Dear Mr. and Mrs. Naturalism, Whatever Your First Name May Be

Begin by considering this.  If our brains are merely a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli, in accord with the laws of physics, biology and chemistry (whatever ‘laws’ may be in a materialistic universe), then true beliefs are illusory, since these beliefs would be only the consequences of these bits of matter reacting with other bits of matter in ways predetermined by antecedent material causes.  It seems inescapable that, according to materialism, our brains are just a random collection of atoms, which behave according to physical laws and predetermined antecedents.  It follows necessarily, then, that true beliefs are illusory, not least the belief in materialism. 

More than that, if the materialists’ perspective is correct, and our reason is reducible to brain stuffs, working as described above, then a subject’s seeming favorable attitude and volitional commitment to any ‘belief’ would likewise be determined not by meaningful reflection and rational deliberations but by material-only antecedents.  So, on your view, I don’t believe beliefs signify anything personal or rational, but are best understood to be sensational effects of purely material causes.   On materialism, I can find no grounds for believing in belief.   

At any rate, what difference this makes is insignificant in terms of materialism.  For like beliefs, truth—the object of knowledge—cannot exist within the context of the materialists’ world.  Truth itself is immaterial.  Moreover, it is eternal.  For instance, there never was nor ever will be a time in which the law of non-contradiction was or could be false.  This fact also points to the immutability and absoluteness of truth.  In a materialists’ world the only thing that enjoys these attributes—immateriality, eternality, immutability, absoluteness—is the fact that there is no ontological (or even logical) residency for such, and therefore no home for truth, thus leaving knowledge homeless as well. 

Your primary problem is rooted in your epistemological autonomy.  Granting your faith commitment to metaphysical naturalism and materialism, in your strivings for knowledge, you are left with and only with the epistemological perspective of pure empiricism.  This leads into a number of problems of significant proportion. 

           

Firstly, empiricism cannot stand the rigors of its own criteria for knowledge, e.g., “Knowledge comes only through sense perception.” The truth of this proposition is not itself something known through sense perception and observation.  Empiricism, ultimately, can tell us nothing about the future, since the future is yet to be observed, and all knowledge is reducible to observation through the senses.  Closely related is the fact that your man David Hume observed, namely that the cause and effect relationships presupposed by empiricists are (obviously!) not subject to empirical observation, analyses and/or verification, and therefore cannot be known, according to the rigors of empiricism.  At best, two events or states of affairs, what are commonly called “brute facts,” occurring in close relation to one another are mere coincidence, happenstance, without any meaningful relation.

Moreover, pure empiricism’s history cannot even agree about the metaphysical reality we’re supposedly observing.  Locke rendered “substance” to be inexplicable; Berkeley decided to simply do away with material reality; but, who really cares, since Hume discovered that there was no mental/immaterial self to do the observing!  Even if a consensus were established, it makes little difference, since empiricism, presuming the principle of induction, and not having an internally coherent justification always begs the fundamental question.  An eminent spokesperson of your stripe understood this much.

It has been argued that we have reason that we know that the future will resemble the past, because what was the future has constantly become the past.  But such an argument really begs the very question at issue...We have therefore still to seek for some principle which shall enable us to know that the future will follow the same laws as the past (Burtrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy [New York, NY: Barnes and Noble, 2004] 45).

Naturalists make much of ‘verification.’ However, the argument for empirical verification breaks a formal law of logic, and is therefore always fallacious.  It goes like this: If hypothesis P, then effect Q will result; Q was the result, therefore P is verified and may be considered ‘theory’ or ‘law.’  This is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.  Because every line of verification must proceed thus, no method of verification is logically valid or sound.  Besides this, if truth were dependent upon verification, then we’d never know anything to be true, since every verification would itself need verification, ad infinitum.  Empiricism has no answer to the problem of an infinite regress in establishing epistemic justification.  Furthermore, empiricism cannot verify, much less account for, the abstract, absolute, universal, and invariable logical laws and concepts it takes for granted. 

