesis 6:1—4.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society. (Winter: 1976): 43—52.  52.

[28] Walton actually appeals to the movie Braveheart in a footnote, see Genesis, 293 fn. 2.

Pride, in the name of sin and nihilism

What is the root of all actual, personal sins?  What is the source of nihilism?  Hear Augustine on the matter. 

“Now, could anything but pride have been the start of the evil will?  For ‘pride is the start of every kind of sin’ (Ecclus. 10:13).  And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of exaltation?  For it is a perverse kind of exaltation to abandon the basis on which the mind should be firmly fixed, and to become, as it were, based on oneself, and so remain.  This happens when a man is too pleased with himself: and a man is self-complacent when he deserts that changeless Good in which, rather than in himself, he ought to have found his satisfaction…And so, to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is to please oneself, is not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness”

City of God, Book XIV, Ch. 13   

No God, No Knowledge--Transcendental Argument from Knowledge

I. From Truth:

P1. If knowledge[1] is possible, then truth exists.[2]

P2. And if truth exists, then it exists as immaterial,[3] invariable,[4] and eternal.[5]

P3. Hence, if truth thus exists, then truth is absolute.[6]

P4. Likewise, if truth is the object and necessary condition of knowledge, and truth is absolute, then knowledge depends on the absolute.

P5. Truth indeed is the object and necessary condition of knowledge; and it is absolute.

C1. Thus, knowledge depends on the absolute.

C2. Therefore, if knowledge is possible, then knowledge depends on the absolute.

II. From Belief:

P1. Furthermore, if knowledge is possible, then it depends on a knowing subject who holds some belief.[7]

P2. In addition, if belief depends on a knowing subject, then such a one’s act of believing presupposes the involvement of the collective complex of intellect, emotion, and volition, which together constitute the personal.

P3. Moreover, knowledge is communicable.

C1. Hence, if knowledge is possible, then knowledge is communicable and thus depends on the personal.

III. From Justification:

P1. What's more, if the possibility of knowledge depends on a personal knower, then it likewise depends on the knower’s mental activity—it depends on mind.[8] 

P2. If the human mind, either individually or collectively, is the sufficient grounds for the integration of knowledge, then the human mind would also have to be absolute (i.e., invariable and eternal, see I:P2, 6); however, it is not the case that the human mind is thus.

P3. It is not the case, therefore, that the human mind, either individually or collectively, is the sufficient grounds for the integration and communication of knowledge.[9]

P4. Hence, if knowledge is possible, then by transcendental necessity there exists an absolute and personal being whose mind alone is the sufficient grounds for the integration of knowledge and can communicate knowledge.[10]

P5. Only the mind of the triune God of Christian theism, which alone is both absolute and personal, provides the transcendentally necessary and sufficient grounds for the integration and communication of knowledge.

P6. Therefore, if knowledge is possible, then by transcendental necessity the triune God of Christian theism exists as the transcendental integration point of all knowledge and communicates knowledge to humans.

P7. It is the case that knowledge is possible for humans.

C1. Therefore, the triune God of Christian theism must exist and communicate knowledge necessarily.  Hence, all knowledge and knowing is dependent of the triune God of Christian theism.

C2. Thus, the denial of God’s necessary existence is to annihilate the possibility of knowing anything at all; not least, that God’s existence can be known to be even the slightest degree doubtful.

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[1] Herein knowledge is to be understood in the traditional constitution of having three necessary conditions or properties, which are (1) belief that is (2) true, and the truth thereof having (3) justification, reason, or warrant.  The three of these together—a true, justified belief—are thus the sufficient condition of knowledge.  Furthermore, the term truth is to be taken in the sense of the correspondence theory of knowledge.   Truth is a real relation or correspondence between a signifier and that which it signifies, between a proposition and some fact, state of affairs, or event to which it refers. 

[2] The statement “truth does not exist” is an “I” categorical statement of the traditional square of opposition, making it to be an absolute negative statement.  Denying the existence of truth’s absolutivity is merely the contrary of its absolute affirmation; both statements, whereby, being absolute and declared to be true. That is to say, the proposition “truth exists” cannot be denied, for if one were right in asserting that “it is not the case that truth exists,” then one would be wrong, as that statement itself would be true, and absolutely so.  Hence, to deny the existence of truth is self-defeating—self-contradictory; it is false by declaration.

