Orr on Traditional Theistic Proofs

A God capable of proof would be no God at all; since this would mean that there is something higher than God from which His existence can be deduced.  But this applies not only to the ordinary reasoning of the deductive logic.  It does not apply to that higher kind of proof which may be said to consist in the mind being guided back to the clear recognition of its own ultimate pre-suppositions.  Proof in Theism certainly does not consist in deducing God’s existence as a lower from a higher; but rather in showing that God’s existence is itself the last postulate of reason—the ultimate basis on which all other knowledge, all other belief rests.

Orr, James, The Christian View of God and the World, (Grand Rapids: Kregel) 1989, 94..

Presuppositional Primer by Martin Jones

For anyone wanting to more capably and confidently defend the Christian worldview and commend the saving faith of Christ, I would recommend Martin Jones’ “The Futility of Non-Christian Thought.”  It is a great primer on the faithful apologetical approach of presuppositionalism, which posits Christ’s self-attesting Word as the final criterion of knowledge in all spheres of human experience.  Here is the opening paragraph.

Biblical Christianity, properly defined in terms of classical Protestantism, offers a radical philosophical critique of non-Christian thought. This Christian critique is radical in the sense that it challenges the very core of non-Christian pretensions and demonstrates that non-Christian thought, whether atheistic, agnostic, or religious, ultimately destroys rationality, science, ethics, and every other aspect of human experience. Continue reading...here.

No God, No Knowledge--Transcendental Argument from Knowledge

I. From Truth:

P1. If knowledge[1] is possible, then truth exists.[2]

P2. And if truth exists, then it exists as immaterial,[3] invariable,[4] and eternal.[5]

P3. Hence, if truth thus exists, then truth is absolute.[6]

P4. Likewise, if truth is the object and necessary condition of knowledge, and truth is absolute, then knowledge depends on the absolute.

P5. Truth indeed is the object and necessary condition of knowledge; and it is absolute.

C1. Thus, knowledge depends on the absolute.

C2. Therefore, if knowledge is possible, then knowledge depends on the absolute.

II. From Belief:

P1. Furthermore, if knowledge is possible, then it depends on a knowing subject who holds some belief.[7]

P2. In addition, if belief depends on a knowing subject, then such a one’s act of believing presupposes the involvement of the collective complex of intellect, emotion, and volition, which together constitute the personal.

P3. Moreover, knowledge is communicable.

C1. Hence, if knowledge is possible, then knowledge is communicable and thus depends on the personal.

III. From Justification:

P1. What's more, if the possibility of knowledge depends on a personal knower, then it likewise depends on the knower’s mental activity—it depends on mind.[8] 

P2. If the human mind, either individually or collectively, is the sufficient grounds for the integration of knowledge, then the human mind would also have to be absolute (i.e., invariable and eternal, see I:P2, 6); however, it is not the case that the human mind is thus.

P3. It is not the case, therefore, that the human mind, either individually or collectively, is the sufficient grounds for the integration and communication of knowledge.[9]

P4. Hence, if knowledge is possible, then by transcendental necessity there exists an absolute and personal being whose mind alone is the sufficient grounds for the integration of knowledge and can communicate knowledge.[10]

P5. Only the mind of the triune God of Christian theism, which alone is both absolute and personal, provides the transcendentally necessary and sufficient grounds for the integration and communication of knowledge.

P6. Therefore, if knowledge is possible, then by transcendental necessity the triune God of Christian theism exists as the transcendental integration point of all knowledge and communicates knowledge to humans.

P7. It is the case that knowledge is possible for humans.

C1. Therefore, the triune God of Christian theism must exist and communicate knowledge necessarily.  Hence, all knowledge and knowing is dependent of the triune God of Christian theism.

C2. Thus, the denial of God’s necessary existence is to annihilate the possibility of knowing anything at all; not least, that God’s existence can be known to be even the slightest degree doubtful.

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[1] Herein knowledge is to be understood in the traditional constitution of having three necessary conditions or properties, which are (1) belief that is (2) true, and the truth thereof having (3) justification, reason, or warrant.  The three of these together—a true, justified belief—are thus the sufficient condition of knowledge.  Furthermore, the term truth is to be taken in the sense of the correspondence theory of knowledge.   Truth is a real relation or correspondence between a signifier and that which it signifies, between a proposition and some fact, state of affairs, or event to which it refers. 