It may be added that empiricism leads to solipsism.  Empiricism begins, is checked, and ends with the subject’s mere (brute) perceptions; and, those perceptions can only be verified by other perceptions, thus leading to solipsism.  The epistemology which most loudly boasts objectivity actually eliminates genuine knowledge of any reality outside oneself—crass subjectivism.  Additionally, our senses are often deceptive, and empiricism provides no means of determining which and how the data should be filtered. 

Finally, empiricism is destroyed by means of the so-called ‘problem of criterion.’  Empiricism is an epistemological ‘method’ for investigating reality; it is a chosen criterion for judging and verifying claims made about what ultimate reality truly is.  The problem comes when one asks, “How do we know that empiricism is the proper criterion for evaluating reality, one that truly corresponds with reality?”  You see, empiricists would already have to know in advance, and exhaustively so, what reality is ultimately like before they would ever be able to identify their epistemological method.  But, they tell us that such is only achievable by means of their method, empiricism.  The point is: You must already presuppose your metaphysical perspective (i.e., materialism) in advance before ever selecting your method of investigation—you must first make a faith commitment.  This, ironically, is the very thing for which you attempt to mock Christians.  Therefore, I believe it apropos to cite Psalm 7:14—15 as a proper acclamation for the antitheistic position:  “Behold, he travaileth with iniquity, and hath conceived mischief, and brought forth falsehood.  He made a pit, and digged it, and is fallen into the ditch which he made.”

Granting all this—making the concept of beliefs unbelievable, making truth a cosmological hobo, and by faith in a false metaphysical construct, making epistemic justification unjustifiable—your materialism, like the mute pagan idols of antiquity, make the idol of autonomous human reason, in a word, dumb. 

It was the Puritan Richard Baxter who declared, “Nothing can be rightly known, if God be not known.”  So, I suppose in a sense the above arguments are simply support for this unpretentious dictum.  The good news is that in the fullness of time God the Father sent forth his Son, Christ Jesus, to live such a life and die such a death and be resurrected in such a glory that rebels like you and I, by faith—not in our own will and reason independent of God; instead—in Jesus’ Name, offices, and work alone we might be saved.  That is, that we might be saved from God’s righteous judgment against our cosmic treason and rebellion, and restored to a right standing before him and relationship with him, having peace with God through Christ by the Holy Ghost. 

In addition, Jesus saves us from the various expressions of our sinful reasoning, such as naturalistic/materialistic antitheism.  Such false constructs lead straightway to epistemological self-destruction, as I believe foregoing succinctly demonstrates.  By the mercies of God in Christ, however, the Holy Ghost begins his work of transformation, which includes not least the renewing of our minds, recreating us in true knowledge and righteousness and holiness, after the image of him who created us, and thus conforming us into the image of Christ.  So, I am not inviting you to have faith at the expense of reason.  Rather, I am inviting you to a faith other than the one that you have now, antithetically other in fact.  This faith, faith in the Logos, Christ Jesus and his self-attesting Word, does not disparage reason; no, this faith is the only one that can save reason, just as it is the only one that can save sinners, like you and like me.

Machen on Apologetics

“In trying to remove from Christianity everything that could possibly be objected to in the name of science, by trying to bribe off the enemy by those concessions which the enemy most desires, the apologist has really abandoned what he started out to defend...The things that are sometimes thought to be hardest to defend are also the things that are most worth defending."

J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1923) pp. 7-8.

Unloading the Debate: An Apologetical Allegory

To what might we compare the debate between the Christian and Naturalist worldviews? We can liken it to a tractor-trailer driver delivering to Georgia Pacific in Big Island.

As Debbie, our driver, descended southward down route 501, something on a nearby mountainside caught her attention. Approaching the plant, Debbie recognized the mountainside diversion as a series of large rocks arranged to read, “WELCOME TO BIG ISLAND.”

Debbie thought to herself, “There are really only two hypotheses that can account for how those rocks obtained their arrangement on the mountainside. Either they came to rest in that position by means of purely impersonal, non-purposeful natural causes; or the rocks are the result of a personal, purposeful agent who works according to a good plan.”

Setting the bigger question aside for a moment, Debbie knew that whatever their cause, the rocks confirmed that she had finally reached her destination.

While being unloaded, Debbie met Greg, another driver. Soon their conversation turned to the rocks.