[3] Like the logical laws that govern them, propositions, which are the vehicles of truth, are immaterial entities.  One cannot grab, freeze, or stub his or her toe on truth.  In addition, truth is not dependant on particular statements or sentences.  The sentences “Kevin is Fanny’s husband” and “Fanny is married to Kevin” both express the same truth, the same proposition. 

[4] If a proposition is ever true, it has always been and always will be true.  For instance, certain statements that are “tenseless,” that is are closed by a particular temporal reference like “at 6:00 pm...” rather than a tensed verb like “now” or “was,” denote a fact or state of affairs that is always true. So,  “At 8:00 am on January 26, 2009 it is (tenseless) snowing in Big Island, VA.” is a closed statement having a meaning that is true always; its truth is unchanging—invariable.

[5] The eternality of truth is related closely to the invariability of truth in fn. 4 and the existence of truth in fn. 2.  Since truth never changes, it’s invariable (fn. 4) and one cannot deny the existence of truth without affirming it (fn. 2), so too, a statement denying the eternality of truth would presuppose truth’s existence and if the statement was true it would always be so, thus eternally so.  Hence, denying truth’s eternality is to affirm it.  Therefore, it’s self-defeating to deny the eternality of truth.

[6] The eternality and invariability of truth constitutes its absolutivity.  Furthermore, truth is independent of any relative or particular knower or thing known.  The laws of logic, for example, are true without reference to any particular object.  So, knowledge does not judge truth rather truth is the transcendent standard by which all knowledge is judged as such (see fn. 1).  Therefore, truth is absolute.

[7] Again, “belief” is one of the three necessary conditions of knowledge.

[8] Granted, there are a number of materialist, physicalist or anti-metaphysicians who have attempted to either flatly deny the existence of “mind” as an immaterial reality of human nature or have strenuously sought to explain it in materialistic, functional categories.   This presentation, let alone footnote, is not the venue to attempt a rebuttal to these claims.  Many philosophers have elsewhere undermined these hypothesises and shown them to be most untenable, Thus, I refer the reader to them.  Nevertheless, given the validity of the foregoing argument and conclusions, an immaterial mind seems self-evidently necessary for the residency of immaterial truth, which has been seen to exist as a real entity.  And the reduction of mind and reason to mere physical functions of the brain alone (i.e., chemical events) is to annihilate any possibility of knowledge at all, since it would make “reason” and “truth” to have no more axiological force than other bodily functions.

[9] There is among “spirituality” and para-psychology in the West today the increasing hope, even foundational hope in the collective human consciousness.  Perhaps premise III: P4 would be meet with a challenge from the likes of them or a similar camp.  And in today’s pluralistic landscape of worldview, such a challenge must be taken seriously and addressed as such, however absurd it may seem—but again, not here.  The notion that a disintegrated collection of mutable and fractured parts can comprise an absolute, unchanging, eternal whole is simply nonsensical.  So, an attempt to argue that it could would be mere morosophy.

[10] The first conclusion of section III, P5, undoubtedly will be met by the strongest contradiction from the unbelieving opponent.  Psychologically speaking, this is exactly what should be expected.  The unbeliever’s problem with his or her professing belief in the true God is much more a moral issue than an intellectual one. (I would argue that the concepts of intellect, emotions, and volition, which are often seen in very sharp distinction from one another in the modern West, are nearly conflated into a unity that is seen as the whole person; one domain never acting apart from the others, in Scripture.)  Intellectually speaking, this statement squarely faces and unequivocally challenges the unbeliever’s intellectual autonomy.  Thinking themselves to be utterly independent in reference to his or her ability to rightly reason and sit in intellectual judgment over the question of God’s existence, the unbeliever is immediately (and psychologically) confronted with the necessary conclusion that such a presumption  would be categorically impossible.  It is this goad, then, at which he or she will kick the hardest.  There is no other answer, however.  Either, it is the triune God who speaks with absolute authority in Christ and the Scriptures or it is nothing, literally, nothing. 