[2] The statement “truth does not exist” is an “I” categorical statement of the traditional square of opposition, making it to be an absolute negative statement.  Denying the existence of truth’s absolutivity is merely the contrary of its absolute affirmation; both statements, whereby, being absolute and declared to be true. That is to say, the proposition “truth exists” cannot be denied, for if one were right in asserting that “it is not the case that truth exists,” then one would be wrong, as that statement itself would be true, and absolutely so.  Hence, to deny the existence of truth is self-defeating—self-contradictory; it is false by declaration.

[3] Like the logical laws that govern them, propositions, which are the vehicles of truth, are immaterial entities.  One cannot grab, freeze, or stub his or her toe on truth.  In addition, truth is not dependant on particular statements or sentences.  The sentences “Kevin is Fanny’s husband” and “Fanny is married to Kevin” both express the same truth, the same proposition. 

[4] If a proposition is ever true, it has always been and always will be true.  For instance, certain statements that are “tenseless,” that is are closed by a particular temporal reference like “at 6:00 pm...” rather than a tensed verb like “now” or “was,” denote a fact or state of affairs that is always true. So,  “At 8:00 am on January 26, 2009 it is (tenseless) snowing in Big Island, VA.” is a closed statement having a meaning that is true always; its truth is unchanging—invariable.

[5] The eternality of truth is related closely to the invariability of truth in fn. 4 and the existence of truth in fn. 2.  Since truth never changes, it’s invariable (fn. 4) and one cannot deny the existence of truth without affirming it (fn. 2), so too, a statement denying the eternality of truth would presuppose truth’s existence and if the statement was true it would always be so, thus eternally so.  Hence, denying truth’s eternality is to affirm it.  Therefore, it’s self-defeating to deny the eternality of truth.

[6] The eternality and invariability of truth constitutes its absolutivity.  Furthermore, truth is independent of any relative or particular knower or thing known.  The laws of logic, for example, are true without reference to any particular object.  So, knowledge does not judge truth rather truth is the transcendent standard by which all knowledge is judged as such (see fn. 1).  Therefore, truth is absolute.

[7] Again, “belief” is one of the three necessary conditions of knowledge.

[8] Granted, there are a number of materialist, physicalist or anti-metaphysicians who have attempted to either flatly deny the existence of “mind” as an immaterial reality of human nature or have strenuously sought to explain it in materialistic, functional categories.   This presentation, let alone footnote, is not the venue to attempt a rebuttal to these claims.  Many philosophers have elsewhere undermined these hypothesises and shown them to be most untenable, Thus, I refer the reader to them.  Nevertheless, given the validity of the foregoing argument and conclusions, an immaterial mind seems self-evidently necessary for the residency of immaterial truth, which has been seen to exist as a real entity.  And the reduction of mind and reason to mere physical functions of the brain alone (i.e., chemical events) is to annihilate any possibility of knowledge at all, since it would make “reason” and “truth” to have no more axiological force than other bodily functions.

[9] There is among “spirituality” and para-psychology in the West today the increasing hope, even foundational hope in the collective human consciousness.  Perhaps premise III: P4 would be meet with a challenge from the likes of them or a similar camp.  And in today’s pluralistic landscape of worldview, such a challenge must be taken seriously and addressed as such, however absurd it may seem—but again, not here.  The notion that a disintegrated collection of mutable and fractured parts can comprise an absolute, unchanging, eternal whole is simply nonsensical.  So, an attempt to argue that it could would be mere morosophy.

[10] The first conclusion of section III, P5, undoubtedly will be met by the strongest contradiction from the unbelieving opponent.  Psychologically speaking, this is exactly what should be expected.  The unbeliever’s problem with his or her professing belief in the true God is much more a moral issue than an intellectual one. (I would argue that the concepts of intellect, emotions, and volition, which are often seen in very sharp distinction from one another in the modern West, are nearly conflated into a unity that is seen as the whole person; one domain never acting apart from the others, in Scripture.)  Intellectually speaking, this statement squarely faces and unequivocally challenges the unbeliever’s intellectual autonomy.  Thinking themselves to be utterly independent in reference to his or her ability to rightly reason and sit in intellectual judgment over the question of God’s existence, the unbeliever is immediately (and psychologically) confronted with the necessary conclusion that such a presumption  would be categorically impossible.  It is this goad, then, at which he or she will kick the hardest.  There is no other answer, however.  Either, it is the triune God who speaks with absolute authority in Christ and the Scriptures or it is nothing, literally, nothing. 