“You know,” Greg started, “before I drove a truck, I was in the construction business, and anyone who has the ability pull off something like that has my greatest respect. I know people might say, ‘Big deal, it’s just a bunch of rocks,’ but something like that requires intelligence and skill that very few have.”

“Greg,” Debbie interrupted, “I don’t mean to contradict, but before I started driving, I went to grad school and minored in geology. If you think that something like that overgrown rock garden can’t exist but for personal design, then you just need to go to the library a little more. There are many things in nature much more complex than that rock-pile that are caused by purely natural means.” She concluded, “A naturalistic explanation is quite possible.”

“In theory, I suppose the natural explanation might be possible,” Greg concurred. “Nevertheless, simply because something is theoretically possible, it certainly doesn’t follow that the theory is true. Whether either of us is willing to admit it or not,” Greg continued, “we’re assuming the truth of our respective hypotheses, even when arguing for them. You actually start with the non-purposeful, impersonal conclusion you’re supposed to argue for; and I begin assuming the truth of the personal, purposeful explanation that I’m to argue for. It would seem therefore that neither will convince the other of their position.”

“Well, then,” Debbie said with resolution, “I guess we’ve reached an impasse. You believe the rocks are the result of some imaginary person; and I think that we needn’t venture beyond the ‘fact’ of the rocks, looking for some mysterious purpose or person. The naturalist view tells us all we need to know about the rocks!”

Optimistically, Greg pressed a bit. “Debbie, I think we can resolve our disagreement. Well, at least resolve which hypothesis is the rational one.”

Debbie, seeming a bit skeptical, agreed to consider the solution. “I’m all ears, Greg.”

“One question is all that’s needed to determine which hypothesis is rational. So let me ask you, Debbie: When you finally arrived here, did you think that the arrangement of stones communicated something independent of themselves?”

“I don’t follow your logic, Greg.”

“Put simply, if you hold that the rock arrangement is merely the result of natural causes, without any intelligent, personal plan behind it; but then, when you saw the rocks you believed that they communicated an intelligible, reliable message—that you were in fact entering Big Island—then your belief in the naturalistic hypothesis is silly, in a word, irrational. Is that better?”

“Interesting,” Debbie said, “well, look, we’re both unloaded…It’s been nice talking, Greg.”

So it is also with the debate between atheistic Naturalism and Christian theism. Both worldviews come to the ‘facts’ of experience interpreting them through their respective pre-commitments. The former, Naturalism, argues that the universe is ultimately impersonal, non-purposeful and random. The latter, Christianity, begins with its fundamental commitment to the absolute-personal Creator-Controller-Redeemer God. Both argue that their worldview fits the facts of human experience, not least, the fact that our sensory organs give us true and intelligible information about the world of experience (independent of themselves), and that our reasoning ability provides a reliable means of ciphering and systemizing that information, that message (which we believe exists independent of our minds).

However, without even skirting the questions, Naturalists simply presume these things and then go on to use them (rationalism) to build a worldview that makes them impossible (irrationalism). For if Naturalism’s the case, then human sense perception and reason are simply part of an infinite series of non-purposeful, impersonal, unguided accidents. But if that’s so, there is quite literally no reasonable grounds for believing that our senses and reason provide any meaningful information about anything.

Therefore, as Greg said in other terms, atheistic Naturalism is simply irrational.

Naturalistic vs. Christian Theistic Views of History

Here is a letter by my editorial-adversary, David McLoughlin. He normally attacks the faith in the Bedford Bulletin, and keeps his political morosophy restricted to the Lynchburg, VA News & Advance. Last week, however, he stepped out side the box a bit and submitted this in Lynchburg. So, of course, I couldn’t allow the opportunity to pass. As of today, my response letter is still forthcoming.

History’s ‘what-ifs’

Letter writers frequently refer to the U.S. as a “Christian nation” or declare our “exceptionalism” — neither of which is true. Our heritage is as much the result of accident as it is of our own determination. Consider just a couple of the “what ifs” of history and think how fragile the outcomes were and what might have been.

After Muhammad’s establishment of Islam, it spread rapidly across North Africa resulting in the Moors ruling Spain for 700 years. In 1492, the Moors were finally defeated at Granada and ultimately driven out. What if the Moors had won at Granada?