Three Views on Apologetics

In defending the Christian faith, believers should be aware of the three general approaches to apologetics, and which method is the most consistent with that faith.  The three approaches are the classical, the evidential, and the presuppositional methods.  First, there is the classical method, which operates on a form of rationalism.  Generally speaking, rationalism maintains that, beginning with self-evident truths and applying the laws of logic, the human mind can arrive at epistemic certainty by deduction.  Additionally, the legitimacy of natural theology is assumed; that is, that man can begin with general human experience alone and arrive at an accurate understanding of God, the world, and man’s relation to both.  Moreover, classical apologetics presupposes that the reprobate mind is neutral toward God’s truth, and functions properly independent of God (contra, Jn. 3:19; Rom. 8:7; Eph. 4:17—19).  Classical apologetics, then, appeals to human autonomy as the source of ultimate authority.  Secondly, evidential apologetics, or evidentialism, is similar to the classical view.  However, evidentialism begins with the presupposition of empiricism rather than rationalism.  Empiricism supposes the validity of sense perceptions; and, applying induction and verification, man can arrive at true knowledge.  Similarly too, evidentialism makes its final court of appeal the authority of autonomous human reason.  Lastly, presuppositional apologetics, or presuppositionalism, works on the epistemological presupposition of revelation, that of Christ and the Scriptures.  Because unbelievers suppress the truth of God clearly and authoritatively revealed in the natural world, the Scriptures are required as corrective lenses for reinterpreting natural revelation after God (see Rom. 1:18ff;).  Presuppositionalism does not rely on human wisdom to persuade the unbeliever.  Rather it rests on the foolishness of the cross and the saving, regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, without which no one can believe (1 Cor. 1:18—25; 2:14).  Presuppositionalism makes the self-attesting Word of Christ its final authority, seeking to bring the sinner’s intellect in submission to the Lordship of God in Christ.  Classical and evidential apologetics suggest that human reason is competent to authoritatively judge the veracity of Christ and his Word.  Therefore, of the three approaches to apologetics, presuppositionalism is most consistent with the faith that Christians are defending.    

Persecution and the Expansion of the Church

I must agree with Philip Schaff, that the “chief positive cause of the rapid spread and ultimate triumph of Christianity is to be found in its own absolute intrinsic worth, as the universal religion of salvation, and in the perfect teaching and example of its divine-human Founder.”[1]  Either Christ and his life and doctrine are final truth and reality or they are not.  These are the only two options.  Because the former is the veritable truth, the utter supremacy and sublimity of the Christian faith is its strongest draw card.  Regarding methodology, the Father has given an elect people to be his Son’s own; the Son accomplished their redemption and promised that “[he] will build [his] church” (Matt. 16:18), and this begins by the Holy Spirit descending on the “little flock,” to whom it is the Father’s “good pleasure to give…the kingdom” (Lk. 12:32).  The expansion of the early (or latter) church is ultimately the result of the infinite wisdom, plan, and power of its Author, the triune God.  Ultimately, therefore, the essential value and altogether worthiness of its Object of devotion, Jesus Christ, was, is, and always will be its final, ultimate means of growth. 

Of course, the synagogues, which scattered the Hebraic religion and worldview through the Roman Empire like seeds, and Roman highways, the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek (i.e., the Septuagint or LXX), the pax Romana or Peace of Rome, the degradation of the heathen moral and religious world, as well as the despaired condition Judaism after the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple all served, in the providence of God, as preparatory antecedents for the arrival of the kingdom in the Son of God, who came in the “fullness of time” (Gal. 4:4).  However, persecution appears to have been (and continues to be in many societies the Church finds herself in) the primary means of expansion.  The weighty and oft quoted words of early Church Father Tertullian are of a truth.  Speaking to the Roman rulers, “Nor does your cruelty, however exquisite, avail you; it is rather a temptation to us.  The oftener we are mown down by you, the more in number we grow; the blood of Christians is seed.”[2]  It was unflinching faith in the supremely worthy Christ that watered the seed of blood spilt by the martyrs.  “As war brings out the heroic qualities of men, so did the persecutions develop the patience, the gentleness, the endurance of Christians, and prove the world-conquering power of faith.”[3] One of the most faith-invigorating experiences I had in my earlier walk was reading through Foxe’s Book of Martyrs.  Learning of the legacy of suffering by grace through faith, upon which the Christian faith was built, really helped to put into perspective the minor resistances I had experienced in my own faith and evangelism. That season was one of great personal growth in faith.  Reading the early Church Fathers continues that growth today.