Right Reasoning, pt. VII, The Transcendental Argument

VII. The Transcendental Argument (TA hereafter)

A.1. Formally stated:

1. In order for phenomenon P to be the case, Q must also be the case, since Q is the necessary precondition of P.
2. P is the case.
3. Therefore, Q is necessarily the case.

A.2. Defined:

“[A TA is] an argument that elucidates the conditions for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon whose existence is unchallenged or uncontroversial in the philosophical context in which the argument is propounded. Such an argument proceeds deductively, from a premise asserting the existence of some basic phenomenon (such as meaningful discourse, conceptualization of objective states of affairs, or the practice of making promises), to a conclusion asserting the existence of some interesting, substantive enabling conditions for that phenomenon” (The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 925).

“Transcendental arguments seek to answer scepticism by showing that the things doubted by the sceptic are in fact preconditions for the skepticism to make sense. Hence the skepticism is either meaningless or false. A transcendental argument works by finding the preconditions of meaningful thought or judgment. For example, scepticism about other minds suggests that only the thinker themselves might have sensations. A transcendental argument which answered this scepticism would show that a precondition for thinking oneself to have sensations is that others do so as well. Expressing the scepticism involves thinking oneself to have sensations; and the argument shows that if this thought is expressible, then it is also false” (Ross Harrison, “Transcendental Arguments,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 9:452).

A word on TAs and the Van Tilian presuppositional apologetic by Dr. Gregory Bahnsen:

“The term “transcendental” should not be confused with the similar sounding word “transcendent” (an adjective for whatever goes beyond human experience). Transcendental reasoning is concerned to discover what general conditions must be fulfilled for any particular instance of knowledge to be possible; it has been central to thinkers such as Aristotle and Kant, and it has become a matter of inquiry in contemporary, analytically minded philosophy. [Cornelius] Van Til asks what view of man, truth, language and the world is necessarily presupposed by our conception of knowledge and our methods of pursuing it. For him, the transcendental answer is supplied at the very first step of man’s reasoning—not by autonomous philosophical speculation, but by transcendent revelation from God” (Van Til’s Apologetic, 5—6, n10).

B. 1. Illustrated form the pedestrian example of necessary conditions—fire:

i. In order for this (P) house fire to have occurred, there necessarily had to have been (Q) an ignition source.

ii. (P) the house fire did occur.

iii. Therefore, (Q) there was necessarily an ignition source (as oxygen, fuel, and ignition are individually necessary conditions for fire; taken together, they provide the sufficient condition).

B. 2. Illustrated from Logic:

(Granting the mislogical atmosphere of the spirit of our age, this example, which dates back to Aristotle, is quite practical.)

i. In order for our (P) debate over the laws of logic to be possible, the (Q) law of non-contradiction, a most fundamental logical law, must necessarily exist, since its denial makes debate unintelligible.

ii. It is the case (P) that we are debating.

iii. Therefore, (Q) the law of non-contradiction, the precondition of debate, must also exist, and exist necessarily.

B. 3. Illustrated from the three-word heart of Van Til’s thought—“Antitheism presupposes theism”:

i. In order for (P) an objective, universal standard of morality to exist—one in which Christianity’s critics could use to judge the God’s dealings with the nations of Canaan—(Q) the God of Christian theism must exist necessarily, since he alone provides the precondition of objective, universal standard of morality.

ii. The antitheists insist upon (P) just such a standard of morality.

iii. In so doing, therefore, (Q) the God of Christian theism is presupposed as the necessary condition of the very criticisms that the antitheist would invoke to argue that God doesn’t exist.

This concludes our series on valid arguments. It is our prayer that you’ve been blessed by this cursory summary, and thereby you will be better equipped to serve, love and glorify God in Christ with all you mind!

Blessings on the you, the people of the living God!