Soon thereafter Spain began its exploration of the New World which included both North and South America. If the Muslims rather than Christians had been in control, Islam, not Christianity, may have dominated the Americas. The Spanish influence from Mexico south is still recognizable today. Our largest minority will soon be Hispanic. While my pure speculation may be of interest only to those who recognize the fragility and accidental character of history, it does suggest that we ought not to be so smug and certain of the reasons that provide the foundation of our characteristics today. We are as much an accident of history as any other nation and, as such, should accept that our destiny might have been much different. The Middle East is the result of the English drawing lines in the sand after World War I, and we are still living with that disaster.

The U.S. is important today as much because of the rich resources we inherited and the two oceans and two friendly countries on our borders as for our own efforts. While it’s true we are predominately Christian by numbers, thankfully we are a secular nation by our Constitution. Could it have been different if the Muslims had won at Granada? Sure. Most U.S. Christians might have been Muslim just like they would have been Hindu if born in India. Imagine a Muslim Liberty University.

My point, of course, is that we are the product of our history as fragile as that is, and a more worldly view, as opposed to an ethnocentric myopia, would serve us well as we participate in a multicultural world.

If people dislike the U.S., it’s not because of our wealth, but because of our attitudes and actions toward people of other nations.

DAVID McLOUGHLIN

Historical Whatnots?

I am compelled to identify the latent comic relief in David McLoughlin’s, “History’s ‘what-ifs’ (Letters to the Editor, Wednesday, 03/10). Although his premises and conclusions had serious intentions, attempting to wed these produces some slapstick philosophy. While McLoughlin admited his “pure speculation” would likely impress only those who share his outlook, he imposed his criticisms and conclusions upon everyone.

The undercurrent of this letter is what’s known as metaphysical determinism. That is, a view of final reality that starts with a blind, undirected universe, consisting of only physical stuffs—like humans and nations. These stuffs move through history, controlled purely by fixed natural laws. Prior physical stuffs, working in accord with these fixed natural laws produce “fragile...accidental” features with no unifying, purposive beginning, meaning or end.

Mindful of this, consider McLoughlin’s central what-if: “What if the Moors had won Granada?”

If peoples and nations are simply material stuffs, aimlessly determined by impersonal natural law, then one could rightly ask, What do you mean, “What-if”? Does he mean, ‘What if’ natural law was temporarily suspended in order to bring about an alternate product to that which all the historical and physical antecedent causes had predetermined (I owe kudos to Steve for this line of criticism)? This is ironically similar to C. S. Lewis’ definition of miracles. Natural miracles, Mr. McLoughlin? Hilarious.

Historical “what-ifs” make sense only if there is an absolute-personality Who, knowing all possible choices, deliberates and governs according to His plan and purposes. Thankfully, there is. “For kingship belongs to the LORD, and he rules over the nations” (Psalm 22:28). McLoughlin’s “What-ifs” are intelligible only if the very Christianity he despises were true.

Secondly, he admitted that his observations were conjectural, but from these he goes on to insist, “we ought...we should.” These are moral terms. It is plain silliness to say that persons are the “accidental” outcome of blind historical and natural forces, and then speak of moral obligations. If McLoughlin’s correct, we may describe what “is” the case, but never prescribe what “ought” to be the case. Morality, Mr. McLoughlin? Uproarious.

Finally, McLoughlin presumes, on the one hand, that peoples’ choice of religion is sociologically determined. Nevertheless, even in making this claim, he, on the other hand, understands himself and his position free from such a morass, and thus culturally neutral. Sounds somewhat funny doesn’t it? Exactly.

McLoughlin, from his own culturally relative, predetermined social construct within a blind, impersonal historical flux, makes the moral demand that the rest of us, namely Christians, make the objective, personal, ethically meaningful choice to transcend our socially determined biases. Sidesplitting!

Only if Christianity is true, could McLoughlin’s request be performed.


KEVIN STEVENSON

Right Reasoning, pt. IV, The Hypothetical Syllogism

Yet another valid form of Right Reasoning...