The Lord Jesus himself both prescribed and predicted this means in Matthew’s Gospel.  He prescribed to the disciple that when they were persecuted in one town or city to “flee to the next” and take with them the gospel there (Matt. 10:23).  Later, when pronouncing the seven woes on the Sanhedrin, Jesus predicted their persecution of the fledgling church would be “from town to town” (Matt. 23:34).  This is precisely the plan we see unfolding in the book of Acts, as the persecution which arose about Stephen “scattered” Christians throughout the surrounding regions, thus fulfilling the divine purpose for reaching the concentric mission fields laid out in Acts 1:8; “they that were scattered abroad went everywhere preaching the word” (Acts 8:4; cf. 8:1; 11:19).  Again, from Schaff, “History reports no mightier, longer and deadlier conflict that this war of extermination waged by the heather Rome against defenseless Christianity…Thus this bloody baptism of the church resulted in the birth of a Christian world.”[4]  In less than 300 years, by pouring out their own blood rather than the blood of others, the early church conquered the known world.  Are these means of missionary growth still in effect today?  Of course they are.  First, God’s glory, beauty, and infinite value cannot be diminished one iota.  And since Christ Jesus is the same yesterday, today, and forever, the intrinsic worth of the faith will continue to grow the Church.  Second, in most Two-Thirds countries, the Global South, persecution is the norm, and is one of the primary means of evangelism.  A visit to Voice of the Martyrs (www.persecution.com) or a reading of the outstanding biography of Sergei Kourdakov The Persecutor suffice to demonstrate this point.   

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[1] Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 2: Ante-Nicene Christianity A.D. 100—325, (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2006), 16.

[2] Tertullian, “The Apology,” pp. 17—55 in Ante-Nicene Fathers: Tertullian (I, II, III), vol. 3, (Peabody, Mass. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1994), 55, italics original.

[3] Schaff, History, 33, italics added.

[4] Ibid., 33, 32 respectively.

MEREDITH KLINE—THE TWO TABLETS OF THE COVENANT

Everyone should indulge himself or herself by reading Meredith Kline’s rich article “The Two Tablets of the Covenant,” from a 1960 edition of The Westminster Theological Journal.

Although the article has a great number of insights, one that was especially penetrating for me was the idea that the Ten Words, in their entirety, were inscribed on both of the tablets. Here is an excerpt from p. 139.

“These considerations point to the conclusion that each table
was complete in itself. The two tables were duplicate copies
of the covenant. And the correctness of this interpretation is
decisively confirmed by the fact that it was normal procedure
in establishing suzerainty covenants to prepare duplicate
copies of the treaty text.”

The Trilemma of the Atonement

Few theological questions can ignite a firestorm of controversy as easily as the question concerning the divine intent of Christ’s cross-work.  At the center of this issue is the query, for whose sins did Christ die?  This question creates a trilemma; only three answers are possible.  Christ’s death propitiated and satisfied for either (1) some of the sins of all people, (2) all of the sins of some people, or (3) all of the sins of all people.  The Reformed perspective of the intent of Christ’s death, that his death atoned for all of the sins of only some people, is the correct view of the atonement.

Option one (1), which states that Christ died for some of the sins of all people, is essentially the Roman Catholic position.  On this view, Christ’s death propitiated the wrath of God against humanity’s guilt of original sin.  Postbaptismal sins, however, must be atoned for through the efforts of the believer by means of good works.  This truncated view is utterly foreign to a biblical theology of what Christ’s death accomplished.  If option (1) is the case, then all people have innumerable sins for which Christ did not die. Consequently, no one is actually saved by Christ’s death, if option one is the case. 

         
Option two (2),the historic Reformed understanding of the atonement, holds that Christ died for all of the sins of some people.  These beneficiaries are variously related to Christ as “his people” (Matt. 1:21), his “friends” (Jn. 15:13), his “body” (Eph. 5:23—26), his “Bride” (Rev. 19:7), his “church” (Acts 20:28), and his “sheep” for whom he lays down his life (Jn. 10:11, 15).  In theological parlance, the term of choice is the “elect” (Rom. 8:32—34).  On this view, option two, Christ’s death efficaciously accomplished the full redemption of  some people, namely the elect. 

         
Option three (3) is that Christ died for all of the sins of all people without exception.  This view is held by Arminians and Amyraldians.  However, if Christ’s death was substitutionary and efficacious, and he died for all people, then it follows that all people are redeemed and thus saved.  The teaching that all are saved is called universalism.  Historic Christian orthodoxy precludes universalism as a biblically faithful conclusion.  The attempt to avoid the charge of universalism is often made by maintaining that while Christ died for all the sins of all men, a person’s unbelief is what ultimately condemns him or her.  It may be asked, however, is not unbelief also a sin?  If unbelief is a sin, then Christ also died for that sin, since he died for all sins, as presented by option three.  If, on the contrary, unbelief is not a sin, then it may be rightly asked why God condemns a person for it?  Hence, if option three is maintained, and Christ’s death was efficacious, then universalism is unavoidable.

