While looking into Epicurus’ “no subject of harm” argument
against the fear of death (odd, I know; it’s for a developmental psychology project),
I stumbled across the top three arguments against epistemological skepticism in
the helpful article over at IEP. Because our post-modern culture glibly embraces
garden variety skepticism, it is prudent to keep a battery of such arguments
handy. Granted, Epicurean philosophy is
presuppositionally antithetical to Christian theism. However, we may “spoil the Egyptians” (Ex.
3:22), so to speak, and bring such arguments into the holy service of the
kingdom and her King by means of apologetical application. The second one is a common one in material
addressing relativism today. The first
argument, though, is fresh (for me anyways) and has a profundity beneath its
playful tone.
I.
The “Lazy Argument”
Epicurus says that it is
impossible to live as a skeptic. If a person really were to believe that he
knows nothing, then he would have no reason to engage in one course of action
instead of another. Thus, the consistent skeptic would engage in no action
whatsoever, and would die.
If a skeptic claims that
nothing can be known, then one should ask whether he knows that nothing
can be known. If he says ‘yes,’ then he is contradicting himself. If he doesn’t
say yes, then he isn’t making a claim, and we don’t need to listen to him.
If the skeptic says that
nothing can be known, or that we cannot know the truth, we can ask him where he
gets his knowledge of concepts such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth.’ If the senses [better,
cognitive faculties – KLS] cannot be relied on, as the skeptic claims, then he
is not entitled to use concepts such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ in formulating
his thesis, since such concepts derive from the senses.