IV. The Hypothetical Syllogism

A. Formally stated:

1. If P, then Q;
2. If Q, then R;
3. If R, then S,
4. Therefore, if P, then S

B. 1. Illustrated from epistemology:

i. If (P) knowledge is possible, then (Q) truth exists.

ii. If (Q) truth exists [and truth is absolute], then (R) truth requires an absolute mind [since truth is absolute and is mental activity].

iii. If (R) truth requires an absolute mind, then (S) knowledge is dependant on an absolute-personal being [since mind is a property of persons].

iv. Therefore, if (P) knowledge is possible, then (S) knowledge is dependant on an absolute-personal being, and that being can only be the God of Christian theism.

B. 2. Illustrated from (anti-) ethics:

i. If (P) Naturalism is true, then (Q) then nothing exists beyond natural phenomena.

ii. If (Q) nothing exists beyond natural phenomenon, then (R) morality must have its basis in natural phenomena.

iii. If (R) morality must have its basis in natural phenomena, then (S) scientific investigation is the only method of detecting morals.

iv. If (S) scientific investigation is the proper method for detecting morals, then (T) we’re left with only descriptions [i.e., “what is the case”], never prescriptions of behavior [i.e., “what ought to be the case”].

v. If (T) we’re left with only descriptions of behavior, never prescriptions [and we can’t move from “is” to “ought” – Hume], then (U) morality is impossible.

vi. If (U) morality is impossible, then (V) there is no morally significant reason one ought to believe anything at all.

vii. Therefore, if (P) Naturalism is true, then (V) no one ought to believe it.

C. Fallacy factor:

With the hypothetical syllogism, we risk postulating relations between antecedent (the “if” clause) and consequent (the “then” clause) that either are not obvious or not there at all. In fact, the hypothetical syllogism is most helpful for demonstrating the truth of more general propositions, such as, “There is no reason to believe Naturalism,” through a chain of causal or logical relations.

Right Reasoning, pt. I: Modus Ponens

I’m now taking the time to offer that list of valid forms of arguments promised weeks ago. I’ll offer them one post at a time, due to the space it takes to illustrate and explain them.

As Christians, we are morally obligated to reason correctly. Reliable patterns of reason are reflections of the way God thinks, thus we are to reflect that reality in all our reasoning. The Christian theory of ethics is inextricably tethered to the Christian theory of knowledge (epistemology), which, likewise, is bound-up in the Christian theory of being (metaphysics). If Christ is Lord, he has authority over not only our actions, but our thinking as well, by virtue of Who and What he is. This especially since, our thinking is the loamy soil from which our actions spring, hence revealing what we truly believe.

Valid argument, moreover, is necessary for persuasive, winsome apologetics and evangelism. If a soft-minded unbeliever is persuaded by means of the many invalid arguments Christians often use, while the end may be worth celebration, the means are perfectly unacceptable.

The following will not be an exhaustive list, to be sure; but it is a foundation. Most arguments we (should) use or encounter will roughly follow one form or another.

Not only does knowing and utilizing valid patterns of reasoning help us to frame the message and defense of the gospel in a cogent, truthful way. It also helps us to recognize the fallacious reasoning that inevitably follows in the arguments of the non-Christians working on their own unbelieving presuppositions.


I. Modus Ponens (Latin, lit. “The mode of putting”):

A. Formally stated:

1. If P is the case, then Q is also the case;
2. P is the case;
3. Therefore, Q is also the case.

B. 1 Illustrated from Naturalistic presuppositions:

i. If (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry, then (Q) true beliefs are illusory, since beliefs are only the consequences of these bits of matter reacting with other bits of matter in ways predetermined by antecedent material causes.

ii. It is, according to Naturalism, the case that (P) our brains are a random collection of atoms, responding to various stimuli according to the laws of physics, biology and chemistry.

iii. Therefore, (Q) true beliefs are illusory, not least a belief in Naturalism.

B. 2. Illustrated from Scripture:

(I.e., Jesus’ response to John the Baptist’s messengers, logically confirming that Jesus was the Coming One, the Messiah. See Matt 11:1—5 // Lk 7:18—22)

i. If I [Jesus] am (P) giving sight to the blind, granting the lame to walk, cleansing lepers, making the deaf to hear, raising the dead, and preaching the good news of the gospel of the Kingdom to the poor, then (Q) I am the One who was to come, the Messiah, since the Old Covenant promised that these works would accompany the Messiah’s ministry.

ii. Tell John what you see and hear, namely that (P) the blind receive their sight, et cetera...

iii. Therefore, John has his assurance; (Q) I am the Messiah, promised in the Old Covenant, whom also his ministry proclaimed.