The foregoing has demonstrated that, despite the heated controversy that is often invoked by the question of the intent of the atonement, two of the three horns of this logical trilemma are pointedly unbiblical.  If the choice is option one (1), then all are condemned, which is unbiblical.  If the choice is option three (3), then unbelief would be included as a sin for which Christ died, and thus universalism is the unavoidable conclusion.  This is likewise unbiblical. Therefore, it has been proved that only option two (2), which posits that Christ died for all of the sins of only some people, the historic Reformed view, is the correct view of the atonement.  Hence, only option two, the historic Reformed view of the atonement, offers theologically self-conscious, critical-minded Christians a logically consistent perspective of Christ’s atonement, one which also couches coherently within the broader edifice of orthodox Christian theology.

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Bibliography

Owen, John, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ. London: Banner of Truth, 1959.

New Exodus Typological Observations on Acts 12:1—24: Peter’s exodus and the judgment of Herod Agrippa I

1. Hints from the gospels (Matt and Lk). A Herod representing an antitypal Pharaoh has precedents in the early gospel traditions. Matt 2:13—18 provides a clear example of Herod serving as an antitypal Pharaoh, who tries to kill God’s firstborn Son, Jesus, True Israel.[1] Also, with great peculiarity, Luke, the author of our considered text, uses the term ἔξοδον "exodus" (Lk 9:31) to refer to Jesus’ death, resurrection, and exaltation he was about to “fulfill in Jerusalem” (πληροῦν ἐν ᾿Ιερουσαλήμ) (rightly so, NEB).

2. There is a broad framing of this pericope (Acts 12:1—24) that also serves to hint toward the original exodus. First, according to historical criticism, the story is a somewhat questionable, perhaps non-chronological interpolation couched between Paul and Barnabas commissioning and departure from the church in Antioch Syria (11:19—30) and their return from the famine relief mission to the Judean church(es) in 12:25. (There are dating questions with respect to the famine in Palestine [A.D. 41?] and the death of Agrippa I [A.D. 44?] that raise questions about the chronological ‘fit’ of the story of Peter’s imprisonment within the broader flow of the book.) Second, there is the conceptual inclusio that frames the pericope proper. This inclusio begins with Herod stretching out his hands in violence against the church; he killed James of Zebedee, and imprisoned Peter (vv. 1—3). The end cap of the story presents the angel of the Lord stretching out his hands and strikes Herod dead in poetic justice (think lex talionis, of course). A strikingly similar framework surrounds the first exodus story. Exodus 1 – 2 tell of Pharaoh’s tireless efforts to kill all the firstborn of Israel. This section of the book closes with Israel’s Mighty Warrior, YHWH, striking dead the firstborn of Pharaoh and all of Egypt (Ex 12:29—32). Luke, like Moses, frames his pericope with ironic judicial inclusio.

3. Another stirring feature of the narrative that evokes the exodus motif in the reader’s mind is the parenthetical clause of 12:3b, which disrupts the flow of the report. “…[Herod] proceeded to arrest Peter / This was during the days of Unleavened Bread / And when he had seized him…” (vv. 3, 4a, italics added). By the time of writing, the festival of Unleavened Bread and the Passover had nearly become the same event (compare with v 4c). This feature conjures all the cultic imagery of Ex 12:43—13:16. The feast of Unleavened Bread was to be perpetually kept by Israel so as to recapitulate the event when “By strength of hand the LORD brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage” (Ex 13:14b KJV, italics added). One can hardly imagine a more appropriate paradigm for the telling of Peter’s deliverance or exodus.

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[1]See Peter Leithart’s Jesus as Israel: The Typological Structure of Matthew’s Gospel here, http://www.leithart.com/pdf/jesus-as-israel-the-typological-structure-of-matthew-s-gospel.pdf

Lay It Up, Christian!

“If you live in the hope of much from the world you will be but like dreamers, that have an imaginary content in their sleep, but they meet with real disappointment when they awake; so when we expect much from the creature, we meet with nothing but burden, vanity, and vexation. Christians are to blame for continuing so long in uncertainties, because they do not get their own title confirmed: 1 Tim. 6:20, ‘Laying up in store for yourselves a good foundation against the time to come, that you may lay hold of eternal life.’ If you would make eternal life present to the soul, then lay up solid evidences. And mark, he speaks ‘laying up’ to note this work is always a doing; always we must be laying this foundation.”

—Thomas Manton, By Faith