B. 3 Illustrated from the crux pro-life argument:

i. If (P) the pre-born are innocent human beings, then (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.

ii. (P) The pre-born are innocent human beings (biblically, biologically and embryologically speaking).

iii. Therefore, (Q) non-therapeutic abortion is murder.

C. The fallacy factor:

With respect to modus ponens and modus tollens (see below in next post) there is always the risk of committing a formal fallacy. In the case of modus ponens, we risk the common error of ‘affirming the consequent.’ This needs some explanation.

In logic, the “If...then” construction is known as a conditional statement. Conditionals are then broken into two parts: The antecedent is the “If...” clause, whereas the consequent is the “then...” clause.

In a valid expression of modus ponens, the antecedent is affirmed or asserted in the second premise. However, if the consequent is affirmed, the argument is made invalid and the conclusion doesn’t follow. To use a classic example:

1. If (P) the roads are icy, then (Q) the mail will be late.
2. (Q) The mail is late.
3. Therefore, (P) the roads are icy.

Of course, it is possible that the conclusion is true; the roads may be icy, thus causing the mail to be late. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not the result of a valid, reliable line of reasoning; it’s mere coincidence.

Only months ago, I had a former co-worker argue for the truth of astrology this way.

“Yesterday, my horoscope said (P) that I’d meet an old lover and rekindle the spark. Then, lo and behold, (Q) I ran into ol’ Billy Bob at the bar, and we had a real good time, if you get my drift! How can you doubt the truth of this, then, Kevin? If (P), then (Q); it was the case that (Q), therefore (P) is true!”

I attempted to explain to Debbie that her reasoning didn’t follow; her argument was a non sequitur. She responded. “I don’t know about all your P’s and Q’s, I just know that Billy Bob and I had a real good time!”

D. Valid, yet unsound:

It is quite possible to also use a modus ponens to create a valid argument that is still false. An argument’s validity, as we have labored to show, has to do with following rules and patterns of reliable inference, logical laws. Still, one may produce a false conclusion by means of a valid form of argument. Consider how a nosey neighbor could reason validly, yet end with a false conclusion.

1. If (P) John is late coming home from work, then (Q) John is committing adultery against his wife, Sara.

2. (P) John is late coming home from work!

3. Oh my! (Q) John is having an affair! Quick, call Joan!

The argument follows the valid form of a modus ponens, yet the conclusion is false. The nosey neighbor’s first premise is faulty, the counterfactual being, John had a blow-out on his way home from work. And because a premise on which the conclusion rests is flawed, the conclusion is also flawed; the argument is unsound.

Therefore, we must watch for both a valid form of modus ponens, avoiding the fallacy of affirming the consequent and drawing conclusions from faulty premises, thus avoiding unsoundness. These things we must watch first in our own reasoning and then in the reasoning of others (Matt 7:1—5). For: If we can’t recognize proper patterns of argument in our own reasoning, then neither will we be able to critique that of others...well you should know how the rest goes by now.

Apologetic Application of Two Classics

Over the last couple of days I’ve posted two of my favorite’s from classic literature: The Emperor’s New Clothes by the Dane, Hans Christian Anderson (A.D. 1805—1875) and “The Eagle and the Arrow”, attributed to the Samian slave “Aesop” (c. mid-6th century B.C.). I do this because they are relevant to our recent discussion of apologetics.

Both the fable and the allegory are pregnant with applications for our apologetic practice; here I’ll mention only the obvious.

I. Concerning The Emperor’s New Clothes:

1. Over the last two centuries, our culture has been visited by two rogue Weavers: Metaphysical Naturalism in the fields of science and philosophy, and her ugly twin sister, Secular Humanism in the areas of education and polity.

2. Western society (sadly much of the visible Church also) has been duped by these two swindlers. Both have claimed that those who won’t see the truth of their systems are either “unfit for the office they hold," or are "incorrigibly stupid.”

3. The Intelligentsia of the Academy (e.g., secular universities) have spun a weave around every discipline of the field of education. If one wants to retain their tenure, they must pretend to see the truth and value of evolutionary antitheism in every domain. Any idea that Darwinism may not be absolute, apodicticly certain fact will render one’s aptitude to teach as “unfit,” thus loosing their position. Moreover, any student that will not bow to the dogamtics of Darwinism is academically flayed as being “incorrigibly stupid.”

4. Secular Humanism is, say the Weavers, the only “neutral ground” between religious factions, each of whom would have their own brand of morality running the socio-political show. But, the delusion follows. Secular Humanism is a world and life view in its own right. It is an overarching theory of everything that enjoys governmental protection and immediate legislative power, which is then imposed upon the whole of society. It is not “morally/religiously neutral” but a moral and religious dogma. (For a succinct examination and critique of Secular Humanism, see Steve Galt’s series of posts, beginning here.)

5. It is the solemn duty of every Christian (2 Cor 10:3—5) to destroy these two strongholds that bulwark our depraved society against the gospel of Christ. When everyone you meet is saying, “How incomparable are the Emperor’s new clothes! What a train he has to his mantle! How it fits him!” As J.C. Ryle has said, “We [Christians] have the truth and we needn’t be ashamed to say it!” We should, then, be like the innocent little lad in Anderson’s story, being the one’s who have the honesty to say, “But these worldviews have nothing on!” (Rom 3:4).

II. Concerning The Eagle and the Arrow:

1. Since only the Christian worldview can provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility (e.g., the laws of logic, human dignity and freedom, causality, normative ethics, et cetera), it’s perfectly unacceptable to allow the non-Christian opponent to assume these while waging an attack on the faith. We should be faithful Christian skeptics.

2. Most approaches to apologetics will grant that, e.g., logical laws and reliable patterns of reason (which make sense in terms of the Christian worldview alone) can provide an agreed, authoritative, neutral point of contact, by which the two contrary positions may be evaluated.

3. But to grant the non-Christian opponent say, logic, is the fletch the very arrow with which he intends to shoot down our holy faith. Moreover, this subjects Christ's Self-attesting authority to another authority, which is nonsensical.

4. Non-Christian systems simply cannot provide the necessary grounding to make sense of the laws of logic, and therefore, must assume the truth of the Christian worldview in order to argue for its falsehood.

5. If we wish to see the Lordship of Christ fly over all, to the ends of the earth, it must begin with us and our approach to contrary systems and philosophies. We cannot give to Christ’s opponents the very weapons (e.g., logic, science, morality) with which to wages their attack.

Any further thoughts?

THE EVOLUTIONISTS’ DILEMMA

The transition from modernity and postmodernity has involved a radical shift in epistemology. However, within both paradigms, philosophical naturalism is the dominate metaphysical assumption. Therefore, the Christian’s need to be able to aptly confront and destroy the stronghold of the evolutionary hypothesis is always a fore issue.

In my experience, a frustration would often arise. This frustration was rooted in the nonbeliever's semantic sliding between two meanings of the term evolution. One the one hand, they will try in vain to argue for evolution in its etiological sense: Evolution explains the origins and sustention of everything. On the other hand, when this premise is being battered, they will quickly invoke some observational variations in a genus or the like, and then attempt to transfer the Christian’s concession of that point back into their argument for evolution in the etiological sense, what I call meta-evolution. They then want to point out that the Christian is anti-science in their rejection of meta-evolution.

Moreover, I’ve found that it is not always the case that this is overtly intentional on the part of the nonbeliever. That is, the nonbeliever is not equivocating the concepts self-consciously. A scanting look through any public science textbook will reveal the same method of persuasion; which, on the part of the textbook contributors, we must conclude however that the use of the equivocation is programmatic. Granting the natural man’s general enmity against God’s truth, the student takes the propaganda in as a fish does water. This argument can help in educating the nonbeliever of just how futile their underlying assumptions are.

Often, then, nonbelievers who have not engaged in the tough-mindedness required to see through the smoke of the intelligentsia are simply parroting what a minimum of 12 years of direct indoctrination has given them.

The only answer to bad reasoning is truth. I’ve found that the use of the dilemma--a valid form of argument--helpful in defusing this type of rhetoric.

Formally, the dilemma has the following pattern:

1. Either P or R

2. If P, then Q

3. If R, then S

4. Therefore, either Q or S

From here, one simply demonstrates from the conclusion (4) that Q and S are either irrelevant, unhappy, or absurd.

This is exactly what I attempt to do with the argument below. In short, microevolution is irrelevant since it is empirically demonstrable and perfectly consistent with biblical teaching; meta-evolution, however, is both a philosophical assumption and philosophically absurd. Therefore, neither concept presents a threat to the biblical doctrine of creation.

The next paragraph is a general framework for how I present my challenge to the evolutionist, though each dialogue must allow for vast personal variability. The more formal argument after it is incorporates an example of a redutio ad absurdum for deconstructing the meta-evolutionary premise. But again, this also requires some flexibility for viability. I hope you find it helpful.

The Thesis:

The evolutionary exponents are either unconsciously trading on ambiguity or are guilty of intentionally equivocating the term “evolution” in order to beguile their audience. Either way, it matters very little, for whether the evolutionary exponent prefixes the term “evolution” with “micro/macro” or “meta,”[1]and their respective connotations, neither concept threatens, much less circumvents the integrity of the basic biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

The Argument:

P1. When evolutionists use the term “evolution,” they are either denoting micro/macro-evolution or meta-evolution.

P2. If micro/macro-evolution is what is meant; that is, either minor or radical changes occurring within the constraints of the law of biogenesis, then surely no one is arguing, biblical creationist or otherwise.

P3. If meta-evolution is being assumed, however, then their argument is self-referentially incoherent, self-refuting; if they’re right, then they’re wrong. This premise is not only intuitively true,[2] but objectively so, for two major reasons:

If (A) “All that Is” is merely a random, impersonal, unconscious collision of atoms and their chaotic chemical interactions, then our brains are simply one minor part in this disorderly, irrational cosmic dance.

Nevertheless, if our brains are ultimately thus, then what we imagine to be “thoughts” and/or “reasoning” are only a façade, since the electro-chemical reactions occurring in our brains couldn’t have any more truth value and/or rational meaning than any other of our physiological happenings.[3]

Furthermore, if (B) matter is all that “Is,” then the fundamental laws that govern our thought—the laws of logic—could not exist. For such laws (i.e., logic, mathematics, morality, etc.) are immaterial and abstract (hence, contradicting “Matter is all there Is”); moreover they are absolute and invariable. (Thus, also contradicting the proposition the physical universe is all that exists, because the only absolute and unchanging feature of the physical universe is that it’s ever- changing, thus, never absolute!)

C1. If, therefore, meta-evolution is taken to be the case, then we have absolutely no reason for believing that it is true, since true thoughts and logical inferences would be impossible.

C2. When arguing for evolution, therefore, the proponents mean either micro/macro evolution, which no reasonable biblical creationist is arguing against; or they are promoting meta-evolution, which means that no proposition or state of affairs can honestly be called “true,” not least the proposition “Evolution is true”!

C3. Hence, the evolutionary case against biblical creationism is that a logical, reasoned case for or against anything is impossible, which is absurd.

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[1] By “meta”-evolution I am speaking of the Darwinian/neo-Darwinian garden variety etiology (i.e., founding myth), which is generally: something creating itself from nothing (or is eternal stuffs); then, all that “Is” must be understood and explained in terms of an eternal intercourse of matter, energy, and time, from which everything in human experience owes its origin, substance, and sustention.

[2] Numerous studies have demonstrated that even in the face of heavy indoctrination in Darwinian evolution by teachers and even parents, and apart from being exposed to the doctrine of biblical creation, children are bent toward understanding the universe to be designed and created with an ultimate telos intended by its Creator, God. That is to say, people are creationists by birth (via God’s general Self-revelation) and made to be evolutionists, as counterintuitive as that is.

[3] Note: we never stand up from the toilet and turn, point, and proclaim, “That is true!” If, then, evolutionary mythology is the case, neither should we point to any proposition about reality or any given state of affairs or concept and have the audacity to state, “That is true!”

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